The MV Estonia sinking is still
not explained! Chalmers University supports scientific
Cheating and breaks Swedish Laws
(28 May 2009)
According two research establishments, SSPA/Safey
at Sea, Ltd., at Gothenburg/Glasgow and HSVA
at Hamburg 2008, the capsized but still floating MV
Estonia sank on 28 September, 1994! They were 2006-2008 paid
>SEK 12 millions to explain why.
No details or calculations (!) are available in any
reports about the capsized floating condition at
01.30 hrs and why/how it changed in the next 20 minutes
permitting sinking! As seen in below (simple) figure
the MV Estonia, prior capsize, floated normally
on/displaced 11 930 m3 buoyancy in the hull
(10 666 m3 air, 1 264 m3 solids,
permeability 0.894 in 14 watertight compartments)
according Archimedes with 6 886 m3 volume
above waterline but below the watertight main
deck (6156 m3 air and 730 m3 solids,
permeability 0.894) reserve
buoyancy. Total hull volume is
18.816 m3. Everybody
agrees to that.
Above main deck in the superstructure and deck house were
another 3 906 m3 of solids.
According above research establishments MV Estonia
loaded 1 000's of tons of water in the superstructure >2
m above waterline, which resulted in the vessel capsizing
and floating upside down at 01.30 hrs. Evidently the
water in the superstructure doesn't affect buoyancy
after capsize!
Upside down, after capsize, MV Estonia thus still
floats, now with 3 191 m3 of hull above
waterline. About 5 012 m3 of water is then
inside the 14 air tight hull compartment
compressing the air there. The vessel displacement is still
11 930 m3: the displacement consists of two
parts; 8.024 m3compressed air/solids in the hull +
3.906 m3 solids in
the superstructure/deck house. So the buoyancy of the
capsized ship consists 67% of compressed air in the hull and
33% of submerged solids! It seems everybody also agrees to
that.
No air can escape from the 14 air tight hull
compartments in this condition, so the vessel cannot
sink. In model scale 1/40 and tests the model evidently
floats higher after capsize, as the air pressure inside the
model hull is less. But neither ship nor model can sink
after capsize! Archimedes looks after that! Any
undergraduate student using a calculator can conclude that a
capsized, floating ship cannot sink. But according above
research establishments and Chalmers University it can!
Dr. Dracos Vassalos of Safety at Sea, Ltd., has refused
to assist in explaining the alleged loss of buoyancy of MV
Estonia between 01.30 and 01.52 hrs. Vassalos is not
interested to resolve the confusion he is causing. And he
lectures stability at the University of Strathclyde. Poor
undergraduates.
Strangely enough the Safety at Sea Ltd 's partner SSPA,
Gothenburg, part of Chalmers University, makes exactly the
same unexplained error, when calculating buoyancy and
floating after capsize and performing model tests of the
sinking (SSPA report no. 4006
4100-4). None of the research establishments
seem to know that capsized ships also float on buoyancy that
was above waterline prior capsize!
In order to sink the model, SSPA releases air from the
capsized hull via two hidden valves in the bottom!
This is unscientific cheating! SSPA is part of
Chalmers University of Technology and has been informed
about the manipulations. According the President of
Chalmers, Ms Karin Markides, the Chalmers opinion is that
the process has been open and well meets the demands put on
a complex process such as this (letter Ref.
No.:C2008/627 of 25 August 2008).
In a previous attempt to explain the Estonia sinking by
the Swedish Board of
Psychological Defence (SPF), the bow was 20 meters
above waterline during the sinking. This does not happen in
the latest studies.
Fig. 5 -
Previous attempt by SPF to explain sinking
The Swedish Government states in its Proposition
”Ett lyft för forskning och innovation” (A
step up for research and innovation) (prop. 2008/09:50) that
the importance of public confidence remains and is
reinforced, when handling questions of suspected
manipulations of research at Swedish universities.
The university is responsible to investigate suspicions
about manipulations of research as per Chapter 1, § 16
of the Rules for Higher Education Institutions
(högskoleförordningen) (1993:100). The university,
as employer, must also take actions against employees when
manipulations of research have been observed.
In the latest Proposition above the Government suggests
that the responsibility of the university remains to
investigate suspected manipulations of research, but that
also an external investigation of suspected manipulations of
research by experts outside the university may in certain
cases contribute to the confidence of any investigation.
In this case Chalmers University and Ms Karin Markides
are breaking the law.
Many experts have recently suggested that the
underwater hull of MS Estonia must be re-examined. It
is very easy! The whole underwater hull is accessible on the
sea floor - both the flat hull bottom and the hull sides up
to the waterline and to the main deck fender. All parts of
the underwater hull are above the mud line. All areas can be
marked up by divers and then filmed by ROV.
On 16 February 2009 Margus Kurm, Chairman of the
Committee, Leading Public Prosecutor, handed in subject
report to the Estonian government. It was the result of the
Committee studying the latest research studies done by the
SSPA consortium and the HSVA/TUHH consortium 2006-2008.
oo0oo
Research Study on the Sinking Sequence
and Evacuation of the MV Estonia - Final Report
The HSVA report Research Study on the Sinking
Sequence and Evacuation of the MV Estonia - Final Report
is another scandal of the Estonia saga. It does not
contribute anything to clarify the sinking of MV Estonia on
28 September 1994. Read ...
(21 December 2008)
Technical Summary of the Investigation
on the Sinking Sequence of MV Estonia
The Safety at Sea Ltd report Technical Summary
of the Investigation on the Sinking Sequence of MV
Estonia is a scandal. It does not contribute anything to
clarify the sinking of MV Estonia on 28 September 1994.
Read ...
(17 December 2008)
oo0oo
Unbelievable new Information
(29 November 2008)
oo0oo
According Vinnova's latest research there are two
witnesses that saw that the visor was lost!
They had at 01.24 hrs - when the list was 90° - gone
to the bow!
This is the time of the Mayday
- but according the Mayday the heel was only 20-30° at
01.24.51 hrs!
They noted that the visor was missing!
But that was not enough! One of the witnesses decided to
climb down on the ramp - that was closed!
As the list quickly became 180° already at 01.30
hrs, the witnesses decided to climb over to the bulbous bow
(that now was upside down) ... where they managed to get
into a raft - which one is not known.
All of this appears to be pure propaganda!
If the ramp had been open, you would expect the following
to happen - I quote from chapter 3.11
of Disaster
Investigation:
"If the visor had pulled open the ramp, then the ramp
should have hit the fore peak deck with 1.8 MNm energy.
The visor should then first have remained hanging on
the ramp top, when the ramp was open - the visor was
pushed aft by the water, waves and the forward motion of the
ship. If the ramp actually fell down on the forepeak deck,
the ramp plate grid should have been bent downward, all ramp
hinges should have been broken, the ramp side guard rails
might have been damaged and should have been bent outwards
3.10, the 'preventer'
wires120 and the ramp hydraulics should have
been pulled out and it would later have been
impossible to close the ramp1.8.
The starboard ripped apart ramp hydraulics should
have hanged out and should later have blocked the closing of
the ramp, when the list was >90 degrees. The ramp should
have folded itself around the fore peak structure. The
forepeak deck 2 should have been smashed (but it is
undamaged). Then you would expect the visor to slip off the
ramp causing more damages to visor housing, etc. But none is
seen."
Conclusion - if any survivors climbed down a
closed ramp as shown in the figure, the ramp could never
have been open before that! The Safety at Sea
report actually confirms that the accident could not have
been caused by an open ramp!
Anders Björkman, Heiwa Co, lectures
at Pärnu, Tartu and Tallinn
'Ten good Reasons why the M/S Estonia
Accident Investigation (1994-1997) must be
reopened 2008!'
A lot of new
evidence has been produced 2008. The new evidence
will be presented and it is suggested it is best
handled by a Formal Investigation reopened as per
international law by the Estonian government.
Lecture will be in English and
Estonian.
Sunday 23 November, 12-2 pm, Pärnu -
Pensionäride päevakeskus, Tammsaare 11 -
invited by ELA
Monday 24 November, 5-7 pm, Tartu - Theatre
Vanemuine (ERGO saal) - invited by ELA
Tuesday 25 November, 6.30-8.30 pm, Lüganuse
Rahvamajas - invited by Nõmmeradio
Wednesday 26 November, 11 am-1 pm, Tallinn -
Tallinna Volikogu istungite saal, Vana-Viru 12 -
invited by Evelyn Sepp, MP
Listen to Nõmmeradio or watch this space
for further details!
At some instant two survivors managed to
climb down the closed ramp, using its stiffening
arrangement and abandon the ship. Angle of heel 93°.
(Source - Vinnova/SSPA/Safety at Sea/Glasgow, May
2008)
Serious Errors in the
SSPA Reports (20 October
2008)
The Vinnova/SSPA report no. 4006
4100-4 - Foundering tests - contains serious
errors that are repeated in the final Vinnova/SSPA report.
The errors concern what happens when M/S Estonia in full
scale and model scale capsizes and floats upside
down on the compressed air enclosed or trapped in the hull.
Evidently the pressure on the enclosed air differs in full
scale and model scale as explained with the below figures
1-4. When the scale is 1/40 the water pressure on the air
inside a capsized hull is abt. 40 times smaller than in
fullscale. But the vessel does not only float on compressed
air upside down. The total volume of the ship's
superstructure and deck house below water is then about 59
190 m3 and it contains a fair amount of buoyancy.
With an average permeability of 0.934 (space full of water)
there is still 3 906 m3 of material (incl. cargo)
in the superstructure and deck house that provides
buoyancy.
Full Scale
In figure 1. below Estonia (full scale) floats in the
water. Her
displacement, i.e. the
volume of water below water line pushed aside by the hull,
is abt. 11 930 m3 (10 666 m3 air,
1 264 m3 solids) and she has abt. 6 886
m3 (6 156 m3 air, 730
m3 solids) reserve
buoyancy between waterline (WL) and main deck
(UD). Her draught is abt. 5.2 metres. The vessel floats due
to this displacement/buoyancy; compare Arkimedes! The total
volume in the hull
(displacement +
reserve buoyancy)
is then abt. 18 816 m3 of which 16 822
m3 is air and 1 994 m3 is solid
material.
Above the hull is the car deck superstructure and the
deck house but they do not contain any air providing
buoyancy. However, the superstructure and deck house, below
water after capsize, contain material that occupies volume
which in turn provides buoyancy; e.g. if there is 3 910 tons
of steel (specific gravity 7.82) in the superstructure and
deck house below water, it occupies 500 m3 and
thus provides 500 m3 extra buoyancy or, if there
were 5 000 tons of other objects in the superstructure and
deck house with specific gravity 1.47 (wall and ceiling
panels, carpets, furniture, cargo, etc), it occupies 3 406
m3 and provides another 3 406 m3
extra buoyancy. Note that this extra non-air buoyancy
is not subject to compression. Thus Estonia probably had
about 3 906 m3 of buoyancy in superstructure and
deck house that would assist her floating upside down after
capsize.
When Estonia has capsized, figure 2, she floats upside
down due to buoyancy of solid material now below water + air
trapped inside the hull. The air in the hull is compressed
due to external water pressure at a new equilibrium. The
bottom of the compressed air bubble is say 5 metres below WL
and the air has been compressed to abt. 11 215
m3.
As you still need 11 930 m3buoyancy
to float on and you have 3 906 m3 in
superstructure and deckhouse + 11 215 m3
compressed air at 1.5 bar in the hull, there is abt.
3 191 m3 volume of the hull that remains
above WL. That's where the
reserve buoyancy
ended up. Estonia thus floats upside down
with abt. <1-2 metres of the hull above WL. 5 607
m3 of original air volume in the hull is replaced
by sea water.
Model Scale
In model scale, say 1/40, the total volume of the hull is
only 18816/64000 = 0.294 m3 or say 294 litres of
which 186 litres is buoyancy
(the model weighs 186 kgs and displaces abt. 13
cms) and you have 108 litres of
reserve
buoyancy - see figure 3. The model
also has an unknown amount of buoyancy in the
superstructure/deck house which should correspond to 61
litres of air. When the model turns upside down, it floats
on 61 liters of solid material below water and 125 litres of
compressed air inside the model hull. But then the outside
water pressure on the air is only about 10 cms of water or
1.01 bar, so the volume of compressed air inside the model
is only reduced by abt. 3 litres! As the model requires 186
litres buoyancy to
float, there remains 105 litres
reserve buoyancy
in the hull above WL after model capsize -
see figure 4. Thus the model will float with about 10 cms
of hull (4 metres full scale) above WL! Reason is simply
that the pressure to compress air in the hull is abt. 40
times smaller in scale 1/40.
To adjust that height to full scale you have to allow
abt. 55 litres (3 529 m3 full scale) of air to
escape from the model. The model will then still float with
the remaining 50 litres of air (3 191 m3 full
scale) above WL.
SSPA model of Estonia floats
after capsize!
If Estonia full scale would have floated upside down,
Estonia model scale would have floated upside down. No
sinking. Apparently it was not the case as in the model
tests the model sinks slowly (after air in the hull is
slowly being released).
