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Välkommen till ett kapitel ur e-boken Katastrofutredning.


'We cannot establish the truth; instead we can establish clarifications, better structure of the available information. The truth of past times is always difficult to establish and it requires that you have complete background information about all matters and such complete information does not exist'.

Björn Körlof, director general of the Swedish Board of Psychological Defence, 010423 (in Swedish Radio) after having been ordered by the Swedish government to create a 'fact bank' of 'Estonia' information not included in the Final report (5)  

1.49 Styrelsen för Psykologiskt Försvar 1996-2001 - Amiral Frank Rosenius

(Detta kapitel är skrivet på engelska men svensk översättning kommer så småningom).

The official disinformation of the 'Estonia' accident investigation took a new turn on 21 October 1996, when the Swedish government decided that the (Swedish) Board of Psychological Defence* - Styrelsen för Psykologiskt Försvar - (SPF) should handle the contacts of (all?) the authorities with the (Swedish) relatives of the victims. One year later the job was extended also to include contacts with the (Swedish) survivors. Otherwise the SPF apparently is the government authority to prepare and train Swedish authorities on public communications, spotting disinformation and revealing rumours in war, etc. Maybe a better name of the SPF should be the 'Board of Free Information Defence' or the 'Board of Media and Authority Communication Defence'. It is unfortunate that the government authority specialized in disinformation and rumours was chosen to handle the correct transmission - communication - of information between the authorities and the public concerning the 'Estonia' accident, when later it was clear, that every essential, technical information about the accident itself, was proven wrong. What does a government information agency do, when it discovers that it has been dragged into a conspiracy to prepare a false accident investigation report, where pure disinformation is an important part?

Defence of Democracy

To uphold the population's confidence in the democratic society in a crisis is one main task of the Board of Psychological Defence. To manage this task the Board must have knowledge about manipulations of information system. The Board of Psychological Defence is a civilian authority under the Ministry of Defence and a part of the total defence of Sweden. It supports other authorities with information planing in the event of a crisis (or war). About 25 to 30 researchers are associated with the activities.

Research about human behaviour

The Board of Psychological Defence, SPF was created in 1954 as a result of experiences of psychological warfare during the second world war and the following 'cold war'.

The SPF is responsible to support the free exchange of opinions, so that it works during a crisis (or in a war).

The SPF does research about human behaviour and questions of information during times of hardship. The 'Estonia' disaster is one example of careful studies (see also http://www.mil.se/fmforum/498/reportage4.html)

To communicate with suffering People

The SPF has in March 2001 issued a small (A5 format) 47 pages report - 'To communicate with suffering People' ('Att kommunicera med drabbade människor') (34), where the project - 'Estonia-information' - is described. The booklet starts - after five empty pages - on page 5 with a confusing excuse:

"There are certainly relatives ... and survivors ... who have not understood various matters and things the way the SPF has interpreted them. It does not mean ... that they (the relatives and the survivors) are wrong ... Every human being ... naturally has one, personal story to tell and an own view on the questions surrounding a disaster like the 'Estonia' foundering".

Therefore:

"It is however also of importance that the SPF gives its view on the matter - that there is a possibility to be self-critical and to explain that certain things could not have been done in another way" (page 5 of (34)).

It must be clear to the reader that the SPF is still today (August 2001) in charge of coordinating the 'Estonia-information'. Thus the SPF has transmitted 'Estonia-information' to relatives and survivors for almost five years. The SPF Estonia team - Johanna Enberg, Björn Körlof, Vendela Dobson-Andersson, Carina Carlson and Disa Byman - state in (34) that the background information has been collected from the government, departments, authorities and 'experts' and from relatives and survivors. They state further that the objective was to transmit correct information in as good time as possible. The SPF states (page 8 of (34)) that the information is about, i.a. the national memorial monument, the official Final report (5) 1.21, the safety at sea work after the 'Estonia' accident 1.37, various legal processes 1.45, the work to cover the wreck, the government decision not to salvage the dead 1.19, the work of the Group of Analysis 1.36, the work of Mr Peter Nobel, the surveillance of the M/S Estonia's accident location and the associations of relatives and survivors. Is not mentioned in (34) that the German Group of Experts arranged two exhibitions 1997 at Stockholm, before the publication of the Final report (5), demonstrating that all technical information of the Commission at that time was misleading. It is also a fact that the SPF 1996-2001 has never clarified or corrected any information of this writer.

