'Other scenarios regarding how water can reach the lower decks are of course possible. If by us used drawings do not reflect the actual status of the vessel, evidently the conclusions are not valid.'
Frank Rosenius, Staffan Sjöling - 28 March 2003
'Frågan hur Estonia kunde sjunka så snabbt har inte klarlagts i JAIC:s haveriutredning. I en ansats att reparera den bristen gavs SPF uppdraget att framta ett material som med utgångspunkt i haveriutredningens rapport skulle åskådliggöra hur Estonia kan ha vattenfyllts i haveriets slutskede. Med den begränsande premissen utarbetades en förstudie som mer kan ses som en övning i dialektik än ett klargörande av sjunkningsförloppet. I den använda beräkningsmodellen har datorprogrammet manipulerats för att arbeta med antagna men icke verifierade konstruktionsförutsättningar samt belastningar långt utöver vad verkligheten skulle tillåta'.
AgnEf - Arbetsgruppen för utredningav M/S Estonias förlisning - B. Calamnius, ord
FAE - Föreningen Anhöriga Estonia - G. Claesson, ordf.
SEA - Stiftelsen Estoniaoffren och Anhöriga - L. Berglund, ordf. - Stockholm den 9 februari 2005
1.51 Styrelsen för Psykologiskt Försvar - sjunkförloppsstudien mars 2003
This chapter is dedicated to my friends Spiro Pahos - "its up to every one's insight to believe what he reads" and Kenneth Rasmusson - free editor at Lund, Sweden - "Men vem vet? Snart kanske det blir ett uppknytningskalas i gamla Svedala :) Man ska ju som bekant aldrig vara för säker".
(Detta kapitel är skrivet på engelska men svensk översättning kommer så småningom).
On 28 March 2003 the SPF made public the Pre-study how to explain the sinking of the Estonia 1994 based on the alleged facts of the Commission. The government had ordered the original task on 19 April 2001.and the SPF had appointed Staffan Sjöling on 30 September 2002 to carry out the study in 60 hrs (sic), assisted by vice admiral Frank Rosenius. The study should have been ready by 31 December 2002.
The writer has met Rosenius and been in e-mail contact with Sjöling. The message was that it is/was impossible to explain the sinking of the Estonia on 28 September1994 without concluding that the 'lost visor' and the 'water on the car deck' story invented 1994-1997 is false. The writer naively thought that he could convince Rosenius/Sjöling to state that their task was hopeless.
The Estonia Pre-study report was thus filed with the SPF on 28 March 2003 by Sjöling/Rosenius. On 1 April 2003 admiral Rosenius was then appointed head of the office of His Majesty the King (chef för HM Konungens stab).
The Pre-study confirms previous Errors by the Commission
The Pre-study report is very interesting as it demonstrates clearly how the Commission 1994-1997 falsified the stability and floatability calculations of the Estonia accident investigation, as already pointed out in 1.9.
The Pre-study can be read below in its entirety in Swedish and English. The very poor Swedish language (syntax and grammar) used by Sjöling/Rosenius is fairly well reflected in the writer's English translation. Sjöling/Rosenius complain in several places of their limited resources. Nevertheless they produce a sensational document - not one essential piece of information can be underwritten by serious stability experts. You can also down-load the Pre-study (in Swedish) from http://www.psycdef.se/extrafiler/estoniastudie2003.pdf .
According to the written SPF instructions, the actual sequence of sinking was not going to be explained in the Pre-study, only the preconditions how to make such a presentation of the last 22 minutes, i.e. between say 01.30 (80 degrees list) and about 01.50-01.54 hrs (the vessel finally sinks), which had not been explained. The writer thought it was usual delaying action by the SPF. But Sjöling/Rosenius actually explain - or make an attempt to describe - the whole sequence of sinking in their Pre-study - from 01.15 hrs until, say 01.54 hrs. To do so, they have to repeat a lot of past disinformation.
How to explain the Sinking of a Ferry with an undamaged Hull?
Sjöling/Rosenius split the task to explain the sequence of sinking into three separate parts -
(a) the flooding of the superstructure with 0-12.000 tons of water on the car deck - (decks 2 and 3) (no sinking and no capsize as the ferry floats 22 minutes on the deck house (sic) preventing capsize while no water flows out through the wide open bow due to trim), and(b) the flooding of the watertight deck house through some damaged openings; a door, some windows (decks 4 - 9 above the car deck) (still no sinking or capsize as the ferry floats stably on the hull and on undamaged parts of the deck house) and
(c) the flooding of some watertight hull (engine) compartments (decks 0 and 1 below the car deck), the latter so that the vessel actually sinks - suddenly.