How does Vinnova/SSPA describe this in their report?
"A number of tests were carried out where the model
capsized, trapped air and remained floating upside down. The
volume of this trapped air was measured, and a mean value
was found to be around 40 liters (2 560
m3 fullscale) . Also the pressure of
the trapped air was measured. The scaling laws give for the
present situation that about 20% of the trapped air should
be evacuated to give a proper remaining amount of trapped
air in the model, see Appendix 1. In this case around 8
liters (512 m3 fullscale)
could be let out in order to fulfill the scale
laws. The two valves in the bottom of the model were
calibrated giving a flow of 6.7 liters
(429 m3 fullscale)
each per minute at the actual pressure. This means
that one valve could be held open a little more than 1
minute during the test."
Not very scientific or convincing and not in accordance
with real full scale and model scale situations. SSPA
ignores completely the extra, permanent buoyancy provided by
the superstructure and deck house that are now below water.
That buoyancy is around 3.906
m3 fullscale or 61 litres model scale. 105 litres
air model scale is 3 529 m3 full scale and
maybe this what Estonia had above waterline after
capsize. There are about 125 litres air and 61 litres of
solids below waterline to float on. 6.7 liters model scale
is 429 m3 full scale! Why let that out per
minute? SSPA knows that the full scale ferry could not have
sunk at all after capsize.
The Vinnova/SSPA final report does not include any
descriptions and calculations of buoyancy of solid material
in hull, superstructure and deck house and (compressed) air
in the hull of Estonia full scale and in model scale and
available buoyancy after capsize. It is very serious.
How can you explain sinking, if you do not calculate
available buoyancy at every instance?
Condition for immediate Sinking
It should be noted that, if Estonia full scale did not
have 6 886 m3reserve
buoyancy in the hull as assumed in figure 1
above, but only 4 000 m3reserve buoyancy
and much less buoyancy in the superstructure and deck house,
she would have sunk immediately after capsize. The total air
volume in the hull then would have been compressed to <10
000 m3 at capsize. The capsized hull floats
deeper and the pressure would be higher on the air in the
hull, >1.5 bar, and the remaining buoyancy provided by
compressed air would be too small to allow floating. The
ferry, upside down then, sinks at once and the air in
the hull is compressed more and more - to say 6-7 bar when
it touches bottom at 80 metres. The volume of the air in the
hull is then compressed to less than 3 000
m3.
In model scale, the model will float with equivalent of 7
056 m3reserve
buoyancy, i.e. 105 litres, and you have to
remove these 105 litres of air, at once, to allow the model
to sink. If you only remove 6.7 litres each minute (429
m3/min full scale) it takes the model 16-17
minutes to sink ... as shown in model tests videos but it
has nothing to do with reality. You must evidently remove
all the excess air ... at once! And that's where the
model test goes wrong! Apart from ignoring constant buoyancy
in the hull, superstructure and deck house due to solid
volumes there being submerged.
Fullscale Computer Simulations
The full scale computer simulations done by
Safety at Sea, Glasgow, strangely also copy the slow,
16-17 minutes, sinking as per SSPA model tests. But in full
scale the air is compressed at once after capsize and the
ship should sink immediately it that were the case ... so
why does the computer animation exactly copy the model
sinking? Air being let out? It is not possible! The Glasgow
company Safety at Sea Ltd's (associated with
Strathclyde University) computer simulation is full scale
and there is no need to let out air. The computer
simulations are also faked! One moment the simulated ship is
seen floating upside down with bottom/keel high above
waterline, the next is sinks ... slowly. But there is no way
the air inside the hull can escape ... slowly. The authors
of the simulation, Dracos Vassalos and Andrzej
Jasionowski, suggest that water flows up from below??
But where does the air go? It is quite serious when
scientists of a university starts to fake their work!
Because that is what they are doing. Actually the work is
done by underpaid students that are forced to manipulate the
input to achieve the desired result of their teachers!
Summary
The model tests and theoretical calculations by
Vinnova/SSPA of Estonia capsizing does not compare with or
reflect full scale or reality.
As Estonia, full scale, would have floated after
capsize, the model would also have floated, albeit much
higher, and never sunk regardless if some adjustments were
done by allowing trapped air to escape.
If Estonia full scale, would not have floated
after capsize, she would have sunk immediately. To show this
in model scale, you have to allow, say 105 litres of trapped
air, to escape at once. To play around with one valve
letting out only 6.7 litres each minute, first aft and later
fwd, delays the sinking 16-17 minutes, actually seen in the
model tests videos. But it has nothing to with reality. The
computer simulations of the same thing by Safety at
Sea, Glasgow, are also faked! This is very serious and
has nothing to do with real safety at sea that Heiwa
Co works for.
Vinnova and Chalmers'
University deny Faults with Estonia
Study (15 October
2008)
Below letter has been sent to Vinnova. A similar letter
has been sent to the Head Master Karin Markides and the
Board of Governors of Chalmers' University.
Verksledningen/GD Per Eriksson, Lena Gustafsson,
Eva Lindencrona
VINNOVA
101 58 STOCKHOLM
Sweden
Beausoleil 8 June 2008
Ref. Heiwa/AB 08.06.032
Dear Ms Gustafsson, Ms Lindencrona and Mr
Eriksson
Re: Falsified research financed by VINNOVA
(The Estonia sinking study 2005-2008)
Regretfully I have to report that the SSPA
consortia appointed by Vinnova 2006 to explain the
MV Estonia sinking has provided you with misleading
scientific reports based on wilfully manipulated
model tests and computer animations, etc.
The SSPA consortia consists of of Chalmers
University (its Shipping and Marine Technology
department), Gothenburg, SSPA Marin AB, Gothenburg,
MARIN, Holland and Strathclyde University, Glasgow,
Scotland and all four parties are providing false
reports.
The project has regularly been reported in the
media. The project was completed on 23 May 2008
with a work shop at Stockholm. I assume you are now
going to report to the Swedish government that the
project is completed.
The fakery is described at Heiwa Co web
site and can be summarized as follows:
Model tests by SSPA use a manipulated model that
cannot capsize or sink and is remotely controlled
to produce a strange heeling and sinking that
contradicts all laws of physics. The model deck
house is made air tight to prevent too rapid
flooding/capsize upside down and the model hull is
arranged to allow air to escape when it is upside
down so that it sinks (otherwise it would not
sink).
Computer animations by Strathclyde are simply
falsified to copy the behaviour of the faked model
tests. The animations cannot be supported by
correct mathematical calculations of stability and
floatability.
Laboratory tests by MARIN about inflow into a
superstructure (sic - should be deck house) are
also manipulated to support the above fakery.
Chalmers (Department of Shipping and Marine
Technology) have contributed with various reports
to support what can be seen in the false model
tests and animations. Professor Rutgersson is no
doubt aware of the manipulations of SSPA and
Strathclyde and has adjusted his findings and
reports accordingly.
The manipulations are very easy to confirm! Just
check the model deck house and model hull with its
illicit control gears or allow some independent
experts verify the findings. Please advise what
action you intend to take.
With kind regards
Yours sincerely
Anders Björkman, M.Sc.
Vinnova has replied 16 June
2008 that everything is in order. Chalmers (Karin
Markides) suggests also (later) the same thing. Below was
sent to Vinnova 18 June 2008:
Dear Mr Eriksson.
Thank you for your answer and explanations by
the SSPA-consortium. In the meantime I have sent
the below e-mail to the SSPA and HSVA
consortia:
Quote
----- Original Message -----
From: Anders Björkman
To: d.vassalos@na-me.ac.uk ; Andrzej Jasionowski
; krueger@tu-harburg.de ; Claes Källström
; Björn Allenström ; Olle Rutgersson ;
valanto@hsva.de
Cc: karin.markides@chalmers.se ; John
Graffman
Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 7:48 AM
Subject: Vinnova - Estonia research
Gents,
As you know I am reviewing your research and
publish articles about it and would be grateful for
answers of some questions. Pls cc this message to
relevant assistants of your research incl. members
of your Panel of Experts:
1. Intitial inflow:
All SSPA model tests indicate an inflow of >2
000 tons/min with open ramp in the given conditions
resulting in an angle of heel >45° within a
couple of minutes.This does not tally with
survivors testimonies and the JAIC report.
1.1 Why is this simple fact not emphasized in
the final reports?
1.2 Why is this not shown in the computer
animation?
1.3 Why does the computer animation show ECR
crew watching monitors at <2° heel, when
the crew was not in the ECR then?
1.4 Why does the computer animation show
evacuation at <10° heel and rolling, when
model tests show that vessel heeling does not stop
then?
1.5 How could two ECR crew reach open, port
(upper) deck 7 after evacuation?
2. Floating on deck house:
The Estonia had 170+ windows in the starboard
side deck house, decks 4-6, with a total pane area
> 110 m² and also normal doors in the aft
bulkhead. The SSPA model tests indicate heavy
rolling at heel >45° and you would expect
all these windows to break and the doors in the aft
bulkhead to be pushed in by waves/water when
submerged resulting in massive inflow of water into
the deck house. However, only a small inflow is
recorded in the model test as only two windows per
deck are assumed 'broken'; at one time the model
floats at 90° heel with about six metres of
deck house submerged and 18 metres above water line
and rolling severly. Windows are generally not
permitted in a superstructure and, if fitted, must
be fitted with permanent, internal closing devices
of steel to provide weather tightness.
2.1 Why are only two windows per deck aft
assumed being broken allowing water inflow?
2.2 Why are no (MARIN) model tests done of deck
house (pls not 'superstructure') flooding at
90° heel with deck house side six metres below
water?
2.3 Why do you insist that the deck house is a
weather tight superstructure, when according
international standards/rules it is a simple deck
house that does not provide any buoyancy at any
time?
2.4 Can you give any example of a ship floating
on a deck house prior sinking?
3. Floating/sinking upside down:
When a vessel has capsized upside down, the
compressed air trapped in the intact hull provides
buoyancy. If the buoyancy exceeds the weight of the
vessel, it floats and cannot sink. If the buoyancy
is less than the weight of the vessel, it sinks
immediately (and persons can be trapped in air
pockets inside the sunken vessel; compare e.g. a
submarine). In the Estonia case it seems it took 20
minutes for the air to compress to allow sinking
and this was simulated in model scale by allowing
air to escape through two vents!
3.1 Does it really take long time for air to be
compressed inside a capsized hull and does the
buoyancy of a capsized vessel diminish with time
after capsize?
3.2 If answer is yes, can you give any
examples?
4. General, Definition of wave
impact.:
The project description included investigation
of other possible sinking scenarios and assistance
by a Panel of Experts.
4.1 Why didn't you investigate sinking due to
hull leakage below waterline and loss of (hull)
buoyancy as cause of accident?
4.2 Do all members of your Panel of Experts
agree with your findings?
4.3 What is your definition of a wave impact and
what force/load does it apply to a structure (bow
visor, window pane)?
Kind regards
Anders Björkman
Heiwa Co - European Agency for Safety at Sea
Un-quote
So I repeat:
SSPA model tests show clearly that the inflow of
water into the superstructure through an open ramp
(visor has ripped open the ramp and initiated the
accident that now starts 15 minutes earlier than
according JAIC) is of the order 2 000 tons/minute
and that an angle of heel >45° degrees
develops within a couple of minutes (full scale -
less than a minute model scale). This is not
according to testimonies of survivors and would
prevent any evacuation of any kind. The computer
animation shows something completely different.
It is quite clear from testimonies that the
engine crew outside the ECR observes, like all the
passengers, the heavy rolling and a stable heel
<15° durig several minutes that enables the
passengers and some crew to escape to open deck 7
during about 10 minutes. The engine crew on the
other hand returns to the ECR ... and observes a
closed ramp 2-3 minutes later, stays in the ECR for
5-10 minutes and then escapes, two of them to deck
7 port side, when the heel exceeds 60°. An
impossible task.
So the SSPA model tests thus show that the heel
becomes >45° very quickly (see e.g. fig 37
in SSPA Final report) and then it is suggested that
the ferry floats on the deck house for 22 minutes
with heeling increasing from 45° - 90°.
Reason is that only two (!) side windows on each of
decks 4, 5 and 6 break and allow water inflow into
the deck house.
There is no scientific evidence of any kind that
only two windows per deck breaks. According
internationl standards, experience and regulations
a deck house is not water tight, weather tight or
air tight and is flooded momentarily when submerged
as all windows break and doors are pushed open. If
the deck house, decks 4-6, were a superstructure,
as suggested by the SSPA consortia, windows are
generally not permitted at all, and, if fitted for
any reason, must be arranged with an internal
closing device of steel, etc. Doors must be weather
tight with six closing toggles and with a sill of a
certain height. The MARIN tests of flooding
superstructure (sic) deck 4 do not prove anything
as only 2 windows in the side are open and the
openings are just below water.
Actually the alleged floating on the deck house
(called superstructure (sic) by SSPA) is the most
obvious falsification of the research. Any ship
does not ever float on a deck house. A ship does
not float on window panes.