The SPF shall also transmit information from relatives and survivors to the government, the government staff council and authorities concerned:

"The ambition has been to demonstrate the good will of the state (government) to provide full information to the relatives and the survivors and to stimulate an active dialogue between relatives/survivors and the authorities" (page 9 of (34)).

Good will? Full information?

However - another confusing excuse:

"The SPF has not commented upon what has been published in the media. It was primarily not possible due to available resources. Secondly it was principally against the free flow of opinion that we have in Swedish society. It should be wrong by the state (government) to comment upon the reporting around a question, unless clear factual errors need be corrected. Furthermore an authority cannot comment upon or refer to the the large amounts of letters to editors or articles of debating nature, that relatives, survivors or the public have published in various newspapers" (page 10 of (34)).

It is a fact that a large amounts of serious, factual - and critical - articles have been published in Swedish newspapers 1998-2000 about the 'Estonia' investigations and its findings Appendix 5 and that all authorities have never replied, probably because every authority could conveniently refer after 1996 to the SPF to handle the contacts - and not reply. Actually the major difficulty after the publication of the Final report (5) in December 1997 was to get any authority to clarify any statements about, e.g. completely false, allegedly factual, technical information, etc. It now seems that it was the SPF that formulated this unusual and unfortunate government policy: an authority cannot comment upon the factual content of an article in, e.g. the media, etc.

This is of course the opposite to free flow of opinion, when the relevant authority has censored or manipulated the actual facts in the first place. A very sophisticated form a dictatorship is at work - you completely ignore the free flow of opinion - and it works well in a small country like Sweden (and Finland and Estonia). It would have cost very little for the SPF to ask the relevant authority to reply to any simple question of the public.

Why didn't the 'Estonia' capsize in two minutes with >1 500~2 000 tons of water on the car deck?

or

How is the official sequence of events 1.9 possible, when the positions of the 'Estonia' at every minute between 00.14 and 01.52 hrs are physically impossible and when the original, false fabrications of Huss/Rosengren of the original plot are further manipulated by the Commission in the Final report (5)?

or

Was the lifesaving equipment in order 1.33?

or

Was the watertight integrity - the bulkheads - and watertight doors in order 1.23?

or

Did the illegal watertight arrangement on deck 0 play any role in the sinking?

etc.

Media Analysis

The SPF naturally is fully informed about all questions without answers.

"Media Analysis
It has been necessary to continuously following the media coverage of the developments of events. In such a way the SPF has found out what question is 'on the order of the day'. ... During the years when the SPF worked with 'Estonia'-information, the authority has filled about 40 files with press clippings and 5 files with written records of voicemedia programs" (page 22 of (34)).

In spite of being fully informed the SPF decided to ignore all criticism in the media. The SPF communications became supervision only to control the questions - and the SPF apparently decided to put the lid on by silence. This was not sensible.

The SPF (Ms Disa Byman) has interviewed, i.a. the following persons about the problems of information and communication (pages 25-37 of (34)): Johan Franson, director of Safety at Sea, National Maritime Administration, who manipulated the dive examination 1.16 and several reports to the government, Ann-Louise Eksborg, director-general of the Board of Accident Investigation (SHK), who signed the Final report (5) and Gunnel Göransson, secretary of the SHK, who, e.g. recorded the films of the visor in the SHK archive before the visor was found 1.14. Naturally the SPF did not interview Mr Olof Forssberg, the past SHK director-general, who 'investigated' the accident for two and a half years and told the media stories, what had allegedly happened, before he resigned or was dismissed from the Commission in May 1997. Nobody from the Group of Analysis was interviewed. The Group of Analysis 1.36 must have been aware of the disinformation. Some conclusions are:

"When a disaster occurs, chaos develops during shorter or longer time. It is totally impossible in the beginning to have a total view of what has happened. Therefore it is difficult, not to say impossible, quickly to give full and relevant information in the beginning" (page 26 of (34)).