Maritime experts concerned with the Estonia sinking has wondered about
(a) how the ferry could load 0-12.000 tons of water in the superstructure without immediate capsize with only 2 000 tons of water in the side and
(b) why wasn't the deckhouse above the superstructure immediately filled with water, when it was submerged and how could it be considered watertight? and
(c) how could the intact, watertight hull compartments below the car deck be flooded with water? and
(d) why didn't the water in the superstructure flow out, when the ship stopped after a few minutes?
Water Filling of the Superstructure above the Water Line - no water flows out
Sjöling/Rosenius apparently assume - Attachment 1 of the Pre-study - that first the superstructure (the car deck space) was water filled at a rate of 300-1 800 tons/min based on info in the Final report (5) 12.6.2. However, 12.6.2 does not say so. It assumes 300-600 t/min inflow the first few minutes - until 20° list is developed. It further assumes that totally only 1 800 tons have flowed in when the list is 35° after 8 minutes, i.e. average inflow was only 225 tons/min. and that the ship then had stopped. The figure 1 800 tons/min seems to come from this author in Appendix 4 - the ship capsizes after one minute. So here the Pre-study does not follow the Final report.
And neither Final report nor Pre-study asks the question - why didn't the water flow out, when the ship had turned after 5 minutes and the bow was away from the waves? At that time you would expect all water inside the superstructure to flow out!
Furthermore, JAIC/Huss suggested elsewhere that the water inflow into the superstructure was only 38,5 - 55,6 ton/min after the accident Table 1.9.2. How can a ship sink if the inflow - into a superstructure above waterline! - is so small? Why doesn't the water flow out through the opening in the bow, when the vessel has turned East and the opening is away from oncoming waves? The journalist Anders Hellberg of the biggest Swedish daily Dagens Nyheter reported that 2 100 tons entered in six minutes. It is 350 tons/minute. Sjöling/Rosenius do not consider any information given by the Commission in the Final report chapter 12.6 about simulations of the water filling 1.21.
The JAIC scenario is simply the following events, fig 13.2 in Final report (5). That figure is a 100% falsification - there is no evidence for anything positions, speeds, courses, angles of list, etc. Everything is just invented as described below:
1. At 01.14 hrs the weather tight bow ramp in the superstructure is fully open (the visor has fallen off and pulled out the ramp). Speed >14 knots straight into the waves. The opening is about 5,4 m wide and 6 m high and the ramp is down to the waterline. Water enters only into the superstructure onto deck 2, when the bow dips into the waves and the ramp assists the water to flow up into the superstructure, where it collects in the side of the superstructure. Course 281°. The ship is of course still floating on the hull and starts to list slowly due to water inside the superstructure. There is no evidence that this happened. Testimonies of the crew suggests that the ramp was still closed two minutes after the first heeling over to starboard.2. At 01.15 hrs - while slowing down - the list becomes 15° due to a certain amount of water in the superstructure on deck 2 - no water flows down in the stairwells down into the hull. The stairwells are far away from the water in the side. Course 281°. Distance sailed since event 1 is 0.25 NM. Ship is still floating. As stated above crew testimonies reported the superstructure dry at this time.
3. At 01.16 hrs - speed 9 knots - the list is still 15° (the water inflow had temporarily stopped (sic)). Course 261°. The ship starts a 180° turn. Distance since event 2 is 0.17 NM. A lot of 'fragments' fall off the ferry, which should prove the turn according to JAIC. Why these 'fragments' fell off is not clear.
4. At 01.20 hrs - speed 6 knots - list is now 30° due to 1 000 tons of alleged water in the superstructure on the bulkhead deck (see suppl. 522 of Final report (5)) - thus the inflow into the superstructure was only about 167 ton/minute during 6 minutes. No water is seen flowing down into the stairwells. Course 122°. The port turn is ended. Distance sailed since event 3 is 0.48 NM. At this stage of events you would expect that all water flowed out! The course is 122°, i.e. bow opening does not face any oncoming waves.