Regarding the sinking of a capsized hull upside
down with bottom up that is floating on compressed
air trapped inside the hull, the proposals of SSPA
are nonsense. Either the capsized vessel floats
permanently on the compressed air as buoyancy
exceeds weight, or sinks immediately when weight
exceeds buoyancy as per Arkimedes. It does not take
20 minutes for the air to be compressed or the
buoyancy to be reduced to be less than the weight.
The arrangement with two valves in the bottom and
allowing air to escape in a controlled fashion due
to scale effects is foolish talk.
You are thus kindly recommended not to hand over
the SSPA/HSVA reports to the government until the
content has been properly verified by, e.g. any
reputable authorities. I would suggest that you ask
the classification societies Det Norske Veritas,
Registro Italiano Navale (RINA) and Japanese NK or
the experts you used to select the research
consortia in 2005 to comment upon
A. the rapid water inflow/flooding of the
car deck superstructure - does it tally with
testimonies and allow evacuation?,
B. the alleged floating on the deck house
- is it possible or should not the deck house be
flooded momentarily, i.e. the vessel should capsize
at once?, and
C. the mysterious sinking of the capsized
hull (what happens to the air and Arkimedes
principle?).
Reason why I did not attend the workshop was
that I was otherwise engaged and had already
informed the consortia of the above and had been
told by SSPA (Jazionowsky) that it was
unreasonable. HSVA (Valanto) could not offer any
comments at all.
Kind regards
Yours sincerely
Anders Björkman
No further clarifications have since been received from
Vinnova, the 'scientists' and Chalmers. It is however clear
that the latest research produce more new questions than
answers.
oo0oo
The Vinnova
Estonia Study 2005 - Amazing Findings 2008
The main expected output of the Vinnova Estonia 2005
study was an explanation of the most probable scenario for
the sinking sequence of MV Estonia 1994.
The surprising result is now known 2008!
MV Estonia loaded more than 2 000 tons of
water per minute through an open bow ramp opening
and heeled more than 45° starboard in a few minutes! In
spite of this 300 persons managed during 10 minutes to
escape to open decks and later to jump overboard to life
rafts in the water. According JAIC 1997 less than 300 tons
of water per minute were loaded.
MV Estonia floated then on the deck house for 22
minutes, while the list increased to 90°. Water
only leaked into the deck house very slowly through two (!)
broken deck house windows per deck. There are more than 50
windows per deck and several doors in the aft bulkhead.
According JAIC 1997 all windows broke at once on decks 4 and
5, when submerged, and the deck house filled with
14 000 tons of water in a few minutes. This is what
normally happens! Then MV Estonia capsized.
MV Estonia finally floated upside down on
compressed air inside the hull for 20 minutes and
drifted at 2.2 knots speed as witnessed by people in rafts
and lifeboats that also drifted at 2.2 knots and reported by
JAIC 1997. However, after 20 minutes the compressed air in
the MV Estonia stern compressed more (!) according latest
findings! The sinking sequence started at last
... as witnessed by some survivors in rafts and lifeboats
close by!
The sinking sequence
2008
MV Estonia thus lost its buoyancy in the stern when
she was upside down 45 minutes after initial water loading
in the superstructure started, so the stern sank and hit
bottom. The MV Estonia was then still floating (!)
with the bow above water. However, also the compressed air
in the bow section compressed more according latest
findings, buoyancy was reduced there too and the bow sank a
few minutes later. MV Estonia thus sank due to
air suddenly being compressed in the hull 25 minutes after
capsize! JAIC could not explain the sinking
1994-1997, i.e. that the air inside the hull was simply
compressed more after 45 minutes and buoyancy disappeared.
Has never happened before, though.
The above is the most probable scenario for
the sinking sequence of MV Estonia 1994 established 2008 by
Chalmers University, Gothenburg, SSPA Sweden
AB, Gothenburg, Strathclyde University, Glasgow,
Safety at Sea, Co, Ltd., Glasgow, MARIN,
Wageningen, HSVA, Hamburg and Harburg-Hamburg
Technical University, Hamburg, at a cost exceeding SEK
12M and 100's of working months of experts' times 2006-2008.
For strange reasons media has not yet reported these
revolutionary, new findings by so many well-known ship
research institutions, probably due to summer
vaccations.
SSPA ship model laboratory at Gothenburg is a Swedish
government owned company. It apparently produces scientific
reports to suit its Owner!
951205 SSPA produced report no. 7524/1995
that suggested that the Estonia visor and locks were subject
to very big wave and inertia loads that caused the loss of
the visor. The findings of that report cannot be verified by
independent experts and authorities and is thus an
embarrassment for SSPA!
The loads (inertia,
buoyancy, damping, friction, impact(?), etc) acting on a
visor and its locks consist of many different components and
there is no agreed procedure to scale up the various
components of the model loads recorded only by strain gauges
to full scale loads and then add them up. It is as simple as
that. And one load - the wave impact load - does not really
act on the whole visor and its locks. A wave impact only
produces a very high, local pressure of very short duration
on a small part of the visor surface. The energy of that
wave impact transmitted to the visor surface is generally
absorbed by the plate panel itself and is not transmitted to
the visor locks far away (or the strain gauges). To suggest
that you can record wave impacts on model visors with strain
gauges recording the total load on the visor is incorrect.
You need local pressure transducers for that … and SSPA
never used them. The report is thus nonsense. But it was
presented 1997 as evidence that
the Estonia visor was subject to big loads …
>1000 tons that knocked off the visor! Even worse, the
Finnish State Laboratory VTT produced a theoretical
simulation concluding the same thing. Another falsification
to support an initial falsification! International
cooperation of the worst kind.
080505 SSPA has produced report no. 134/2008 reviewed
below: It contains three serious errors:
1. In spite of recent model tests by SSPA itself 2007
showing that inflow through an open bow ramp of the Estonia
in the given conditions at the accident is >2 000
tons/minute causing a very rapid listing >45° within
a couple of minutes, the report concludes that it actually
didn't happen - the inflow must have been much less (JAIC
suggest <300 tons/minute) as the angle of heel was
<15° for 10 minutes allowing 300 persons to
evacuate.
2 It is suggested that Estonia was floating on its
deck house for 22 minutes as >250 windows in the side
with a total glass pane area >110 m² did not really
break when rolling and smashing into the waves and later
when submerged >10 metres! The flimsy doors at the aft
bulkhead of the deck house were also water tight! This is in
total contradiction with international standards and
experience that a deck house is not watertight and that its
windows always break when submerged and the complete full
scale deck house is flooded instantaneously. JAIC/Final
report strangely assumes decks 4 and 5 are
completely flooded but not decks 6 and 7 of the deck house.
They are watertight! You cannot have it both ways!
3. It is suggested that a capsized ship that
floats upside down for 20 minutes on compressed air
inside its hull suddenly sinks! The air in the aft
end of the hull is suddenly compressed more (after
20 minutes!) reducing buoyancy there and the stern
sinks. Then the air in the forward end of the hull
is compressed more (after a few more minutes!) and
the bow sinks. To demonstrate this in model scale
SSPA uses two vent valves!
Capsized,
floating vessel 22 June 2008!
So after 20 minute floating air is let out from the aft
part of the model via remote control of the vent … and
the stern sinks. And then this operation is repeated
forward. It has nothing to do with science.
It would appear that recidivism is rampant and beyond
control at SSPA.
oo0oo
The ultimate
manipulation - how SSPA faked the model tests
(to hide the true cause of
accident!)
The Vinnova MV Estonia sinking research
study ordered by the Swedish government 2005 was completed
with a public workshop at Stockholm 23 May 2008. The two
research consortia have submitted their final reports
(SSPA,
HSVA)
and supporting documents including videos of model tests and
computer animations (1000's of pages and 100's of MBs of
cyber space).
Their conclusions are one and
the same. The Estonia sinking took place more or
less as explained by the JAIC 1994-1997 (!), i.e.
the visor was lost, water was loaded on deck 2 (the
car deck) of the superstructure and the vessel
heeled suddenly >45°, it takes less than
three minutes, and was then floating on the deck
house (!) for 22 minutes full-scale, when the
heel angle slowly became 60, 70, 80 and 90° as
per figure left (no. 37 of the SSPA Final report)!
Then the vessel capsized, heel increased 90° -
150° in one minute, and the vessel floated
upside down.
Only six aft windows of total 250+ deck house
windows (2.4% !) in the submerged starboard side are assumed
to break when impacted by waves and submerged 10 metres
below water. There is totally >110 m² of glass panes
in the side and all should be broken and pushed in! But SSPA
only allows <1 m² of windows to break allowing a
very small water inflow. JAICon the other hand suggested 1997 that all windows
on decks 4 and 5 were broken and that the deck house filled
with 14 000 tons of water! Capsize was however prevented as
the vessel floated on buoyancy in decks 6 and 7 (??) - deck
house decks 6 and 7 were watertight. SSPA changes the JAIC
data but the result is the same. The vessel was thus
floating (!) on the deck house and allowed to trim on
the stern before heel exceeded 90° and capsize (sic)
occurred … as shown in model tests and
animations.And then the model floated upside
down ... and suddenly sank!
However, it is all due to clever,
intentional manipulations of the alleged scientific work of
which all consortia participants must be aware!
Industry (IMO/SOLAS) safety standard is
that a deck house does not provide any buoyancy at any time!
A deck house is not water tight ... or air tight. It leaks
like a basket.
To demonstrate and suggest the opposite
is intellectual
violence of the worst kind -
to fool innocent survivors and relatives ... and everybody
else!
The manipulations are however very easy
to see in the SSPA model test video at the consortia
web site. If the
link does not work try here!
There is also a computer
animation of the same event
that differs completely from the model test. Some examples
will be shown.
Fig. 1 At time
00:20 - a wave sloshes against closed bow ramp.
Note that there are no windows/openings in the
port, white deck house above the blue
superstructure. Actually the model deck house is
made air tight on the port, forward and aft sides,
so that the model will not capsize, when the deck
house comes below water!
The manipulated tests are good
evidence that everything JAIC stated 1994-1997 is
wrong! Evidently the Estonia did not sink due
to a lost visor + water in the superstructure. If
that were the case, there is no need to falsify
model tests 14 years later! MV Estonia sank
due to hull leakage below waterline as suggested by
Heiwa Co since September 1994.
The model test video starts with
a 48 seconds sequence (00:06-00:54) with ramp
closed and 14 pitching bow movements up/down as
expected. You can see that the ferry could have
sailed without visor! The waves push the ramp aft
against the superstructure.
Fig. 2 At time
01:04 the ramp opens. Note windows in starboard
deck house side. Details of the windows are not
clear - are they open or just painted ... or both?
In the model test only two (!) starboard deck house
windows on each deck 4-6 aft (there are 250+
windows in each side) are assumed to be broken
allowing water to enter. This has nothing to do
with reality! A ship does not float on thin window
panes.
At video time 01:04 the ramp
opens and water is loaded on the car deck during
about 25 seconds (01:04-01:29) and 6-7 bow ramp
opening pitching movements below water and the
vessel quickly heels >20° to starboard as
expected.
Fig. 3 Ramp
opens in computer animation. Note windows in deck
house front. Computer animation does not show the
initial heeling.
The ramp opening is also shown
in the computer animation but no water inflow or
heeling.
Fig. 4 At time
01:24 abt. 100-200 tons water (full-scale) is
pushed into the superstructure, when deck 2 is
below the waves. It happens every 6-8 seconds
full-scale or 2-3 seconds model-scale and is a very
noisy event (if it takes place?).
At every bow pitching below
water 100-200 tons of water is pushed into the
superstructure like a tsunami causing an enormous
noise! No survivors heard anything like
that.
Fig. 5 At time
01:50 vessel has just started the port turn and
more water enters on deck 2.
At time 01:30 (80-90 seconds
full-scale after ramp was opened) the alleged turn
to port seems to be initiated and the vessel is
slowing down; more water is loaded on the car deck
through the open ramp when 16 waves are scooped up
(01:30-02.31).
Fig. 6 At time
02:18 the turn continues and vessel slows down ...
and more water has entered into the superstructure
and the deck house comes under
water.
Fig. 7 Engine
crew watches a closed ramp before the sudden
heeling in computer animation. The actual event
took place 2-3 minutes after the heeling
started!
The vessel is then heeling
>40°. Evacuation is then not possible.
Nobody can walk on a deck that is sloping 40°
(maximum is <18°). All survivors have
testified that the angle of heel was much, much
less (<15°) for at least 10 minutes
allowing >300 persons to reach open decks! The
development of the heel goes much faster than
reported by witnesses. See also fig. 9 below. It is
now, 2-3 minutes full-scale, 50-80 seconds
model-scale, after heeling started that the engine
crew has gathered in the ECR and observes a
closed ramp according to JAIC! The
angle of heel is already >40°!!
Fig. 8 Water
sprays in at forward ramp.