The public is not stupid and knows the problem to investigate an accident. The public is not interested in quick solutions. The public wants true information - even if it might take time. The SPF has never researched the simple fact that all 'information' of pure technical matters actually given during the first week after the accident was pure disinformation - backed up by false facts - as described in this book.

The simple solution should have been for responsible authorities to state that relevant information about e.g. the technical condition of the 'Estonia' or the cause of accident was not available at the beginning (the first week) and to ensure that any information published later was correct, truthful and fully proven. The SPF has never commented upon Mr Lehtola first lying about the real position of the 'Estonia' wreck and announcing a false position 1.4 and later lying about the damage in the side Appendix 5 (Lehtola denies the existence of the damage in spite of the fact that it was discussed in the Commission and mentioned in the media). The SPF has never commented upon the fact that the official position of the visor was that of a buoy taken on 9 December 1994, allegedly anchored on the visor position, long after the visor had been salvaged. The SPF has never commented the unusual situation that unproven information given very early later became 'facts' based on what is today clear disinformation. It seems that the SPF has never considered the possibility that various civil servants, e.g. Forssberg, for unknown reasons early, shamefully lied about what they were supposed to handle in a correct manner. Furthermore:

"A big problem afterwards has been spreading of rumours about the 'Estonia'. It is probably due to the fact that a final point of the tragedy has not been made. The information about and the description of the complete sequence of events and its causes has not been acceptable to all" (page 27 of (34)).

The impossible, official Sequence of Events

The impossible, official sequence of events 1.9 is today a proven fact. It is not a rumour. This writer does not spread rumours. The Fact Group does not spread rumours.

The SPF does not describe the alleged 'rumours', etc. Are they the unproven statements of civil servants? 'Rumours' about, e.g. explosives, did not start until 1998/9. The SPF in its report (34) never states that probably 80% of the non-acceptance of the official 'information' is based on factual information 1998-2000, like the ones in this book, proving the official 'information' wrong. It is not 'rumours'. A new investigation commission can easily prove any 'rumours' wrong - all rumours the writer has heard of are physically impossible. Explosive devices, e.g. between the visor and ramp do not sink the ship, etc. However, an explosive device can be used under water to remove, e.g. a visor or to try to open a ramp. Such a suggestion is not a rumour - it is an idea based on photos of damages not available until January 2001 3.10. Why the Commission suppressed the information 1994 is unclear. Evidently the SPF was not aware of such information 1996. A new investigator should concentrate the investigation and examination on the new, proven, technical facts and information. That the surviving key witnesses in the Engine Control Room are lying about their escapes - 1.48 - is self-evident. Why were they lying? And if they lied about this critical item - to save their lives - did they lye about other matters?

UN/IMO Resolutions were not applied

There are UN/IMO resolutions to this effect - but - more excuses:

"The work in the Commission was not done without problems. Three countries should work together. It was three countries with different legal systems and different organisations of marine accident investigations. The three different countries also have completely different traditions concerning investigations of this type" (page 28 of (34)).

The SPF thus avoids 2001, like all other Swedish authorities 1994-2001, to mention that there existed an international UN/IMO resolution 1994 about the procedure how to handle the 'Estonia' accident investigation - UN/IMO Resolution A.637 (16).

It was replaced in November 1997 by Resolution A.849 (20), which in principle says exactly the same things in a 'Code of marine accident investigations', i.a. that the public evidently shall have full access to and insight into the investigation, while it is being done. The governments of Sweden, Finland and Estonia have adopted both resolutions Foreword. The three countries therefore had in theory exactly the same systems, organisations and traditions to investigate a marine casualty, if they had followed the UN-IMO resolutions. If, for any reasons they had different approaches, the Estonia investigation was evidently a good opportunity to apply the IMO resolutions.

The resolutions are crystal clear and logical, e.g. all investigative meetings and information shall be public, all facts shall be proven, new facts presented after the publication of any first investigation report demonstrating that the first 'facts' are wrong shall be reviewed and examined again later, etc., etc. Why cannot the SPF support these simple principles?