5. At 01.22 hrs - speed 4.5 knots - list 35°. Course 140°. Distance since event 4 is 0.2 NM. Ship is still floating. Alarm is raised onboard. As the speed is almost nil and the bow points away from the waves, you would expect that all water flows out of the superstructure, i.e. that the water inflow is negative = water outflow = the vessel list should be reduced, etc. Without any evidence the JAIC suggests the opposite - more water comes in! - and Rosenius/Sjöling just accept that as fact. They suggest that inflow is 300-1 800 tons/minute into the superstructure at this time, which is nonsense.
6. At 01.24 hrs - speed 2.1 knots - list 40°. Course 160°. Distance since event 5 is 0.12 NM. Windows are smashed in deckhouse deck 4. The deck house starts to fill with water (and the new Sjöling/Rosenius assumption is that the engine rooms start to be flooded by 400 tons/min through open ventilation ducts in the side ending just below the deck house - otherwise the ferry will never sink!).
7.1 At 01.30 hrs - speed 1.7 knots - list 60-70°. Course 154°. Distance since event 6 - 0.30 NM.
7.2 At 01.33 hrs there is 1 500 tons of water in the superstructure on deck 2 (see suppl. 522 of Final report (5)) - thus the inflow into the superstructure was only about 38,5 ton/minute during 13 minutes since 01.20 hrs. With 1 500 tons of water loaded in the superstructure the angle of list should only be 32°. Speed is nil! All water should no flow out! The vessel drifts sideways. The list is 75° because there is also water in the deck house: according to the Final report (page 183)"18.000 tons of water onboard distributed between the car deck and decks 4 and 5 would have given a heel angle of 75°", but the intact, watertight deckhouse deck 6 and 7 prevents capsize - the ship floats on the watertight deck house. (Assuming like Sjöling/Rosenius that the engine rooms had been flooded since 01.24 hrs with 400 tons/minute there should now also be 2.800 tons of water in the hull, which would have sunk like a stone, i.e. the sinking stops at 01.33 hrs). But ...
7.3 At 01.35 hrs the list is 80° (figure 13.3 of Final report) - no sinking. The ship still floats on some dry and empty hull compartments somewhere and drifts sideways with 2,2 knots speed.
7.4 At 01.40 hrs the list is 115° (figure 13.3 of Final report) - the vessel is still floating, i.e. the hull is still not fully flooded.
7.5 At 01.42 hrs there is 2 000 tons of water in the superstructure on deck 2 (see suppl. 522 of Final report) - still no sinking - thus the inflow into the superstructure was only about 55,6 ton/minute during 9 minutes since 01.33 hrs. There is no evidence for any of the inflow figures given above. All figures are invented!
8. At 01.52 hrs the ship (suddenly) sinks/disappears. Distance from 7.1 - 0.88 NM (average speed from events 7.1 to 8 is 2.4 knots, i.e. the speed increased after event 7.1).
The sinking position of event 8 is 1 570 m due East of the start position 1. The sudden sinking after 38 minutes is not explained.
The basic question for Sjöling/Rosenius to answer is thus: How did the watertight hull, decks 0 and 1, with 14 watertight compartments, >18 000 m3, fill with water during 28 minutes between, say 01.24 and 01.52 hrs (so the ship sank without capsizing/floating upside down)? Sjöling/Rosenius suggest it was throught illegal or incorrectly installed ventilation ducts in the side of the superstructure leading to the hull compartments but no evidence is given!
Another question is - how could the Estonia drift the way she did - so long, so fast and with constant speed - while being water filled via the ventilation ducts?
Another question is: who made figure 13.3 in (5)?
And why didn't the water inside the superstructure flow out at 01.24 hrs, when the opening in the superstructure was not facing the waves and the speed was zero? Why did only water flow in/up into the superstructure >2 meters above waterline? According to the law of gravity the water should have flowed out.
Sensational Discovery - Ventilation Ducts in the Superstructure Side 8 meters above the Water Line
Sjöling/Rosenius come up with a sensational discovery - they state they have located - on three different ship's drawings ([4] Drawing 590 02/21 - Safety and Fire fighting equipment, [5] Drawing 590 64/1 - Ventilationplan, Blatt 1 and [6] Drawing 590 24/1 - Wagendeckausrüstung) never heard of before - ten ventilation ducts in the ship's side leading down into watertight hull engine compartments from the deck house.