The engine
crew remains another
6-8 minutes in the ECR - starts pumps, talks to the
bridge, etc. They do not panic in spite of the big
heel! In the computer animation this event takes
place much earlier - before any heeling has started
(!) and the floor is horizontal. They only see a
closed (!) ramp with some water spraying
in.
Actually - there was no engine
crew in the ECR before the heeling occurred! The
closed ramp was observed 2-3 minutes after
the heeling/big rollling started and when the
engine crew had gathered in the ECR. According to
the model tests the heel is then
>45°.
Fig. 9 Computer
animated passenger evacuation at <10° heel.
According model tests the ferry is never in this
position very long!
It is now the passengers start
to evacuate. In the computer animation evacuation
takes place when the heel is <10°; a
position that occurs during only 10 seconds in the
model tests.
Fig. 10 At time
03:26 the vessel has stopped sideways in the waves.
No more water is scooped up through the ramp
opening
The computer animation is quite
misleading.
The model test video is then
interrupted (02:34-03:01) by a 'Model scale speed'
(?) insert. It seems to be some pictures of
water starting to flood the deck house through some
pipes?
At 03:02 the video continues;
the model is then sideways in the waves, the
engines are stopped, the heel is >45° and
the vessel 'floats on the deck
house'. >110 m² of windows in
the side are not broken!
Fig. 11 Computer
animation of 35-40° heel. Center of gravity G
is above center of buoyancy B. This is the critical
angle when vessel would turn upside down. But it
does not happen in the model tests!
This is not a stable condition -
there is no equilibrium and you would expect the
deck house* to fill up quickly with water, the
model to capsize - heel 90° and float upside
down with heel 180° within a few minutes
full-scale (the hull is full of 18 000
m3 air), but it
does not happen! It is now the manipulations
start!
*A superstructure is weather tight and no
windows are allowed and any opening in it must be
as strong as the steel enclosure preventing water
inflow. A deck house with thin window panes
is as watertight as a cane basket!
Fig. 12 At time
04:13 the vessel drifts sideways in the waves.
Starboard side is facing the incoming waves. You
would expect the vessel to turn upside down =
capsize.
The model deck house - all
spaces above deck 4 - is arranged so that the water
inflow is very small!
There are no window
openings on the port (upper) side or in the front
or aft bulkeads of the deck house (!). Water enters
only through a few broken windows below water in
the starboard side aft to allow the vessel to trim
on the stern and later sink on the stern. This
manipulation provides buoyancy in the deck house
that does not exist in reality!
Fig. 13 At time
06:24 the vessel has reached this impossible
position. It is not stable unless the white deck
house is full of air below water line! This is the
basic manipulation to prevent
capsize.
Between say 06:00-11:00 the
model is heeling >60° sideways in the waves
and rolling totally >40° i.e. between
40° and 80° heel.
Any survivors should have
experienced this as a roller coaster trip but it
never happened in reality. Evidently all windows in
the starboard side would be broken at this time,
but SSPA does not allow it. One reason for the
violent and unusual rolling is the behaviour of the
buoyancy in the deck house that will reinforce the
rolling! In reality there is no buoyancy in a deck
house.
Fig. 14 At time 06:50 the
vessel rolls severely.
Fig. 15 At time 06:54 the
roll is maximum.
Fig. 16 At time 10.10 the
vessel rolls severely.
Fig. 17 At time 10:14 the
roll is maximum. Note the valve in the
bottom!
Fig. 18 At time
11:18 the vessel rolls severely. But the >4000
tons of water (full-scale) inside the
superstructure does not trim the vessel.
There is >4 000 tons of water
(full-scale) in the superstructure and you would
expect it to trim the model, i.e. flow aft (trim on
stern) or flow forward (trim on bow) ... and flow
out. You wonder where the 4 000 tons of water is?
Water on the other hand flows into the deck house
only through broken windows aft and trims the
vessel on the stern.
Fig. 19 At time
11:53 the deckhouse side decks 4-5 are permanently
under water. Two 'broken' windows aft are
indicated in the red ring. No water can enter
through the other 'windows'!
Fig. 20 Computer
animation of the deckhouse side decks 4-5
permanently under water. In the animation the
windows are assumed not to break and there is
plenty of buoyancy in the deck house! In reality
all the windows should be broken.
At time 11:53 the starboard side
windows of decks 4 and 5 are permanently below
water; windows of decks 6-8 are below water when
the vessel rolls down … but the water cannot
freely fill the inside spaces as inflow is
restricted to a few windows at the aft end
only.
Fig. 21 At time
11:56 the deckhouse side decks 6-8 are under water
when vessel rolls.
Fig. 22 At time
12.46 the deckhouse side decks 4-5 are permanently
under water.
All windows
should be broken due to the severe rolling and
waves hitting the thin window panes, but little
water is seen flooding the deck house. In the model
test only two starboard windows on each of decks 4,
5 and 6 aft are broken! This is completely
unrealistic!
Fig. 23 Computer
animation of the deckhouse side decks 4-5
permanently under water. Only a few windows aft are
alleged to be broken. It is suggested that the
engine room is flooded through narrow ventilation
trunks and that the flooding of the engine room
goes quicker than the flooding of the deck house.
There is no evidence for that! The deck house
should be flooded instantaneously and the vessel
should capsize and float upside
down!
Same observations can be done
later at 12:30-14:00. At time 12:46 there are
underwater pictures of the whole
starboard side above deck 4 below water -
and you would expect the deck house to fill up 100%
with water!
Fig. 24 At time
13:23 the vessel has reached this impossible
position. Capsize is prevented by air in the deck
house.
Fig. 25 Only
reason why vessel floats at time 13:59 is that the
model deck house acts as an air tight life west
preventing capsize. It is a serious manipulation to
fool the public.
The vessel is rolling
20-30° around a heel angle of 60° and you
would expect all windows on starboard side to
break, when impacted by the waves allowing
a
substantial inflow
of water into the deck house. But it does not
take place!Flooding into Deck No 4, 5
and 6 could only take place through two (!) open
windows in the starboard aft part on each deck of
the model according to SSPA. So the model
floats on the air inside the deck house below
waterline! No capsize can take place as you would
expect. But the vessel trims on the stern due to
the water in the deck house.
Fig. 26 The
computer animation evidently shows the windows in
the port side - but then the condition is
permanently unstable and the vessel should turn
turtle.
In the computer animation this
position is shown in figure 26.
Fig. 27 For this
animated condition with 40-50° heel to be
stable the deck house must be assumed to be full of
air below waterline. The designers of the animation
thus know that the model tests were going to be
manipulated and vice versa!
And it is backed up with the
animation in figure 27.
Fig. 28 Only
reason why vessel floats at time 16.06 is that the
model deck house acts as a life west preventing
capsize.
Fig. 29 Only
reason why vessel floats at time 16.26 is that the
model deck house acts as a life west preventing
capsize.
Between 13:13-25:10 the vessel
is floating with 80° heel angle sideways in
the waves and it is only due to water not being
able to flood the deck house!
Fig. 30
Impossible floating condition at time 16:27. It is
now the engine crew crawls out of the funnel and
... climbs up the vertical deck 8 to the upper port
side. The engine crew was very agile! Climbing 10
meters straight up!
It is now the ECR
crew escapes and
arrives at the funnel ... and climbs up to the port
deck house side 10 metres above! All lies of
course!
Fig. 31
Impossible floating condition of a ferry under any
circumstances!! A vessel cannot float like this!
90° heel! Center of gravity G is outside
center of buoyancy B and turns vessel uppside down.
Only by adding buoyancy in the deck house you
achive equilibrium. This is Hollywood (at
Strathclyde!).
In the computer animation this
unstable condition is shown stable as in figure 31
left.
It would be interesting to see
the stability calculations behind the animation.
You need plenty of air in the deck house below
water for extra buoyancy there to achieve
stability! But such buoyancy does not exist in
reality. A deck house is not water tight. It is
flooded momentarily.
Fig. 32 At time
22:16 the ramp opening is permanently under water
and the complete superstructure is flooded. It is
an impossible floating condition of a ferry under
any circumstances!! A vessel cannot float like
this! 90° heel! This is Hollywood (at
Gothenburg!).
Fig. 33 At time
22:21 the model at 90° heel starts to sink
lower in the water
The ramp opening is soon
permanently below water.
Fig. 34 At time
23:30 the model is still at 90° heel. It takes
time to flood the deck house as only two windows
aft per deck are open.
Fig. 35 At time
23:34 the model is still at 90° heel. It takes
time to release the air in the deck
house.
Fig. 36 Computer
animation of stable condition at 90° list.
Note that the starboard side broken windows are 10
meters below water - but the model still floats on
air/buoyancy in the deck house (indicated by a
green
frame) below waterline
(red
line). This manipulation shifts center of buoyancy
B below centre of gravity G to obtain equilibrium.
It is a criminal manipulation!
Fig. 37 Only two
deck house windows aft per deck are assumed broken.
The vessel floats on thin window panes!
The condition at say time
23:30-23:34 is simply impossible from stability
point of view; 90° heel, bow ramp opening
continuously below water and the
superstructure full of water. Only
air below waterline in the deck house providing
buoyancy can achieve it!
The flat starboard deck house
side is then 10 metres (!) below water full of
openings (all windows should be broken but in the
model test only two large windows in the aft part
on each deck 4-6 are open (!)) and the deck house
can then not provide any buoyancy for equilibrium!
It is only by wilfully (intentionally!)
preventing water to enter at the starboard bottom
side and the
air
(at least >15 000
m3
full scale) inside the deck
house to
escape that the model floats stable at this
time. If the deck house fills with
water
up to the waterline,
the vessel turns upside down very
quickly.
Fig. 38 Computer
animation of stable condition at 90° list and
with brave survivors checking the bow ramp. This is
really Hollywood stuff!
Fig. 39 At time
25:19 the model is still at 90° heel but the
ramp is completely below water indicating the car
deck superstructure is completely full of
water.
In the computer animation two
brave survivors decide to have a look at the ramp
when the list is >90°!
Fig. 40
Schematic of cross section of Estonia at 90°
heel and draught d. G is the centre of
gravity/weight of the ship, B1 is the centre of
buoyancy of the hull, B2 is the centre of buoyancy
of the air below waterline in the deck house that
exists according SSPA. If B2 does not exist the
vessel heels to 180° (upside down) and floats
on B1 (above G) at once. The
violet
area is
the air column of height h in the deck house below
waterline that achieves extra buoyancy and a stable
condition at 90° heel. Normal air is shown as
yellow! h is also the solid water pressure head on
the windows at d below waterline. No window pane
can resist that pressure. All windows panes will
break immediately. A ship does not float on window
panes!
MARIN has done model tests of
the flooding of the deck house between decks 4-5
only - but only at small angles of heel and with
two (!) windows open. And MARIN believes the deck
house is a superstructure*(!). The MARIN study is
part of the manipulations.
*A superstructure is weather tight and no
windows are allowed and any opening in it must be
as strong as the steel enclosure preventing water
inflow. A deck house with thin window panes
is as watertight as a cane basket!
It appears that the SSPA staff
arranged the model deck house by only a few
openings aft to prevent the deck house being
flooded instantaneously as expected when
submerged!
But it is very crude! The model floats much too
high in the water at the beginning due to very large B2 (see
fig. 40). The model deck house should be examined by
independent controllers or auditors.To
achieve a horizontal sinking before capsize or heel
>90° also the hull was modified to control hull
buoyancy B1. The latter was then used to actually sink the
model after capsize. The manipulations were not done by
amateurs.
It is very simple to demonstrate that
immediate capsize takes place in any model tank at
zero speed and no waves with the
existing model ,when the deck house is submerged. Just
provide some realistic openings in the model deck house
starboard side and aft end, so that water can flood
the deck house and some openings in the port side to
allow air to escape! Initially the E-model floats upright
but when 3 000 tons of water (full scale) is loaded on deck
2 to simulate flooding of it, the model heels >45°
and the starboard side deck house decks 4 and 5 come below
water and the deck house is flooded instantaneously and the
model continues to heel to 180° upside down (like the
MV Jan Heweliusz). This can also be shown by simple
animations, e.g. static stability calculations. Both
consortia assume and state the opposite - that the windows
do not break and that it takes 22 minutes to fill the deck
house through some small openings - to support a false
sinking scenario and provide manipulated model tests and
animations to this effect. It is not only
unscientific; it is criminal!
Fig. 41 At time
25:31 the model is >90° heel and waves are
sloshing over the port upper side.
When the model has abt. 90°
heel at say time 23:30, i.e. the port upper side is
horizontal and the ferry starts to capsize (!!)
90° to 150° heel without trimming. The
amount of air remaining in the hull at this
time decides whether the ship will float or sink
after capsize.
Fig. 42 At time
26:49 big waves are sloshing over the port upper
side.
Fig. 43 At time
27:13 is the last video picture of the model above
water. It is floating almost upside down. Note the
wide open ramp and compare with fig.
37.