Information shall not be agreed at secret meetings and then filtered to the public via another agency. Lying crewmembers would have been easily spotted already in 1994, if all information had been accessible. Now the Commission made the statements of the lying crewmembers secret for 38 months 1994 to 1997, in fact the Commission protected the lying witnesses - the SPF had not access to the original information - and used the lies as 'evidence' of the alleged sequence of events, and then, when the statements became public, refused to discuss the matter.

In September 2001 the German journalist Jutta Rabe stated that the Estonian key witnesses had been forced by the Estonian secret police to modify their testimonies 1996-1997. Rabe had interviewed the witnesses. Ministers like Ms Mona Sahlin cannot disregard international United Nations decisions in various resolutions, etc., but the SPF, being a government agency, evidently does not dare even to inform the minister - and the Parliament - this basic fact. It leads to other authorities disregarding the same resolutions and also the international rules for safety at sea. The Swedish National Maritime Administration is a prime example of the latter - it disregards the IMO/SOLAS rules to suit its particular interests and encourage its safety inspectors to lye about and to ignore basic facts. Safety at sea suffers and becomes worse!

According to the SPF - another excuse:

"The working language (of the Commission) was English. At the same time the English language knowledge of the investigators was highly variable. Thus the work became difficult in the Commission" (page 28 of (34)).

It is interesting to note that the SPF suggests language as the reason for the difficulties of the Commission to investigate the accident 1994-1997. Nowhere in the at least 20 protocols of main meetings of the full Commission is language a problem. Everybody spoke good English. The real 'problem' was evidently to agree a false sequence of events and to falsify testimonies and 'scientific reports, etc. to this effect and to write the false Final report (5). So the Finns wrote some of their reports in Finnish and dr. Huss wrote some of his reports in Swedish, etc. Language problems? The problem was to maintain the secrecy, so that information could be manipulated to suit.

Freedom of Information

Furthermore according to the SPF:

"Another problem (sic) was that Sweden is rather unique with regard to the principle of public access of information (freedom of information). The members of the other countries were sometimes very upset (hot blooded), when questions being handled by the Commission were reported in Swedish media" (pages 28/29 of (34)).

The SPF does not expand:

Why was it wrong when questions handled by the Commission was reported in the Swedish media? Isn't that the purpose also of Finnish and Estonian media?

Actually the problem was another one: as all essential information of the accident was false, it needed to be coordinated. But various members of the Commission told different, contradictory stories to the media. The result was in the end that the members accused one another of lying, etc., which was also reported in the media.

The SPF does not mention anywhere in its report (34) that it was the Swedish delegation that made all technical information and evidence of the accident investigation secret 1994 onwards 1.22 and that only selected pieces of technical information were leaked to the Swedish media 1994-1997 1.44. It was Sweden that first ignored the UN/IMO resolutions about freedom of information of marine casualties. When the writer wrote (1) 1996-1997 all Swedish authorities refused any information. It is particularly disturbing that all information (in English) by the German shipyard to the Commission 1996, when the SPF was appointed to handle the communications between relatives and, e.g. the Board of Accident Investigation, was made secret by the Swedes and was not made public until March 1998, i.e. it was withheld from this writer. It seems that the SPF was not even aware of the German information, i.e. one government agency, the Board of Accident Investigation, SHK, kept another government agency responsible for information and communication, the SPF, in the dark! The SPF never complained about the SHK secret procedures.

How could SPF inform the relatives and the survivors 1996-1997 about the 'Estonia' accident, when the Board of Accident Investigation kept the German information secret until 8 March 1998 (and then tried to hide it in an archive)?

It is another fact that the SPF had, and has, excellent connections with the Swedish media. In retrospect - as described in this book and based on the German information - you can conclude that all essential technical information of the Commission was disinformation and that this cannot have been possible without good media contacts (compare 1.44). As a logical consequence the SPF and the Swedish media have carefully, after 1996, avoided to handle any information produced by, e.g. this writer in his books and on the Internet and other parties. One reason seems to be that the writer is not a survivor or relative (sic). However, the SPF was one of several authorities, which were asked by the Swedish government in the autumn 2000 to comment upon the information in the Swedish version of this book. The SPF director-general Björn Körlof then replied to the government (Ms Mona Sahlin) that

"the SPF cannot judge the truthfulness or the reasonableness of the factual statements" but recommends "that a review of the material is done and that forms are created to replying as soon as possible."