They obviously make reservations in the Pre-study about the existence of the alleged ducts and the whole Pre-study is nonsense without the ducts; nobody including the Finnish, Swedish and Estonian maritime administrations and the JAIC 1994-1997 has ever heard about the ducts before, they are not shown on the General Arrangement plan of the ship or any drawings officially kept by the Finnish or Estonian administrations or the BV Class society, normally the hull engine compartments are ventilated via the funnel and the engine casing/uptake with the fans/fire dampers located in the funnel, normally you do not fit A-60 insulated ventilation ducts to hull spaces in the side of the superstructure, etc.
Incorrect Ventilation Ducts
The origin of the newly found drawings by the SPF is apparently the Finnish Maritime Administration. If the drawings are correct and they are not, they prove that the 'Estonia' was incorrectly built 1979-1980 by the Meyer shipyard at Papenburg, Germany, and badly approved and certified by the Finnish Maritime Administration, 1980, and incompetently checked at Port State Controls by the Swedish Maritime Administration, 1980-1994 and, again, incorrectly surveyed and certified by the Estonian Maritime Administration and Bureau Veritas, 1993-1994. The reason is simply that the ventilation ducts and openings are 100% in contradiction with the 1966 Load Line Convention. You cannot fit ventilation ducts to compartments below the freeboard deck, e.g. engine rooms with openings without watertight closing appliances in the side of a ship superstructure. Any ventilators must be fitted at least on top of the superstructure deck, with a high coaming and with external means to be closed in case of fire, etc.
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Normal practice is that ventilation of machinery spaces and emergency generator room, in order to satisfactorily ensure, in all weather conditions (i) the continuous ventilation of machinery spaces, and (ii), when necessary, the immediate ventilation of the emergency generator room, that the ventilators serving such spaces have openings so located that they do not require closing appliances except fire dampers, i.e. that they are installed at the centerline with the coamings extend for more than 4,5 m above the deck in position 1 (0.25L forward part of deck 4) or 2,3 m above the deck in position 2 (0.75L aft part above the superstructure; deck 4 in the case of the Estonia). The safe location of any ventilation openings is at deck 6 - not below deck 4 in the side. Evidently no ventilation ducts were originally fitted in the side of the Estonia to ventilate the engine rooms, as it was done via the casing and the funnel. |
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The Origin of the strange Drawings
The reader should now be very curious about these drawings; [4] Drawing 590 02/21 - Safety and Fire fighting equipment, [5] Drawing 590 64/1 - Ventilationplan, Blatt 1 and [6] Drawing 590 24/1 - Wagendeckausrüstung suggesting ducts in the side down to the engine rooms.
Where do they come from as the shipyard evidently has not produced them?
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It is very easy to prove that the alleged drawings are false - just ask for the originals from the Meyer shipyard! The shipyard (Mr Hummel) has informed that no such ducts exist. However, there is a possibility that the original ventilation of some hull compartments were found deficient and that the ventilation outlets were modified later. The drawings may be a 'proposal' of one type of modifications but later some other modifications were done. Regardless - the modified arrangement was illegal. It would appear on the other hand that some openings in the side were used to ventilate the superstructure/car deck space outlined above and as seen on the photo right of the interior of the 'Estonia' car deck; you see the duct (beside the pilot door) with opening grids at deck 2 and 3 levels. It seems that the ventilation idea was to extract air via fans on deck 4 aft and allow air inlet through ducts in side - as shown - with an external opening below deck 4 - without any closing devices. It is a stupid arrangement - in case of fire in the superstructure, it cannot be sealed off. The closing arrangement of the inlets in the side must be fitted on deck 4 outside the car deck space. |
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Sjöling and Rosenius and the strange Drawings
Sjöling/Rosenius assume that the drawings are true and correct and that ventilation ducts exist in the side between deck 4 and the hull compartments (they ignore the ducts between the outside and the cardeck!) - and that the watertight hull compartments were conveniently flooded through them - and that is why the Estonia sank. The hull on which she floated was flooded through ventilation ducts in the side! Finally we are told why the Estonia sank without capsizing. Because Sjöling/Rosenius confirm that otherwise, with water in the superstructure, the Estonia would have capsized
There are allegedly according Sjöling/Rosenius at least ten ventilation ducts in the sides leading down to six watertight hull compartments Attachment 3 of the Pre-study and below table (and none to the car deck):
Number
Frame
Space
V21
26
Store room
V22
37
Store room
V23
46
Store room
V24
49
Store
V25
64
Main engine room
V26
65
Main engine room
V27
55
Main engine room
V28
80
Engine workshop
V29
A
Engine workshop
V210
94
Sewage tank room
Table 1.51.1 Alleged 10 off vent ducts in side from below deck 2 to just below deck 4.