Big waves are seen sweeping
across the port upper side of the deck house until
27:13 when the model rolls upside down (the ramp is
still open (!) - it does not close) and after that
only underwater footage is shown; thus we cannot
see the underwater
hull now above water
to establish the buoyancy available.
Fig. 44
Animation of vessel floating upside down. Evidently
no air can escape from the watertight hull then and
the ship should continue to float. But by releasing
air through a hidden vent in the bottom the model
sinks.
How the air - 16 822
m3 - trapped and
compressed to <11 214 m3inside
the intact hull below the car deck at this time
escapes is not known. In the model test it is
evacuated via two vents(!), one aft and one
forward, so that the model actually sinks. The
explanation (sic) is that this manipulation is
required due to scale effects! So SSPA first opens
the aft valve and the stern sinks. And then they
open the forward vent and the bow sinks. There is
also 3 906 m3 buoyant material in
the superstructure and deck house to assist
floating. The weight of the vessel is only 11 930
tons (or m3) so 3 191 m3
hull is above waterline after capsize!
Fig. 45 At time
28:47 the model is floating almost upside
down.
Fig. 46 Computer
animation of floating upside down. This is a
condition witnessed by survivors around 30 minutes
after the heeling started. There is no reason for
the ship to sink after reaching this position! Many
capsized ships have floated upside down like this
for weeks after capsize, e.g. Jan
Heweliusz.
Fig. 47 At time
31:34 the model is still floating almost upside
down. The black buoy floating beside the upside
down hull was previously located on the model and
is now floating freely. It supports the cable that
is used to remote control the two valves in the
bottom of the hull to produce the
'sinking'.
Fig. 48 At time
32:38 the model the stern starts to sink. SSPA is
releasing air trapped in the aft hull to achieve
sinking. Otherwise the model would never sink on
the stern.
Fig. 49 At time
33:48 the model stern hits bottom. Later SSPA opens
a vent forward and allows air trapped in the hull
forward to escape so that the bow sinks. Quite
stupid manipulations,
actually.
The video does not show the hull
above water after 27:13. You can maybe see the air
being released through the vent - like a whale
blowing out air?
The model should evidently have
continued to float after rolling upside down if the
buoyancy of the hull (the compressed air),
superstructure and deck house exceeded the weight.
Or it would have sunk at once if the weight
exceeded the available buoyancy. SSPA has announced
that they allowed the air in the hull to escape
through two vents(!). Otherwise the model would not
sink - a ship that suddenly capsizes upside down
generally floats ... upside down on the air trapped
in the hull, when buoyancy exceeds weight! If the
weight exceeds the buoyancy, the ship sinks at once
as per Arkimedes! However the model stern hits
bottom at video time 33:48. The model thus lost
buoyancy aft first! Very strange.
Fig. 50 At time
34:37 the model bow disappears below the
surface.
The video includes a few seconds
of the bulb at the bow still above
water.
Actually the model should drift
upside down for twenty minutes full-scale (8-9
minutes model-scale) at 2.2 knots speed to reach
the wreck position. It is not possible. The video
and animation are nice pieces of pure propaganda
and misinformation!
So why did the SSPA and HSVA consortia scientists and the
SSPA Industrial Panel of Experts decide to manipulate the
research with this stupid deck house trick to fool the
public? Were they subject to pressure from forces of
intolerance and insane self-assertion to cover up the fact
that the Estonia sank due to leakage below waterline? Anyway
- their professional reputations and those of their
institutions are definitely destroyed for ever. Vinnova has
cooked a soup in a basket.
oo0oo
Announcement by
SSPA/Chalmers/Strathclyde/MARIN
7th April 2008 (actually published on their web
site15 April 2008)
"It is hereby announced that the project has entered
into its final stages of synthesis of the available
evidence. All final reports, relevant data and the video
from physical model experiment on the most likely sinking
sequence conducted on the 3rd April 2008 at SSPA’s
laboratory in Gothenburg will be made available in early May
2008. A final international workshop will be held in
Stockholm on 23rd of May 2008 to facilitate public
discussion and exchange of opinions on the outcome from this
investigation."
So then we will know (1) how fastthe
Estonia model heeled to 37° due to water
noisily loaded on the superstructure car deck and then (2)
how she floated on the (model) deck house for
20-25 minutes (full scale) and (3) how at least 18 000
m3
air trapped in the (model) hull leaked out during
another 20-25 minutes (full scale), when vessel (model)
floated upside down until sinking, and (4) how she
moved/drifted between the position of alleged visor
loss and the final position of the
impossible sinkingfor about 50 minutes (full
scale)!
oo0oo
Does a ferry float on a
deck house?
Above picture illustrates how a ro-pax ferry floats and
heels <37° with water on a
cardeck
above waterline. With no water on the car deck the ferry is
evidently upright with its centre of gravity G above
the hull centre of buoyancy B. With
water on the car deck it
heels, G shifts to the heeling side and B
shifts as well - there is balance and a stable condition.
Easy to show with proper stability
calculations.
The second picture shows what happens when
more water is loaded on the car
deck and when the (green)
deck house becomes
submerged below the waterline. G shifts outside of
the hull centre of buoyancy B and the ferry will
capsize (turn upside down), unless it floats on the
deck house! Heiwa
Co described it in a book
1998.
The ferry will only float (and never sink) and will not
capsize as long as the red part of
the deck house is 100% watertight! Does anybody
believe that the Estonia deck house was watertight? There
were 200 windows in the side between decks 4 and 7! No ferry
has ever floated on a deck house! According international
standards a deckhouse is immediately flooded when submerged
and does not provide any buoyancy.
Estonia had about 50 windows in the side
of deck 4 with a total area of abt 18 m² or just 5% of
the total wall area. The window panes brake at about 0.1-0.2
bar pressure and the inflow of water is then of the order 4
800 m3/min. When the
windows of deck 5 comes under water the inflow rate is the
same, while it increases to say 8 400
m3/min for the windows at
deck 4 as they are submerged more. Total inflow is then of
the order 13 200 m3/min.
When the windows of deck 6 comes under water the inflow
there is 4 800 m3/min
(same as deck 4 in the beginning) while the inflow at deck 5
becomes 8 400 m3/min as
they are submerged more and 10 800
m3/min for the windows at
deck 4 as they are now submerged most. Total inflow into
the deck house is
then 22 400
m3/min and
it increases rapidly when the side is submerged more. As
the total volume of the deck
house is abt 22 000
m3, it is clear that the
deck house fills up 100%
within less than two minutes ... and the ferry capsizes like
Herald of Free Enterprise. It is not possible that Estonia
floats on the deck house
for 20-25 minutes full-scale (or 3-4 minutes model-scale) as
in the SSPA tests!
So how happened that the SSPA model didn't capsize
with a submerged non-watertight
deck house?
Was the deck house
arranged with hidden floating aids inside (like some rubber
balloons that were deflated during the tests or some other
arrangement to prevent water inflow and escape of air to
fake slow flooding of the deck
house and associated slow heeling and sinking)?
The deck house (picture
below) has no windows or openings in the port side at all
(!) that would allow air to escape when the starboard side
becomes submerged and the deck house is flooded with
water.
SSPA will provide full description of the
deck house and
associated stability calculations by 5 May 2008 to be
further discussed at an international ship safety symposium
on 23 May 2008 at Stockholm.
SSPA will then also explain how the compressed air
trapped in the hull after capsize managed to escape
allowing the model to actually sink.
The model heels fast, when water is loaded on
the car deck and the deck house (deck 4
upwards) is submerged. However, then the model
floats on the deck house for a long
time!
Why there is no inflow of water into the
deck house is a mystery. We see all
deck house windows in the side deep under
water and waves. And the windows should be
broken!
The model should very quickly - at heel angle
>37° - continue to flood the deck
house and heel to 180°, i.e. floating
position upside down. A stable heel condition with,
e.g. 70-80° heel does not exist in reality! At
that time the model rolls 20° around the heel
angle. Probably the model has floatability built
into the deck house that does
not exist in reality! Why put on a deck house that
does not fulfill any function. What is hidden in
the deck house?
The model then floats at 90° heel and with
the complete superstructure - the car deck -
flooded (abt 25 minutes into the video).
A totally impossible stable floating
condition.
But then finally the complete deck house is flooded
... and the model heels upside down ... slowly. The floating
condition shown in the picture below (next section) is not
shown after 26.58 minutes of the video! Instead underwater
pictures are shown. The Estonia floats upside down. And then
the stern sinks. Very strange. How does the air trapped
in the stern escape?
Heiwa Co will analyse the SSPA video further, when
all details of the model, incl. its deck house, are
available.
oo0oo
SSPA model tests 3 April 2008 now done
(DN
20080404)
"In the big basin of the SSPA test laboratory that can
simulate wind and where the model of the Estonia can head
into wind and waves to simulate the weather of the night of
the disaster until the bow ramp opens and allows water to
be loaded on the car deck:
- It produces a heeling that causes the ship
to turn, so it rests at 90 degrees against the
waves. The engines stop and the heeling
increases. When windows come under water, they
are pushed in and water flows down into the
hull via ventilation trunks and
others. Then the ship turns
upside down and sinks, explains
SSPA research boss Claes Källström.
In reality it took almost an hour for the Estonia to
sink. In the scale used in the SSPA basin it takes about
eight minutes until the stern sinks, the bow rises up a
short moment, while the last air bubbles out through the
open bow.
- We have done this test several times with various
assumptions about the interior of the Estonia.
First using computer and then with the
model in the basin. The results are stable and
the sequence of events we get is in agreement with the total
picture provided by survivors, says Claes
Källström."
It is one thing to show model tests for an uncritical
audience. Now the computer simulations and the model tests
shall be described, recorded and explained, e.g. speed,
course, displacement, floatability (draughts), angle of
heel, trim, weights loaded due to inflow into deck
house, superstructure and hull, their locations at every
second (time t) during the complete sequence, i.e. from t =
0 (when the incident begins) until t = when the Estonia is
lying on the bottom.
Of great interest is how fast the heeling
between 0° and 45° develops, due to water
loaded on the car deck and what happens then. How
fast is the deck house, now under water,
flooded? The amount of water inside the deck
house at various times is of vital importance
to know!
During the test the model suddenly turns upside
down with the keel up ... and floats. After
this dramatic event no more water can flow into the
hull - the air in the hull can only be compressed
and it takes place instantaneously.
Either the model floats for ever or sinks
immediately! If the model floats upside down ...
and later the stern starts sinking, there is
something strange going on. How is the air in the
stern released?
Heiwa Co will analyse the SSPA report
when available.
oo0oo
SSPA model tests 3 April 2008 - Media
invited
At the tests the model with 14 knots speed full scale -
2.2 knots model scale - and bow seas shall lose the visor
that pulls open the ramp in the superstructure.
The tests go 6,3 times faster than in full scale reality.
Water shall then during 19 seconds (two minutes fullscale)
and with about 16 pitchings with the bow opening under water
be loaded on the car deck in the superstructure and
heel the model to starboard. The angle of heel after 19
seconds will likely exceed 40°, when the deck
house on deck 4+ comes under water according previous
model tests, when the
deck house was full of foam. See also Heiwa
Co:s calculations of inflow through open ramp done
2000. The deck house will now be flooded through
damaged windows in the side and the angle of heel will
increase!
After 19 seconds and reduced speed (heel is >40°)
it is planned that the modell shall turn port against the
waves and turn 180 degrees during another 19 seconds - the
engines will stop - and capsize with the hull upside
down. It is now, three, four minutes full scale after the
initial heeling that evacuation takes place - how it is
possible with heel >40°?! The
engine crew and the passengers
on deck 1 would never have time to escape with such fast
developments of heel.
"It is not decided whether the watertight doors in the
hull below the car deck shall be open or closed during the
tests", according Björn Allenström, one of the
responsible scientists.
However, it does not matter, if the doors are open or
closed. The buoyancy - the air inside the hull - is
the same and the longitudinal centre of buoyancy does not
change. The model will only float upside down a little
higher than in full scale!
"When Estonia was flooded with water, the air in the
hull was compressed. As we cannot recreate the same high
water pressure in the model, we must release air from the
model under controlled conditions; if not the model has too
much buoyancy", according Claes Källström,
chief or research at SSPA (source Ny Teknik, 2008-03-19)
Källström probably thinks that air trapped
inside the capsized hull is compressed, when the
position of buoyancy is upside down and when water
has stopped flooding the hull! How much air that must
be released is simple to calculate, so that the model
floats a little lower like in full scale after
capsize. But after this adjustment, you cannot release more
air! The model must evidently float after capsize and drift
to the position of the wreck!
Estonia sank after about 50 minutes. The model will on
the contrary not sink after eight minutes according Heiwa
Co:s calculations. The modell will never sink!
Compressed air inside the hull can never escape after a fast
capsize.
Heiwa Co looks forward the SSPA model tests 3
April 2008. They will confirm that the Estonia did not sink
due to water loaded on
the car deck! (Published
2008-03-21)
Read also the German report about
the same matter below. Further down on this page you find
many other facts that SSPA ignores in its scientific
analysis of the Estonia incdent.
oo0oo
Did MV Estonia turn 180°
port at 01.02 hrs?