Apart from the observation that it is strange that the SPF - the agency in charge of 'Estonia-information' - was not able to judge the truthfulness of factual statement, it would have been very simple for Björn Körlof to contact the writer and others about the truthfulness and reasonableness of his statements. Why would this writer and others spend time to produce untrue and unreasonable statements? But no such attempt was made. It should have been obvious to the SPF that the purpose of the writer was to honestly promote better safety at sea. Instead the SPF is silent when Swedish and Finnish civil servants accuse the writer of being a 'conspiracy theorist'. The conclusion of Ms Sahlin was as expected - on 19 April 2001 - that

"no new circumstances have been presented, which indicate that the course of events of the accident differs in any essential way from the description of the Final report ...".

The SPF never complained about this false conclusion. It is a very illogical statement/conclusion. On the one hand no new circumstances have been presented, on the other hand the SPF shall collect a 'fact bank' and explain why and how the ship sank. Regardless - whatever SPF collects, it will contain numerous new circumstances, which indicate that the official course of events differs completely from the real one. The SPF must then again recommend that IMO resolution A.849(20) is applied.

The SPF states:

"In Sweden we are by tradition used to openness from the authorities. It is a guarded tradition of Swedish society. Therefore it is no coincidence that the Swedish law (about government work) clearly states that the authority is required to give information, advice and help in relevant questions of the activities of the authorities (SFS 1986:223)" (page 37 of (34)).

However, the SPF has never criticised the fact that Swedish authorities as the Board of Accident Investigation and National Maritime Administration have systematically kept vital information secret and refused to reply to inquiries or have transmitted pure disinformation about technical matters of the seaworthiness of the 'Estonia' and proposals to improve safety at sea. This writer has grave doubts about any 'openness' from the authorities. When the writer managed to publish his early conclusions in the biggest Swedish daily Dagens Nyheter on 16 August 1996, the only reply from the authorities was that he was unintelligent, unscientific and unreasonable 2.1, etc. A few months later the SPF was appointed to handle all communications between the public and the authorities - and from then on no authority replied to anything.

The SPF in its report (34) evidently does not mention incidents like when Commission expert Bengt Schager in Swedish daily Svenska Dagbladet 970922 stated:

"I do not believe any longer in the Commission. - it has not acted correctly ... I do not think that the quality is good of the Final report ... there were actually many defects on board. There are items that should have been mentioned in the Final report, which are not there ... It should have been more detailed and have better analysis".

Such statement of an insider of the Commission naturally totally destroys the trustworthiness of all parties involved with information and communication of the 'Estonia - the government, the Commission and the SPF.

Trustworthiness

The SPF states about trustworthiness - a final excuse:

"It is impossible to create a trustworthy relationship between an authority and media/relatives unless the responsible party for information (i.e. the SPF - writer's note) has access to all information of the Commission. … The image, which the large part of the public receives of a serious accident, is a picture transmitted by the media. It does not matter if the image of the media is correct or not (sic). The large number of persons - the public - only gets the picture produced by the media - the cause and what actions that are taken, etc. - and it is this image that is remembered. It is easy and it goes fast to get a bad reputation. On the other hand it is long and hard work to correct such a reputation" (page 41 of (34)).

The Fact Bank - an Explanation how the 'Estonia' was filled with Water

The Swedish government (Ms Mona Sahlin) is fully aware of the above. The handling of the old 'Estonia- information' by e.g. the Board of Accident Investigation and the National Maritime Authority is highly suspect and probably illegal. Ms Sahlin has therefore decided on 19 April 2001 that the SPF shall:

'collect information about the M/S 'Estonia' sinking - a 'fact bank' - that shall provide information to the public and answer questions about the accident',

and

the fact bank shall contain 'an explanation that, based on the sequence of events of the Final report (sic), describes how the 'Estonia' was filled with water at the end of accident'.