These ducts of small cross areas must be fitted with external A60 fire insulation and in addition be fitted with weathertight (sic) fire dampers at deck 2 or at deck 4 level. In the latter case the duct must be of substantial thickness. If such ducts existed they were stupid and illegal - how to maintain and overhaul a weathertight fire damper inside a fire insulated duct? It was much easier to ventilate the store rooms, workshop and sewage tank room from the central casing and the engine room from the funnel/engine casing/uptake and this is how it should have been done. Why retrofit ventilation exhaust ducts from store rooms, workshops and sewage tank rooms in the side through the superstructure and car deck space?
We should however not worry too much about these new ducts, which will not be submerged until the list is >40° when there are substantial amounts of water on the car deck according to the Commission. The Pre-study is very descriptive about the water in the superstructure on the car deck - and confirms that the Final report is false! Because a ferry does not float upright with water loaded in the superstructure on the car deck - deck 2! The Estonia evidently capsizes before water starts to flow down into the hull compartments through any small cross area ventilation exhaust ducts in the side unless he water flows out of the superstructure. However, more realistically the Estonia should never have capsized in the given scenario with very little water inflow - all water should have flowed out, when the vessel stopped, before capsize could have occurred.
Water on the Car Deck - Capsize
Attachment 5 - Loading condition with water on the car deck, C0-C31, - of the Pre-study clearly demonstrates the original falsifications about water on the car deck. Sjöling/Rosenius suggest that the Estonia would only list 0-55 degrees sideways with 0-12 000 tons of water on the car deck and that the moving water - up to 12.000 tons - will not trim, capsize or sink the vessel - or flow out!
This is not possible! It is impossible to load 12 000 tons of water in the superstructure of a ship with deadweight about 3 300 tons or probably only 3 000 tons of which 2 200 tons is already used.
Furthermore any free water on the car deck moves to the lowest point and trims (rotates longitudinally!) the ship; e.g. 10.000 tons (sic - an enormous free moving weight = to the original weight of the ferry!) forward trims the ship 10 meters on the bow; the ship will fall/roll over forward (actually all water in the superstructure would flow out, but realistically the ship would have capsized sideways and floated upside down before that with only 1 900 tons inside the superstructure = the absolute limit) and turns like a turtle and floats upside down after one minute. Alternatively the ferry trims on the stern and then the bow opening becomes 5-10 meters above waterline. And then - how would water enter through the bow? Therefore the JAIC decided (it is an essential part of the falsifications of all events) that the Estonia didn't trim a centimeter due to the continuous inflow of water (no outflow) on the car deck into the superstructure and the bow ramp was always a little above water (sic! - Attachment 7.2 and Attachment 10 and starboard inflow point WOS of the bow opening and all conditions C0-C31) and Sjöling/Rosenius do not contradict them in their 60 hours of Pre-study.
Limited Deadweight, limited floating Buoyancy
Everybody concerned with ferry stability/loading/floatability knows that any roro-passenger ferry type Estonia has a certain limiting, intact load carrying capacity - the dead weight - say 3 345 tons. The ferry cannot load more cargo, as it will then not survive the risk of two compartments collision damage/flooding of the hull. Two compartments collision damage of the hull and flooding of two watertight compartments of the hull corresponds to the loading of about - maximum 2 000 tons - extra cargo on the car deck of an intact ship. After that, i.e. flooding of more than two compartments of the hull, the watertight hull becomes submerged below water - and sinks. Therefore the loading conditions C8-C31 in Attachment 5 of the Pre-study with 0-12.000 tons loaded in the superstructure are an incorrect assumption or a plain invention.
The Estonia will never survive any of the conditions C8-C31 for the simple reason that she cannot load 2.000 - 12.000 ton water on the car deck as assumed by the JAIC 1994-1997 and Sjöling/Rosenius in 2003. In reality the 'Estonia' would have capsized sideways and up side down long before that with only 1.900 tons of water on the car deck. To use conditions C8-C31 in a Pre-study to demonstrate the sinking of the Estonia is incorrect. It is unscientific!
Thousands of Tons of Water on the Car Deck do not trim the Estonia
And it is here that the scam becomes revealing. In order to hide the fact that the water on the car deck trims, capsizes and sinks the vessel, the originators of loading conditions C8-C31 manipulates the calculation;
(a) the water in the superstructure becomes fixed (like ice!) and does not move or flow out, it is just added as a fixed weight to confuse the computer software,
(b) there is no trim whatsoever (the ice does not move) unless the trim changes a little on the stern (how is not explained).