New findings to explain the MV Estonia sinking have
been reported by Der
Spiegel 01/08! According to German scientists
Valanto and Krüger, HSVA and T-U Hamburg-Harburg
working for Vinnova, the MV Estonia made a 180°
port turn south/east already at 01.02 hrs (sic) on the
morning of 28 September 1994!! According to official
information by the JAIC the turn took place 01.17 hrs ... as
witnessed by MV Mariella. The 180° turn took place a
few minutes before the Mayday at 01.22 hrs.
According to the latest German findings MV Estonia had
50° list at 01.20 hrs and was drifting at that time. It
will be interesting to see how the scientists invent new
events to explain the sinking. The German report to explain
the sinking will be pusblished in May 2008.
The Swedish/Scottish/Dutch consortium led by SSPA working
on the same project has commented upon the new findings in
Swedish daily Dagens
Nyheter. They are not so certain that the Germans
are right! SSPA are doing there own final model tests of the
sinking to be completed this spring. Heiwa Co has already
analyzed the SSPA 2007 model tests. See below!
Heiwa Co will publish an analysis of all these
findings when available.
ooOoo
A new report about the
MV Estonia sinking (part of the Vinnova study
2006-2008) has been published 2007 by the Institute
of Ship Design and Ship Safety at
TU-Hamburg-Harburg
by Prof. Dr.-Ing. Stefan Krüger and Dipl.-Ing.
Felix-Ingo Kehren
The report is very poor as the basic assumption of the
whole report is incorrect (page 66):
"Note, that the superstructure (sic) of MV
Estonia is assumed as watertight - in the beginning of this
investigation. This has the consequence, that the
superstructure gives a supporting buoyancy. All calculations
carried out in the scenarios in Chapter 7 consequently
express the lowest possible heeling angle - in other words
the scenarios are calculated in a conservative way
(sic). The lever arm in Figure 5.7 shows this
distinctively."
The scientists Krüger and Kehren do not know the
difference between a real
superstructure (the
enclosed, weather tight structure above the watertight,
subdivided hull and high
above the waterline between the main deck (deck 2) on top of
the hull and the freeboard deck (deck 4) on top of the
superstructure of MV Estonia) and a non-weather tight
deck house on top of the
freeboard deck (the structure above deck 4), the latter that
cannot be included in any stabilty calculation as it does
not have any buoyancy. They thus include the deck house in
the superstructure and make the whole vessel watertight up
to the funnel.
This means that the ferry will neither capsize, nor
sink and that the scientists can load 16 000 ton of water on
the car deck without sinking the ferry in its main scenario
1! (page 79):
"8.3 Scenario 1
In scenario No.1 the investigation is focused on the
heeling behaviour with water on Main Car Deck, Deck 4
(sic)
A pre-heel of MV Estonia assumed to 1.22° to
Starboard-Side - a heel of 1° to 3° is mentioned
in several testimonies. The calculation carried out
containing water on Main Car Deck in 50t steps up to 2000t,
in 100t steps to 3000t, 250t steps to 10000t and up to
16000t in 1000t steps."
The scientists do not seem to know that ships
capsize (floats upside down) with water loaded
in the
superstructure on
the Main Car Deck, CD, (deck no. 2 of the MV Estonia) and
that the MV Estonia capsizes with only 2 000 tons of
water loaded there (because GZ<0 for any angle of
heel) due to lost visor/open bow ramp and no buoyancy in the
deck house deck 4 upward as per below figure (where LCG of
water is 59 meters from AP and trim is ignored):
Intact vessel with
intact superstructure has positive GZ until
60° heel. It is not 100% correct as the superstructure
starts to flood through open ventilation openings on deck 4,
when it becomes submerged at heel angle is 38°, but if
the ventilation opening is considered weather tight you can
heel to 60°. 500 tons on
CD heel vessel 13° and then
GZ>0 until 37° heel, when the superstructure
starts to flood thourgh venilation openings.
1 000 tons on
CD heel vessel 23° and then
GZ>0 until 36° heel when the superstructure
starts to flood thourgh venilation openings.
2 000 tons on
CD heel vessel 36° and then
GZ<0 so heel continues to 180° = capsize!
(GZ on vertical axis, heel angle on
horizontal axis)
Free water forced into and on a car deck also trims the
vessel (it will capsize already with 1 900 tons on CD
due to trim) and will evidently flow out through any
openings in the superstructure (e.g. an open bow ramp), when
the vessel stops and has not capsized previously.
Krüger and Kehren prevents capsize by making the
deck house watertight
and assume in the calculations that the free water on deck
no. 2 does not trim the ship (the free water LCG is
magically exactly 59 metres from the aft perpendicular and
does not move even if the deck is not level in longitudinal
direction)!
So Krüger and Kehren (page 103) load 16000 tons on
the car deck and the mean draft is 10.12 metres ... and the
heel is only 9.59°! Actually the vessel would have sunk
long before that. Then there are 17 other scenarios of all
kinds ... and the vessel never sinks and never heels a lot.
The hull is assumed intact!
Krüger and Kehren carefully avoids to study the
most obvious scenario = vessel's
hull is leaking below
waterline, watertight doors are open = sudden loss of intact
stability with say 600 tons of water on deck no. 0 as
witnessed by crew and stable heel <12° (allowing
evacuation for 10 minutes), heel increasing when a leaking
aft ramp comes under water flooding deck no. 2 aft = sinking
as witnessed by survivors. All testimonies by survivors to
the effect that the MV Estonia was leaking below waterline
is conveniently ignored by Krüger and Kehren!
Thus the report is of no value for serious research
into the sinking of MV Estonia and for better safety at sea
in general.
"It is hereby announced that to aid the proceeding of
this study, the SSPA Consortium invites any substantive
information to be provided in written form for consideration
in explaining the circumstances of the loss of the MV
Estonia.
If deemed beneficial, and is agreeable, further dialog
will be initiated with the contributing parties.
The information provided to this consortium will be
made available publicly through this site, or other media,
after due scrutiny.
The information can be sent electronically or in other
form to the address given in the Contact Us
section."
Heiwa Co has since made a number
of contributions to the SSPA Consortium and none has
been made available publicly and no dialog has been
initiated today (21 January 2008). The SSPA Consortium final
report explaining the sinking will be ready by March 2008
and later reviewed at a Seminary of unknown date and
location. In the meantime interested parties should continue
visit this page for review of the developments.
oo0oo
SSPA produces a Power
Point Presentation with
questions about MV Estonia
sinking (31 August
2007)
In a recent PPP the SSPA consortium statets that :
"No consistent explanation of the chain of events
leading to all these processes (various
observations of the sinking) has been provided to
date".
SSPA Sweden AB
produces another manipulated 'Estonia' model test
report
(Report no. 4006 4100-2)! (uppdated 25 August 2007)
In 1995 SSPA Sweden AB produced a manipulated
'Estonia' model test report
to show big wave impact forces acting on the visor (when
there were none!). 31 May 2007 SSPA Sweden AB
produced a second such report
(Report no. 4006 4100-2) with completely misleading
conclusions about water inflow into the 'Estonia'
superstructure after the visor was lost and what
happens.
The ship model was self propelled and manually radio
controlled and allowed to run into irregular head waves (Hs
= 4.2 m) at speed 14.5 knots with open ramp. So far so
good!
- Not to risk that the ship model would capsize (heel
180°) starting at 37° heel with 1800 tons of water
(full scale) loaded on the car deck and to pitch/trim too
much, an additional 100% buoyant superstructure (0%
permeability) was added full length on deck 4 on top of the
car deck superstructure decks 2-4. In reality a deck
house with windows and doors is located on deck 4-8, which
does not provide any buoyancy at any time! It fills
immediately with water when submerged. Proper means to
prevent the model to capsize and protect instruments and
equipment inside the model should allow the model to heel to
80° when capsize can be stopped. Equipment/instruments
can be protected by plastic bags.
-The model ramp could not have been properly scaled -
apparently it was too light. It was seen to close 'now
and then' during the tests; a 16 ton full scale steel
ramp would have permanently fallen down below the waves and
been acting as a plough forcing water into the
superstructure all the time.
- Probably the permeability of the car deck
superstructure space was not done correctly, i.e. 100%
permeability forward where no cargo was loaded and about 60%
where trucks and cars midship and aft occupied the space.
More water should have accumulated forward during the
tests.
The model was therefore seriously flawed.
A correct model should have been permitted to pitch/trim
freely at any angle of heel and to heel until at least
80° when some means to prevent further heeling -
capsize 180° heel - would be activated.
Two runs were performed.
The responsible persons, Claes Källström
and Björn Allenström, conclude:
In both cases the model heeled about 15° after about
half a minute full scale time (600 tons of
water on the car deck) and 25° after one minute
full scale time (1200 tons of water on the
car deck).
"The ship model got a final heel angle of about 46-47
degrees after about 3-4 minutes".
Comments:
The reason for the 40% reduced water inflow (1200
tons/min versus expected >2000 tons/min as per previous
tests) is that the model ramp was closed, 'now and
then' (sic), during the tests.
There is no doubt that the ship model would have trimmed
several metres on the bow and capsized at 37° heel
caused by 1800 tons of water on the car deck after only one
minute and then turned 180° turtle and floated upside
down. This was only prevented by the extra 100% buoyancy
fitted on top of deck 4 of the model and the incorrect
permeability of the car deck space deck 2. The time delay
was due to the model ramp reducing
inflow.
The reason, why the report does not say
when the the critical heel angle 37°
(or slightly less) occurs during the tests and
what happens then, is that then the model
suddenly heels much more, >47°, it
capsizes, but the capsize and trimming on the bow
are prevented by the additional 100% buoyant
superstructure on top of deck 4.
The observation that the ship model got a final
heel of about 46-47 degrees (3000 tons of water on
the car deck) after about 3-4 minutes has therefore
no relevance as that condition is not stable!
Stability is then only provided by the extra
100% buoyancy on top of deck 4 that does not exist
in reality. See photo right!
The responsible persons, Claes
Källström and Björn
Allenström, further conclude:
"After that the model was filled with (3000 tons of)
water on car deck it was left drifting in the waves. …
The drift speed in the waves was measured to about one knot
(full scale). It can be assumed that if wind had been added
the drift speed would have been about twice".
Comments:
The observation that a ship model filled with 3000 tons
of water (full scale) drifts at one knot (full scale) in
test basin due waves is evidently ridiculous. There is no
current in a model basin. The waves only heaves the model
up/down. The assumption that the drift speed is twice due to
wind is also unscientific gibberish. The model would
simpy have capsized and floated upside down long before
reaching the condition with 46-47° heel.
Question:
Why does SSPA Sweden AB produce such misleading findings?
No big bow trim or capsize at 37° heel but a stable
condition with 46-47° heel (sic) and big stern trim and
then drifting with a speed 2 knots (sic)!
Answer:
This is to permit the ship to float another 50
minutes and to drift one and a half mile before
sinking as alleged by the JAIC - to be further
simulated by the 'research' consortia.
Evidently no such things happened. The
survivors reported sudden rolling 30°
port/starboard at time of accident (01.02 hrs) and
then a stable condition with <15° list
starboard during 5-10 minutes, so that they could
evacuate. Attending vessel observed 'Estonia'
immobile in the water and not drifting at all (at
01.25 hrs) and the vessel sinking at 01.35 hrs.
The latest SSPA Sweden AB tests and
report, falsified by Claes
Källström and BjörnAllenström using a flawed model with a
100% buouyant tank on top deck 4 is another
shameful attempt to mislead the public about the
'Estonia' accident!
Heiwa Co has 22 August 2007 asked a spokesperson for
the consortia to withdraw the report and to redo proper
model tests but the reply is that this is 'very
unreasonable'!
Theearlier promise that 'All Heiwa Co
information will be considered' is forgotten! See links
above left!
oo0oo
Survivors' Testimonies prove the JAIC
wrong (Updated 20 July
2007)
There were 137 surviving witnesses aboard the Estonia
1994. 134 survivors evacuated at once to open decks after
the heavy noises ( the collision) at 00.56 hrs, the rolling
>30° port and starboard at 01.02 hrs and the stable
listing at 01.03 <15° starboard together with 100+
others that drowned. The 134 survivors tell how the Estonia
floated stably while she sank and the angle of list
increased during 30 minutes. Some survivors from deck 1
below waterline observed that water leaked in down there
after the noise and before the the rolling. The Estonia
was leaking forward!
Only three survivors
did not evacuate at once! They went to the engine control
room and tried to reduce the listing by emptying and filling
various tanks during 8-10 minutes. An impossible task as
many manual valves were located far away! They also inform
that the bilge pumps had been started, i.e. the Estonia
was also leaking in the engine rooms! They have also
said that they saw water spraying in on deck 2 at the
closed bow ramp two minutes after the heeling
occurred.