The latter is not possible. Ms Sahlin has shot herself in the foot. The Commission could never explain 1994-1997 how the 'Estonia' was filled with water to sink - and - 2.1 and 2.12 - ignored all surviving passengers statements of the accident and has later - with the help of Huss/Rosengren/Franson - 1.9 and 1.16 - falsified the alleged sequence of events based on further false calculations and 'scientific' reports and the manipulated dive examination, etc. It is simply impossible to explain the filling of water of the hull and the sinking of the ferry based on the falsified sequence of events of the Commission. The SPF must point this out to Ms Sahlin, the government and the Parliament. Or Members of Parliament should point this out to Ms Sahlin directly in the Parliament - that her foot is bleeding and soiling the floor. It will help Sweden to clean up this mess.

The SPF concludes:

"The information shall as far as possible give a complete and clear picture of what has happened, what decisions that were taken and what the consequences are" (page 41 of (34)).

The SPF has appointed Ms Disa Byman for this project. The information manager Göran Lindmark of the SPF in a letter of 13 August 2001 (dnr SPF E 11/01) to 'relevant authorities and organizations' (it is not clear to whom the letter was actually sent) summarizes the preparatory work:

"I hope that she (Disa Byman) will be given the possibility - and if necessary receive support - to review the material that is available in your offices and which later may (sic) be included in the 'information' bank … The objective of the SPF is that the 'information' bank shall be available in a beginning during 2002."

The hidden information in various archives of Swedish authorities and organizations can only support the findings in this book 'Disaster Investigation'. The basic, technical information about the 'Estonia' accident given by, e.g. the Swedish government and the Swedish members of the Commission between 28 September and 18 October 1994 was wrong. Most errors then produced by other authorities were a result of the original, false information. Later the experts of the Commission produced a range of false, technical reports to support the Commission. Ms Disa Byman need not worry about whether the reports in the 'fact' bank are true or false as long as correct cross-references are made, e.g. to Vendela. The false reports are easy to spot - read this book - and any cross-reference to a false report explains the false conclusions of an otherwise correct report by a manipulated authority. The SPF 'fact' bank shall therefore be used as another argument for a completely new, technical accident investigation, which regardless must take place, as proven new facts have already been presented, to resolve all outstanding technical questions and finally clarify why the 'Estonia' sank. The SPF 'fact bank' will only produce more such new facts.

The SPF 'fact bank' should include, i.a.:

full report(s) of dr. Nuorteva 30 September - 2 October 1994 about analysis of four sonar pictures taken 30 September 1994 showing a big object at the bow of the 'Estonia' 1.4,

all testimonies of 2nd mate Ingemar Eklund of the 'Mariella', who witnessed the sinking 1.9,

log book of the 'Mariella' between 00.00 and 24.00 hrs of 28 September 1994 with, i.a. times, positions and observations recorded by Ingemar Eklund,

names and numbers of survivors on board the 'Mariella' at 13.20 hrs and 23.55 hrs of 28 September 1994 1.41 and how they were treated,

why only 61 survivors were brought to and registered at hospitals in Finland according to the Final report (5), when 63 survivors were actually rescued and brought to Finland according to (35),

names of four Swedish policemen embarking the 'Mariella' from two helicopters and their reports,

all reports about 'fragments' from the 'Estonia' found after the accident - times, positions, types, finders 1.14,

reasons why the ROV films (seabed survey 1 October and mudline survey 2 December) were edited not to show the complete superstructure, e.g. the starboard pilot door 1.1, 1.4, 1.16 and 2.24,

log book of the HMS Furusund stating positions of the ship, when it (a) visited the wreck end September/early October and when it (b) filmed the visor on the sea floor at various times mid-November 1994,


log book of the M/S 'Nordica' stating position of the ship, when it salvaged the visor on 18 November 1994,

supporting scientific material behind the Huss/Rosengren/JAIC plot of sequence of events 1.9 done on the simulator of the Kalmar Maritime Academy,

all background material of the big damage opening/hole in the starboard front bulkhead never reported by the Commission 3.10,