(c) in addition - to avoid that the ship then sinks with 12.000 ton extra weight loaded in the open superstructure - the originators of loading conditions C8-C31 suggest that the vessel floats on the watertight deck house!
Magic - the Ferry floats on the Deckhouse for 11-17 Minutes
Everybody concerned with ferry stability/loading/floatability knows that any roro-passenger ferry type Estonia does not float on the deck house. The deck house, > 9 meters above the waterline, presents no water- or weather tightness whatsoever to provide buoyancy or a righting moment to prevent capsizing. The deck house is an open structure without any watertight or even weather tight means. Sjöling/Rosenius apparently know these simple facts, which explain their confused explanations of GZ-curves associated with the loading condition, L2, used in the report and confusingly described in Attachment 4 (they try to explain the real facts but then ignore them and simply conclude that the deckhouse is 100% watertight).
Falsified GZ-curves
Any ship has only one basic GZ-curve, which may be reduced in extent if a part originally considered providing buoyancy, e.g. a superstructure, is being open to the sea, e.g. the bow ramp is open. The open deck house is not considered in the GZ-curve. GZ is the righting arm at different angles of list of the ship.
And this is the second part of the original Estonia falsifications (see chapter 12.6.1 of the Final Report (5)) repeated in the Pre-study. Sjöling/Rosenius not only suggest that the superstructure (open at the bow) and deck house decks 4-8 are 100% watertight, they propose that the only way for the ship to sink is that the deckhouse is flooded through some defined inflow openings, e.g. the doors aft used by passengers to walk in and out and, reluctantly, the windows in the sides Attachment 3, even if the difference is small.
Finally they suggest that it takes 11-17 minutes to actually flood the 100% watertight deckhouse - 17 minutes via the doors or 11 minutes via windows+doors.
All this is of course fantasy without factual foundation.
The deckhouses of the Herald of Free Enterprise, the Jan Heweliusz and Le Joola contained no buoyancy and were instantaneously flooded when the ships capsized (and floated upside down) and the Estonia was no different. In the Pre-study calculations Sjöling/Rosenius play God and allow water to flow into the deckhouse (and the hull compartments below) so that the Estonia sinks slowly without capsizing during 11 to 17 minutes.
Blame the Napa Computer Software
In order to play God (or Devil) - and invent (falsify) scenarios how the Estonia sank - Sjöling/Rosenius make reference to Finnish Napa computer software, which they allege can compute the stability and floatability of a ferry during the sinking process. The Napa software is only applicable to floating, generally intact ships with some underwater hull compartments flooded and in communication with the sea after damage - damage stability.
The ship is initially floating on a hull with watertight subdivision and with a weather tight superstructure with certain subdivision (including watertight buoyancy tanks) contributing buoyancy when submerged while, the ship heels. Then certain underwater hull compartments are assumed flooded and the software computes the new floating position, etc. Nothing more, nothing less. A Napa computer cannot be used to show how a ship sinks.
Sjöling/Rosenius modify the Napa program, as Huss, Karppinen and Junnila previously, 1.9 and 3.12, and make initially the whole deckhouse 10 meters above the waterline watertight (sic) hull compartments on which the ship is alleged to float when submerged. This innocent (sic) mistake is the basis of the falsifications.
The Napa program could of course handle 'water loaded on the car deck' in the superstructure - water = <1 000 tons - and would compute a large trim and heel and risk of capsize, which would occur with 1 500 - 2 000 tons. The Napa program could evidently not handle 2 000 - 10 000 tons of water 'loaded' on the car deck. The software would just compute that the ship was lost, had capsized, as it could not load so much!
It is very easy to verify this! Check it on any Napa computer fitted to a Sweden/Finland roro-passenger ferry, e.g. when visiting Stockholm!
The Estonia could not float with 5.000 - 10.000 extra tons of water in the superstructure as the extra buouyancy in the hull to survive two-compartments flooding was only 2 000 tons. This the Estonia conspirators detected already 1995. In order to 'cheat' the software they (a) made the deckhouse watertight and (b) the 'water on the car deck' a solid weight - no trim - balanced by the invented (non-existing) buoyancy in the deckhouse. Rosenius/ Sjöling inherited this stupid and dishonest set-up from the JAIC. And they accpted it. And tried to improve on it! It is quite dishonest. Any scientific model test basin will discover this manipulation.