All observations of survivors indicate that the
Estonia was leaking below water line in at least two
locations forward and aft at 01.00 hrs. The free water
on and in several compartments on deck 0, explains (a) the
rolling >30° port and starboard at 01.02 hrs (GM and
GZ were negative), (b) the stable listing at 01.03
<15° starboard (positive GM when more water leaked
in) and (c) the actual sinking.
The exact
time for the collision or sinking is known.
The JAIC ignorered all testimonies about leakages below
waterline and instead announced that the sudden healing was
caused by the lost visor (sic) and a fully open bow ramp.
There are no evidences supporting those suggestions:
1. Wave impacts against the fore ship cannot knock off
the visor. The force/energy are too small and the noise is
very high! Nobody heard anything.
2. Water ingress through an open bow ramp is five times
larger than indicated by JAIC and causes immediate capsize
and floating upside down. It didn't happen!
3. All information about a missing visor of the wreck
after the accident and that it was found and raised 1560
meters west of the wreck are lies based on falsified and
edited underwater films of the wreck. The visor was never
fully detached from the ship when it was floating! The visor
was removed from the wreck after the
accident!
The JAIC then produced a 100% false Final report on 3
December 1997 to hide the actual cause of sinking;
multiple leakages below waterline due to a collision!
The high number of dead victims was due to the fact that
the Estonia was not seaworthy and lacked proper life saving
equipment, etc., which the ship owners were fully aware of.
The job of the JAIC by the Swedish government was to hide
the Truth. The ship owners were very happy. They got away
with murder.
oo0oo
Chief prosecutor Margus Kurm believes
the lying Crewmembers
On 11 May 2007 Estonian chief prosecutor Margus Kurm
reported that he belives the three crewmembers that escaped
from the engine room of the Estonia long after the listing
ocurred and thus that he does not believe the 134 other
survivors! His findings can be read here.
oo0oo
Scientific Report proves the JAIC
Accident Scenario wrong
Actually the only test close to the actual conditions of
the Estonia (14.5 knots) was done at 11.36 knots, when the
initial inflow was 1108.9 tons/min. Tests at higher speeds
could not be done as then the model was overfilled with
water! By simple extrapolation it is clear that the initial
inflow at 14.5 knots would be >1800 tons/min. As this
water will trim the vessel on the bow the conclusion is that
the initial inflow will increase to 2000-2500 tons/min!
By simple calculations done 1999
Heiwa Co has got exactly the same result.With such big inflows the vessel would capsize and float
upside down after one minute!
The JAIC suggests (figure 12.16 in the Final report) that
the initial inflow at 15 knots would have been only 315
tons/min increasing to 580 tons/min when there was 1000 tons
of water loaded. It is thus evident that JAIC miscalculated
the inflow by a factor 6, which invalidates (again) the
complete JAIC report. But the writers of the SSPA report
shall still validate the JAIC scenario! As this is
impossible, the SSPA staff indicates that maybe the vessel
sank due to leakage below waterline. Media does not
react.
Accident took place at least 10-13
Minutes earlier than officially reported - Four times more
Water would have entered the Vessel in one Minute than
officially reported
"Presently, in March 2007, a few main findings can be
summarized as:
The bow visor was lost obviously already few
minutes past one o'clock, and not at 01:15 h as in
the JAIC Final Report. This difference is due to different
interpretation of the survivors' testimonies. "
Progress Report of "Research Study of the
Sinking Sequence of MV Estonia"
Hamburg Ship Model Basin (HSVA) March 9,
2007
"Estonian Time
Event/Observation
01.02 hrs
… the ship heels over making loose
items fall. Among other items one alarm
clock that stopped 12.02AM when the battery fell
off.
01.05 hrs
At least one full heel-over from side to side
is experienced where after the ship ends up at a
list of more than 15° to SB."
Research Study of Sinking Sequence of M/V
Estonia (Chalmers University of Technology) 10 October
2006 (see link left above)
This confirmed finding by two independent researchers
changes everything in the official report. As the listing
probably took place 10-13 minutes earlier than reported by
the JAIC, there is now 19-22 minutes of time between the
listing and the Mayday sent at 01.24 hrs in lieu of 9
minutes as reported by the JAIC. JAIC has reported a lot of
events between 01.02-01.15 hrs based on the assumtion that
the vessel was upright. All these events must now be pushed
back to before 01.02 hrs but this is hardly possible as they
contradict everything, e.g. the alleged change of watch at
01.00 hrs. Also there is much more time for crew action
between listing and Mayday that now must be explained, e.g.
why the crew waited 19-22 minutes to send the Mayday.
Another finding (by SSPA Marine AB) February 2007 is that
four (actually six) times more water would have entered the
ship superstructure through the bow in event of a lost visor
than stated by the JAIC. This means that the vessel would
have capsized and floated upside down after only two
minutes, if the visor was actually lost.
These new findings change everything in the JAIC Final
report and require a complete new re-hearing of the
case.
***
The 'Estonia' Sinking -
The Biggest Scam In Maritime
History
The M/S "Estonia" sank in the Baltic on 28 September
1994 under mysterious circumstances. At least 852 persons
died. The ferry had frequently carried ex USSR military
material from Tallinn to Stockholm, some of it on behalf of
the Swedish Armed Forces. Immediately, without any evidence,
the authorities stated that the bow visor had caused the
accident. However it seems that the visor had nothing to do
with the accident but was simply removed from the wreck
under water by the Swedish Armed Forces
after the accident - so you could blame the
accident on the visor. It explains all lies and official
false information about the sinking presented 1994-2005. To
support the official lies many surviving Estonian
crewmembers were kidnapped by the authorities
later on the day of the event. Other crewmembers
were forced to lie about what happened and about
the cargo.
All information was then falsified to support the official
story as described in the book Disaster
Investigation by Anders
Björkman, a reputable safety at sea
consultant based in France.
Four out of five do not believe the
official Conclusions
Some 80 percent of Estonians polled said (August
28-September 4, 2000) they don't believe official
conclusions about why the ferry Estonia sank six years ago
this month in one of Europe's worst maritime disasters,
local media reported on September 2. Investigators said the
Sept. 28, 1994 tragedy, which killed 852, occurred when
fierce waves broke badly made locks in the bow door, causing
it to fall off and for water to flood the ship. They also
said the crew reacted too slowly. The investigators never
provided any evidence for their different suggestions what
caused the accident.
Most relatives of the mostly Swedish and Estonian victims
have called for a new investigation. Of 400 Estonians
questioned by ES Market Research, 78 percent said
they didn't accept the 1997 findings of official Estonian,
Finnish and Swedish investigators, reported the Eesti
Paevaleht daily, which ordered the survey. Sixty-seven
percent also said they backed the dive of American Gregg
Bemis to the Baltic Sea site of the shipwrecked ferry, which
area governments opposed as a desecration of an officially
declared gravesite. The poll, which had a margin of error of
4 percent, was conducted just before the dives got underway.
Bemis said on September 1 that he had found a
previously undiscovered hole in the ship's
superstructure, though he said it required further study.
According the official investigation the hole does not exist
- the relevant area of the superstructure is undamaged
according to the official accounts. According to Bemis the
hole is 2 x 0.7 meters caused by explosives. In an
editorial, Eesti Paevaleht said Swedes were more
likely to believe the official conclusion, though it didn't
cite poll results. It said Estonia's past under Soviet
totalitarian rule made it more skeptical of official
findings.
The People does not understand - the
Report was not for them!
Jaan Metsaveer, one of the investigators,
adamantly defended the official explanation, arguing that
laymen sought simplistic answers because they couldn't
understand the technical accounts in the commission's
lengthy final report.
"It was a document that was written for
experts, not for the general public,"
he was quoted as saying. He said some relatively minor
details about the accident remain unknown, e.g. the
hole that Bemis discovered, but that the general
conclusions still stood. Estonia's government also dismissed
suggestions that the dives led by Gregg Bemis last week may
have made significant enough discoveries to justify a new
investigation.
"From the government's point of view,
we've seen nothing new,"
government spokesman Priit Poiklik said.
"We don't believe a new investigation is
warranted."
Diving is
permitted at the Wreck
It must be clear to anybody that diving is permitted at
the wreck as long as it is done under the authority of, e.g.
the Estonian government or Parliament and that the purpose
of the diving is either to 'protect the wreck' or to
'protect the marine environment'. The wreck has spent
a long time on the bottom of the sea and it would be very
prudent to carry out a detailed examination of the wreck now
to establish if any further action is required to protect it
or the marine environment. At the same time any suspect
areas of the wreck can be examined of damages not reported
by the JAIC or caused by unreported human activity.
***
Heiwa
Codoes not believe that the
accident 1994 was caused by bad visor locks 1978! Every
essential finding by the Commission is false! Testimonies
have been changed, facts have been manipulated, people have
been threatened to shut up.
Heiwa Co is involved with ro-ro
passenger ferry operations since 1989.
When the 'Estonia' sank in September 1994
with the loss of at least 852 lives, the
questions were why and if it could happen
to other ferries.
A secret investigation, or rather a campaign to
cover up the Truth, took place 1994-1997. The
official report of the accident issued in December
1997 does not provide any answers whatsoever about
the real cause. Everything you have been told about
the visor causing the accident is false! The visor
was attached to the ship when it sank.
The victims (dead and relatives) and
witnesses of the accident are left helpless at the
wims of corrupt accident investigators and their
respective governments.
Was the sharp buckle in the visor caused when
the 'Estonia' collided with the aft fin of a partly
submerged submarine?
To assist survivors and relatives who after the accident
still pursue the Truth 2006, Heiwa Co has compiled
some Findings that will
easily convince anybody that all essential, official
facts of the accident are false. If you want to
study the official lies you only have to visit the Swedish
government web site Estoniasamlingen
and compare (in Swedish only).
Twenty facts listed below also prove that the complete
official investigation 1994-1997 is 100% falsified. Not one
essential information is correct. It is a legal scandal
according to a statement by the MP Björn
von der Esch in the Swedish Parliament 30 May 2002
(and not reported in the media).
The alleged loss of the visor having caused the
accident is a well orchestrated myth and the Swedish media
does not dare to inform the public about it.
20
Facts prove the Commission wrong
It is sad to conclude that every essential official
information about the 'Estonia' accident 28 September 1994
announced between 1994 and 1997 is false. The following are,
e.g. twenty proven facts, which are not mentioned in the
official Final Report issued December 1997, but are
described in the book Disaster
Investigation and summarized
for Estonian readers at a separate web
page:
No
Fact
Ref.
1
Salvage of the
victims- all
dead bodies could have been recovered during the
first week. It was not done as the visor
was still to be seen on the wreck
below
2
Stability- the
'Estonia' should have capsized
immediately with 2 000 tons of water on
the car deck in the superstructure. It was
erroneously assumed that the deck house was
watertight
The
impossible Sinking- never explained! The plot of the
'Sequence of events'
- figure 13.2 in the Final
Report - during the 'sinking' is a
falsfication! It is a plot of an
undamaged ship turning and drifting - and
never sinking (which has been edited
away)!
Model tests and
simulations - in order
to demonstrate (sic) that high wave impact loads
had knocked off the visor, the model tests done
by SSPA Marine AB 1995 had to be
falsified. And when matematical
'simulations' were carried out later proving the
model tests wrong, the simulations were also
falsified! Amazing falsifications of the Final
report
The dead bodies could and should have been recovered
immediately after the accident. The French-Norwegian company
Stolt-Comex offered its services at very low cost and had
equipment and staff in place. The offer was refused. The
only logical reason seems to have been to prevent outsiders
from investigating the wreck in early October 1994 and to
find the true cause of the accident. Probably the visor was
then first attached to wreck itself, then detached
underwater around 4-6 October, so it fell to the bottom
below the wreck, and as the visor was not finally
removed/salvaged until mid-November, no salvage of bodies
could take place in early October. Later - all proposals for
further investigation of the wreck to confirm new findings
are refused with reference to the dead bodies - they shall
rest in peace. So the refusal to salvage the bodies had two
reasons - to prevent an early inspection of the wreck and to
prevent any later inspections of the wreck.
The official sequence of events during and after the
accident is not possible
Heiwa Co quickly concluded 1994 that the official
sequence of events was unlikely - unbelievable - and that
the visor must have fallen off after the first sudden
listing -
Staff
Changes at the National Maritime Administration
It is quite strange to note the following staff
changes in the Swedish National Maritime Administration 2001
since the 'Estonia' accident 1994:
1. Mr. Jan-Olof Selén is Director
General 2001. In 1994 he was legal counsel at the
Ministry of Transportation to minister Ines Uusmann who
decided not to or prevented the salvage of dead bodies.
He is not a seafarer.
2. Mr. Johan
Fransonis Director of Maritime Safety. In
1994 he was legal counsel of the Swedish NMA and led the
dive investigation of the wreck and presented several
misleading information reports to the public about the
'Estonia'. He is not a seafarer.
3. Mr. Ulf Hobro is Chief Ship Inspector at
Stockholm. In 1994 he was technical and safety
superintendent of the Swedish owners of the 'Estonia' -
N&T - and responsible for the safety of the
'Estonia'.