written report from diving 2-4 December 1994 and discussed by the Commission 15 December 1994 to the effect that the ramp had been closed before the accident and then had been ripped fully open and then closed itself 1.16 and 1.17,

evidence that the ramp locks and hooks are damaged as stated by the Commission,

details of and reason for salvaging luggage from cabins on deck 6 on 3 December 1994 by diver 'John' 1.16,

evidence that lifesaving equipment was in order 1.33,

an explanation how dry evacuation of 2 188 persons onboard the 'Estonia' should have taken place,

evidence that watertight subdivision/watertight doors were in order 1.23,

why the principle of Archimedes from 252 BC does not apply,

the original manuscript of the Final report agreed in March 1997 (so that it can be compared with the printed report (5) of December 1997),

etc.

The Silence Game

The SPF report 'To communicate with suffering People' ('Att kommunicera med drabbade människor') (34) is a very disturbing document. It describes between the lines the 'Silence Game' of the government about the 'Estonia' 1994-2001. Nowhere is mentioned that the public - relatives, survivors and interested parties - not only are entitled to 'information' but have the constitutional right to full insight into the investigations and the decision making procedures, when they are done - and not in a 'fact bank' presented later.

Every stated event must have a proven cause; physical causes should produce real events. An official report cannot be a fairy tale!

Secrecy of any kind is not permitted with marine casualty investigations. By coincidence a Swedish journalist, Knut Carlqvist, published a book about the 'Estonia' two months later (11 May 2001) - titled the 'Silence Game' (Tysta leken) (33). One player of the 'Silence Game' is Ms Mona Sahlin. The winner of the Game is the one who shuts up.

In the Swedish Parliament 13 December, 2001 - Ms Mona Sahlin

In the Swedish parliament on 13 December, 2001, the deputy Swedish minister of industry and trade, Ms Mona Sahlin, in charge of the Estonia affaire, stated with regard to all outstanding questions, e.g. the above:

"It is also about making it more clear, not only informing the public what actions have been taken to prevent future accidents, but also to point to the facts and information that exist, so that more persons can search for an answer and can research all what is still unclear.

I will mention some areas. Among them is, as stated earlier, the fact bank of the Estonia or the national memory bank of the Estonia, which the Board of Psychological Defence (SPF) has been given the task to compile. It is not only a question to give relevant information about what exists, knowledge and facts in the hands of many different authorities and places, which shall be available simply and clearly. It is also a question of the possibility maybe to find an answer to several of the questions which are asked."

The actual final Events of the Sequence of the Sinking ... shall be ready next autumn 2002

Mona Sahlin:

"For example there are many questions about the actual final events of the sequence of the sinking, which I will also return to later. Therefore the SPF fact bank shall contain material about them.

The information I have indicates that the fact bank shall be ready next autumn 2002. It will not be a short sighted work but something that I am convinced will exist as long as I live and breathe. The memory bank of the Estonia is something that the whole (Swedish) nation needs to have access to and needs to learn from and by".

The above statement is not a good contribution to the 'Silence Game'. What has the SPF to say about it?

Admiral Frank Rosenius - the Writer meets with the SPF

The writer has actually met with the SPF on 24 April 2002.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the final events of the sequence of sinking/water filling of the 'Estonia' and to get copies of relevant plans of the ship.

The writer saw the new director general Mats Ekdahl, a journalist (Swedish daily Arbetet, Vi, Läkartidningen, etc.) and his information secretary Göran Lindmark (since 1999/2000). They had little knowledge about the 'Estonia'-affaire 1994-1999. At the meeting was also admiral Frank Rosenius (retired), former commander of the Royal Swedish navy submarine flotilla and the Swedish navy (1998) and former deputy supreme armed forces commander (1999) and a board member and supervisor of the SPF! All three happily informed that their interpretation of the government decision of the 19 April 2001 was; first a 'fact bank' - it can take a couple of years - and then to explain the water filling and the sinking based on information in the 'fact bank'. The SPF had done nothing about the 'Estonia' for a year.