To slowly fill the Estonia with water Sjöling/Rosenius then opened selected 'inflow openings' to the deckhouse, so it was slowly flooded - and they discovered that the ship would capsize and float upside down. In order to prevent capsize they suggest that decks 7 and 8 are not fully flooded at all and that deck 5 floods before deck 4 (?) and/or then they find ventilation ducts at deck 4 to some hull (sic) compartments and then they allow these hull compartments to flood - so that the ship fills with water. All this is 100% unscientific and 100% dishonest and has nothing to do with naval architecture or seamanship.
Total Time for Sinking - The Estonia sinks 1 000 Meters short of the official Position
Officially - according to the JAIC - the Estonia lost the visor at 01.15 hrs and had about 80 degrees list at 01.30 hrs and later the ship sank at 01.50-01.54 hrs. All the time - regardless of increased enclosed weights - the wreck was drifting at a speed of >2.2 knots. The official task given to the SPF by the government was to clarify the sequence of water filling between 01.30 and 01.50/54 hrs - the last 20-24 minutes (the end of the accident). Sjöling/Rosenius in their Pre-study (attachements 12-15) do not make any attempt to set actual times to their invented events. The attachements 12-15 do not and cannot make any sense.
Regardless, it seems that Sjöling/Rosenius - when they start flooding the deckhouse, which happens at about 01.24 hrs according to the JAIC, cannot stop the ship sinking in longer than 11-17 minutes, i.e. the Estonia sinks already at 01.35 hrs (as suggested by this writer due to hull leakage and visor in place) or 01.41 hrs (suggested by Sjöling/Rosenius). In neither case the wreck will sink at the official position of the wreck relative the visor at 01.50/54 hrs. So how could the visor be lost 1 560 meters West of the wreck? We are back to the simple conclusion that the official visor position is false, that the visor never detached from the ferry, and that the visor was blown off using explosives by Swedish Navy divers under water after the accident.
The Pre-study written by vice admiral Frank Rosenius and Mr Staffan Sjöling of the Defence Equipment Board (Försvarets Materialverk, FMV) seems to be another tragic - misleading - document in the row of false reports about the Estonia. How can the staff at the Swedish Board of Pyschological Defence accept such a report?
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E-brev till SPF |
E-mail to the SPF |
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Beausoleil 6 April 2003 - Er ref SPF Dnr E19/03 Mats Ekdahl - Generaldirektör SPF Vendela Dobson - informatör, SPF Hjärtligt tack för Förstudien av sjunkförloppet + Bilagor 1-15 sända 2003-03-31. Analys av förstudien visar att metoden att simulera sjunkförloppet är fel. Utgångspunkten - Bilaga 5 - lastfall med 0-12.000 ton vatten i överbyggnaden är omöjlig - Estonia kapsejsar och flyter upp/ned redan vid lastfall C7 och kan inte lasta mera vatten, lastfall C8-C31, utan att sjunka direkt. Anledningen tycks vara att output från Napa-datorn beträffande trim helt enkelt har manipulerats. Därför blir alla följande slutsatser i Förstudien och bilagor 6-15 missvisande (förutom att många referenser i Förstudien ej finns redovisade i Bilagorna). Mera uppgifter om brister i Förstudien finns på min hemsida - http://heiwaco.tripod.com/epunkt151.htm . SPF ombedes göra om Förstudien med bättre kvalifierade experter. Vänliga hälsningar Anders Björkman, Heiwa Co |
Beausoleil 6 April 2003 - Your ref SPF Dnr E19/03 Mats Ekdahl - Generaldirektör SPF Vendela Dobson - informatör, SPF Many thanks for the Pre-study of the Sequence of Sinking and Attachments 1-15 sent 2003-03-31. Analysis of the Pre-study shows that the method to simulate the sequence of sinking is wrong. The starting point - Attachment 5 - load conditions with 0-12.000 tons of water in the superstructure is impossile - the Estonia capsizes and floats upside down already in load condition C7 and cannot load more water, conditions C8-C31, without immediate sinking. One reason is that output from the Napa computer re trim simply seems to be manipulated. Therefore all following conclusions of the Pre-study and Attachments 6-15 are misleading (in addition many references in the Pre-study are not shown in the attachments). More errors of the Pre-study are shown at - http://heiwaco.tripod.com/epunkt151.htm . SPF is kindly requested to re-make the Pre-study by better qualified experts. Kind regards Anders Björkman, Heiwa Co |