4. Mr. Åke Sjöblom is Chief Ship
Inspector at Gothenburg. In 1994 he did the last safety
control of the 'Estonia' at Tallinn 8 hours prior to the
accident and found several defects that were not
mentioned in the Final Report.
5. Mr. Per Nordström is deputy Director of
Maritime Safety. In 1994 he was technical director of the
Swedish Ship Owners Association of which the owners
N&T of the 'Estonia' were leading members.
6. Dr. Michael
Huss, PhD, is April 2001 appointed Chief -
Ship Technical Division at the NMA. In 1994-1997 he
produced a number of falsified studies to prove the
official sequence of events and the sinking.
7. Capt. Sten
Anderson is still Chief - Accident
Investigations. In 1994-1997 he was the Swedish NMA
observer in the international investigation.
The seven top members of the Swedish NMA have all
contributed to the misleading 'Estonia' accident
investigation. The official position of the Swedish NMA is
that the Final Report is complete and correct and that this
web page does not include any new information.
The Visor at the
Wreck
Other new information is the below picture of the
'Estonia' wreck published in Sweden spring 2000. The
left picture is a 'sonar picture' of the wreck
officially made 1996 - two years after the accident -
but probably made already 30 September, 1994 - the day the
wreck was found. Actually the left picture is a
hydrographical chart of the wreck area with a picture
of the wreck sketched on top. By removing the
'wreck' you get the center picture showing a pyramide
shaped object about 13x13 m on the bottom about 6-7 metres
high - shaped like the visor (left picture) with the
bottom up. The pictures suggest that the visor was in
fact found at the bow of the ship, i.e. it could not
have fallen off under way, before the sudden list occurred
far away from the sinking position. There are more pictures
of the visor
on the bottom of the sea.
'Sonar picture' of sea
floor and wreck released 2000
Same picture with the sketch
of the 'wreck' removed showing only barimetric
depth curves
The visor after salvage -
note the big buckle due to a
collision
You can read more about the independent Heiwa Co
investigations in the following books and reports
written by Anders Björkman some of which are found on
the Internet (and never quoted by Swedish media):
Nya Fakta om
Estonia(1999 - in
Swedish) - Price Euro 15:- incl. postage. Order
the book!
Some outstanding
Questions about the M/S
Estonia - Paper
presented the 27 October 1999 at the 'Debate on the Estonia'
of the "DESIGN FOR SAFETY" CONFERENCE of the Ship Stability
Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow,
Scotland.
Ship owners and ship safety experts have a lot to learn
from the 'Estonia' accident. The deficiencies 1993 in
design and arrangements were due to the fact that the
'Estonia' was never designed to sail on the open sea.
She was designed 1979 for protected coastal trading
and the SOLAS requirements were never fully used or
complied with in spite of certification to the contrary.
Thus she was permitted by the Finnish and Swedish maritime
administrations 1980 to have too many (open) watertight
doors - total 22!, restricted number of life rafts under
davits, no possibility to evacuate all 2000 passengers
aboard by life saving means under davits, a swimming pool on
the the double bottom, etc.
Unfortunately, when the trade changed in 1993, the new
Swedish/Estonian owners never bothered to up-grade the ship.
The owners and the maritime administrations were one and the
same. In retrospect it would have cost very little to have
made the 'Estonia' safe and seaworthy as per the
SOLAS in 1993.
The hull steel work performed in 1994 to install the fin
stabilizers should have been better supervised and
documented. Now the stabilizers were installed in a
compartment that could only be accessed via watertight
doors! Then the Estonia would never have sunk in 35 minutes
as she did in 1994.
The visor and bow ramp were defective prior to the
accident and could not be locked. The ramp was secured by
ropes and the visor was held in place by its own weight and
its hydraulics. The JAIC just concluded without any evidence
that they were in perfect condition and locked at the time
of accident.
There are strange stories about an explosive device
found at the bow
Since 1999 many parties have requested the Swedish
government to re-open the investigation as per IMO
Resolution A.849(20) and to review the new proven facts and
then inform other interested countries. Every time the
Swedish government has refused with the weak argument -
no new facts have been presented. In April 2001 the
Swedish government in a press release referring to this web
page stated that it did not contain any information to the
effect that the official cause and sequence of accident were
wrong! It is very sad - the writer of this web page started
out trying to help and to improve safety at sea. Now he is
being treated like an idiot by the Swedish and Finnish
establishments.
And what do you see on the picture right? It is
a big hole found in the superstructure of the
'Estonia'. The hole is in an area, which the
Commission states is 100% undamaged. The hole is
certainly the result of an explosion from inside
the superstructure as (i) the edges are bent
outboard, (ii) material is missing from the centre
inside of the hole and (iii) analysis of test
pieces of the ruptured edges show that the material
has been subject to high temperatures = explosion.
See the damage hole
in the superstructure .
The hole was blown open by the Swedish Navy when
the visor was removed from the wreck at the bottom
of the sea after the accident.
Many persons ask why the authorities presented a 100%
falsified explanation and report about the accident. The
simple answer is that the Swedish government didn't want the
public to know what really happened, so it decided to make
up a totally false story - the lost visor.
By parading 'experts' stating that ferries sink due to
lost visors and by falsifying testimonies from some crew
members the conspirators managed to create a fairly credible
story among the ignorant public.
Evidently, the visor was attached to the wreck, so the
visor had to be removed by explosives in order to be
salvaged, etc., etc., which had to be kept secret.
And the technical explanations were never good enough
- evidently a ferry does not sink due to a lost visor - the
ferry would have capsized and floated upside down with water
in the superstructure. So why was a falsified explanation
ordered by the Swedish government? To protect the
incompetents Swedish National Maritime Authority
(Sjöfartsverket)? Or a more sinister cause - to
protect, e.g. military interests using the 'Estonia' ferry
to carry secret ordinance from the former Soviet Union to
Sweden? Will we ever know? It is quite easy actually - ask
the Swedish government to provide the missing information.
The whole matter is presently handled by theSwedish
military authorities.
28 September
2006 - 12 Years Of Lying About The MV Estonia Sinking
1994
This is not a "conspiracy theory" website. The definition
of a theory is: "An assumption based on limited
information or knowledge; a conjecture (guesswork)." No
theories are presented here, only conclusive evidence and,
well, some hypothesis. After the MV Estonia sinking 1994,
the Swedish Government and its lackey the Joint Accident
Investigation Commission took it upon itself to be the
official determiners of the Truth, in this case a story
about a stupid visor. But, it is evidence, and not the
Government, that determines what the Truth is. The
Government's official story about MV Estonia is not the
divine Truth; do not fall into the trap of thinking that any
counter-evidence against their story is just a mere
theory.
Accepting The MV Estonia
Truth
Do not get defensive when presented with MV Estonia
counter-evidence even late. Who are you trying to defend?
You are not being accused of lying about MV Estonia; the
Government is.
No longer let society, the media, social democrats,
moderates, or the Government do your thinking for you. You
will not be charged with a "thought crime" for
believing that the Government did lie about the MV Estonia
sinking. You are free to believe whatever you want to.
According to the logic of the Swedish public, a story is
not real unless it is reported by the mass media. Following
this logic, the Government couldn't possibly have lied about
the MV Estonia sinking unless some major newspaper or TV
news station said so.
Fact: The media has the exact same evidence that this
website has. Fact: The media has had this evidence for many
years. Fact: The media has had many years to say that the
Government lied about the MV Estonia. Thus, the media will
not suddenly come out tomorrow and say that the Government
lied about the MV Estonia.
It is not important to know why the Swedish media will
not report that the Government lied about the MV Estonia.
All you need to know is that after many years they have not
done so and therefore will not do so. As for Heiwa Co, it is
just an organization of people concerned with safety at sea
who are here to show you the Truth.
So, either all of the evidence on this website means
nothing and does not warrant any kind of investigation, OR,
the Swedish media knows the truth about the MV Estonia and
is withholding it from the public.
This is the MV Estonia fulcrum. You must pick one of the
two; you have no other choice.
Come On, Rebut The Counter-Evidence!
If the MV Estonia counter-evidence is indeed so kooky and
crazy, then how come the Swedish media can't just rebut it?
What, are they so dignified and classy that they are "not
even going to justify it with a response"? There should be
no problem with the Estonia counter-evidence being plastered
all over the TV news.
Skeptics love to attack the messenger and love to attack
the plausibility of the conspiracy i.e. "The Government
lying about the MV Estonia is totally implausible and beyond
absurd.", but never talk about the actual evidence. They
feel it is not necessary to acknowledge the evidence, when
in fact the evidence is the only thing they should be
concerned about.
Your Opinion About The Swedish
Government Means Nothing
Attempting to debunk the MV Estonia counter-evidence is
one thing, but simply saying, "I don't think that the
Government is capable of doing such a thing," means
absolutely nothing and is not evidence. Stick to evaluating
the evidence, rather than pushing blind allegiance.
Making Your Decision, Taking A Stand
Once you have viewed all of the evidence on this website,
make your new decision about the MV Estonia sinking
immediately. Do not be someone who refuses to act alone,
waiting to see what others will do first. What you need to
realize is that you are in fact that "other person." And,
you need not be in accord with "the collective". Think for
yourself, rather than falling to peer pressure and engaging
in groupthink. But remember, "thinking for yourself"
involves the fact that you do not need your beliefs to be
validated by other people's beliefs.
If the majority is uninformed, then their opinion means
absolutely nothing. Just because something is widely thought
to be the Truth does not automatically make it the Truth.
You should be able to go up to your family and friends, and
proudly tell them that you know the Truth about MV Estonia
1994. And don't worry if they call you "crazy," because it
is not that you are crazy, it is that they are
uninformed.
"All truth passes through three stages.
First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently opposed.
Third, it is accepted as being self-evident."
-Arthur Schopenhauer, German
Philosopher (1788-1860).
The Real Kooks
The person who goes about an investigation in a logical,
objective manner and pays attention to evidence is not a
kook. The real kook is one who thinks that governmental
treason is impossible and ignores evidence that is right in
front of their face.
Skeptics will use delusional rationalizations to explain
away all of the MV Estonia evidence. For them, it does not
matter what evidence is presented, because their ultimate
goal is to hold onto their existing worldview at any cost
rather than to be open-minded and seek the Truth. It is a
worldview that is practical, sensible, popular, sane, and
rational....but not true.
The MV Estonia Truth Is Not Some Kind
Of "Mysterious Secret"
The MV Estonia counter-evidence is obvious. The fact that
the Truth finally after 12 years is coming out is
refreshing.
MV Estonia is not up for debate. It has already been
proven, far beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Government
and JAIC lied about the MV Estonia sinking - that was the
easy part. The hard part is getting the Truth out to the
Swedish and Estonian public, because to them the thought of
their Governments lying about the MV Estonia sinking is
taboo.
It is not as though the MV Estonia counter-evidence is
weak, it is blind allegiance, herd mentality and ignorance,
that is stalling the Truth. The evidence is here, but
because the people have been tricked into believing the
Joint Accident Investigation Commission 1994-1997 and don't
want to feel they have been duped for the last 12 years,
they stop asking questions. For the skeptics, being correct
is more important than being corrected. Skeptics are not
"defending the Truth," they are just defending their fragile
egos. A real defender of the Truth would take all pieces of
evidence into account; and then, they would evaluate that
evidence OBJECTIVELY.
"A fundamental
objective of the Swedish system is that the citizens should
have faith in central government
activities and be able to examine them
critically. The decentralisation of central
government activities has been carried out with the aim of
making the agencies more efficient and of moving the
decision-making process closer to the individual citizen.
Under the law, all agencies serve the citizens and provide
them, on request, with information about their activities.
The management controls in the agencies must safeguard this
right.
Government
organisation in Sweden differs from that in most other
countries. Sweden's central government administration is
characterised by very small ministries. Less than 1 per cent
of the 300 000 central government employees work for the
ministries. The agencies working within the different fields
of competence of the ministries have a high degree of
independence from the ministries. The central government
agencies are responsible for making their own decisions in
cases that involve the application of the law and the
exercise of public authority.
It is common for
an agency employee to have tasks or interests beyond his or
her job at the agency. Decentralisation and/or
delegation of responsibility and powers create greater risks
of conflicts of interest and similar situations. One such
situation arises when civil servants, in the course of their
duties, are improperly affected by their spare-time
occupations. This is particularly true for
universities and technical institutes, where many employees
have second occupations. For example, university
employees may own companies that have business relations
with their own university. Such situations, which in
themselves are questionable, can mean that employees, on
behalf of their university departments, favour their own
companies in a bidding process. The public's faith in civil
servants can be shaken by problems of conflict of interest
if agency management is unable to apply the Administrative
Act's rules on conflict of interest in the agency's internal
control system. Conflicts of interest and
part-time occupations still pose a serious problem,
especially in universities.
Jan Hagvall - Audit director at
the Swedish National Audit Office, responsible for the audit
of all government agencies within the area of responsibility
of the Ministry of Finance.