The SPF had not asked any expert to explain how the 'Estonia' could have been water filled and sunk according to the events outlined in the Final report (5) and could not present any lines plans, watertight subdivisions plans, stability or hydrostatic data of the 'Estonia', etc., as requested by the writer. In principle the SPF had done absolutely nothing since the 19 April 2001 about the 'Estonia' except asking some government bodies to produce documents not available in the JAIC archives. The writer, Heiwa Co, proposed that it could help with the task.

Admiral Frank Rosenius

The SPF had however created a 'reference group' that should check the documents being stored in the 'fact bank'. The reference group consists of admiral Frank Rosenius (see left and above), Magnus Faxén (a retired ambassador), Hans Landberg (a retired professor of history), Disa Bystedt (the outside consultant collecting the material) and Mr Lasse Jonsén. In the reference group are also 'interested' parties, mainly relatives to victims of the accident; Ms Anna-Karin Wallenstein, Mr Odd Lundqvist, Ms Monica Köpsén and Mr Björn Stenberg. The first meeting of the reference group was planned for 29 May 2002. When the SPF 'fact bank' is ready (by 29 May 2002 the SPF could not even produce a layout or a preliminary inventory of the fact bank) and when, i.a. the above listed items have been clarified, then we will have a better, final understanding why the 'Estonia' sank - how the deadly event took place and its real cause - or why we will not find out - as the 'fact bank' may be empty.


The SPF was very friendly with the writer, and why shouldn't they? (The writer has served in the Swedish navy!). The job of the SPF is clear - to demonstrate that, e.g. the facts in this book can never be proven and that they can only be used as a distraction for curious people and an excuse to avoid real analysis. The SPF is a part of the Minstry of Defence and cannot possibly criticize its headmaster.

But it is good that admiral Rosenius+ is part of the 'fact bank' team. He should be able to clarify the involvement of the Swedish Fleet and the 'Estonia', e.g. the whereabouts of HMS Furusund in September/October/November 1994 and the crew aboard, the alleged removal of the visor under water after the accident by the Swedish navy and the alleged diving of Mr Håkan Bergmark, tel. 08-618 90 60, 0736 43 49 92, Helsingforsgatan 65, 3 tr., SE 164 78 Kista, Sweden on the 'Estonia'. Officially no Swede has ever dived on the 'Estonia', but Mr Bergmark maintains that he has dived with four colleagues ... and seen a big hole in the side! If admiral Rosenius cannot clarify these matters, then something is ... strange.

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* The SPF board members are: Sam Nilsson, chairperson, Laila Bäck, MP, Lars Christiansson, information consult, Rutger Lindahl, professor, Bo Riddarström, Överstyrelsen för civil beredskap, Frank Rosenius+, Department of defence, Yrsa Stenius and the SPF director general Björn Körlöf.

The SPF media advisory board members are:

Anders Lignell, TT, Bengt Frykman, SR, Bertil Karlefors, TV4, Christer Jungeryd, Radioutgivareföreningen, Göran Zackari, SvT, Svante Mossbrant, Teracom, Jan-Erik Berg, Teracom, Peo Wärring, Tidningsutgivarna, Mats Oscarsson, Räddningsverket, Åke Wideström, Post- och telestyrelsen, Kurt Hedman, Presstödsnämnden and Ingegerd Hedin, Pliktverket.

+ Vice Admiral Frank Rosenius (ret) was Deputy Supreme Commander at the Swedish Armed Forces Head Quarter 1998 - 2000. He graduated from the Royal Naval Academy 1962 and spent his first years in submarines and was the captain of RSwN Submarine Sea Serpent 1969-70. He graduated from the Swedish NDC 1974 and US Naval War College 1981. He has been Commanding Officer, 4th surface flotilla 85-88, Chief of Fleet Staff 88-89, Assistant Chief of Defense Staff (Operations) 89-92, Deputy Head of department of International and Security Affairs in Ministry of Defense 93-94, C in C Swedish Fleet 94-98. He is a fellow of the Royal Swedish Society of Naval Sciences and the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences. Rosenius was in charge of International and Security Affairs when the 'Estonia' sank and when the Swedish Fleet assisted with the work on the visor.

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