No reply has been received (18 April 2003)
In January 2004 the SPF (http://www.psycdef.se/estonia/tasks_ongoing.asp) decided to make a computer annimation of the sinking based on the below Pre-study to be presented 1st September 2004 - 10 years after the actual sinking. The SPF and the writers of the Pre-study have ignored all comments by Heiwa Co that the Pre-study is wrong and that therefore evidently also any computer annimation will be wrong. Anyway, the sinking in the Pre-study goes to fast so that the 'Estonia' sinks 1 000 meters West of the actual wreck position. Heiwa Co has 17 March 2004 sent below e-mail to SPF:
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E-brev till SPF 17 mars 2004 |
E-mail to the SPF 17 March 2004 |
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Vendela Dobson, Göran Lindmark, Mats Ekdahl - SPF Hej, för er kännedom meddelas att min hemsida finns pà Internet igen http://heiwaco.tripod.com sedan söndags. Redan pà màndag kom ett e-brev fràn birgitta.heijer@economy.ministry.se laddat med ett nytt virus (W38blage.p). Naturligtvis var e-avsändaraddressen falsk. Barnsligt försök att sabotera min dator. Ni ombedes läsa hur Sverige fuskar bort SEK 28 millioner pà sjösäkerhetsforskning 2001-2004 http://heiwaco.tripod.com/vinnova.htm och hur Heiwa Cos ansökningar smusslas bort. Ni ombedes läsa hur Heiwa Cos bevisade uppgifter 2000 om Estonias sjöovärdighet smusslas bort i ett märkligt remissförfarande http://heiwaco.tripod.com/remiss.htm (när ovan Birgitta Heijer tydligen var statssekreteraren som beordrade remissen). Och naturligtvis skall ni läsa om SPFs, er egen, märkliga vattenfyllnadsstudie (för SEK 40,000:-) av Staffan Sjöling pà http://heiwaco.tripod.com/punkt151.htm och jämföra med Heiwa Cos analys http://heiwaco.tripod.com/punkt19.htm . Själv har jag inget med Estoniaolyckan att göra än att jag och mitt företag Heiwa Co analyserar uppgifterna med uppgift att förbättra sjösäkerhet, vilket ni naturligtvis är medvetna om. Nu tycker jag att Sveriges förföljelse av Heiwa Co gàr för làngt. Era uppdragsgivare vet inte skillnad pà sanning och lögn längre eller hur man skall uppföra sig anständigt eller moraliskt i t.ex. sjösäkerhetssammanhang. Vad tycker ni själva? Är det roligt att spela med i den här sörjan längre? Har ni inte eget omdöme? Säg NEJ. Säg att ni inte har lust att arbeta med uppdragen (minnesbank, vattenfyllnad) längre. Säg att ni inte längre tror pà uppdragsgivarnas uttalade, uppriktiga vilja (vad den nu kan vara?). Säg att de kan hitta andra personer (t.ex. HM Konungens stabschef) för att reda upp i sophögen. Läs gärna mitt nya förord http://heiwaco.tripod.com/forord.htm varför jag fortsätter att arbeta med denna märkliga historia. Jag är en lycklig och fri människa men jag tycker inte om att en massa amatörerer med höga titlar i lilla Sveige förlöjligar mitt företag och vad jag uppnàtt i sjösäkerhetssammanhang i IMO och Europa och världen. Ni ombedes därför vänligen att avsäga er fortsatt inblandning med Estonia. Bästa hälsningar Anders Björkman Heiwa Co European Agency for Safety at Sea |
Vendela Dobson, Göran Lindmark, Mats Ekdahl - SPF Greetings, please be advised that my home page http://heiwaco.tripod.com is on the Internet again since last Sunday. On Monday arrived an e-mail from birgitta.heijer@economy.ministry.se loaded with a new virus (W38blage.p). Naturally the address of the sender was false. A childish attempt to sabotage my computer. Your are requested to read how Sweden wastes SEK 28 millions on safety at sea research 2001-2004 http://heiwaco.tripod.com/vinnova.htm and how the Heiwa Co applications are swept under the carpet. You are requested to read how the Heiwa Co proven information 2000 about the Estonia un-seaworthiness was swept under the carpet in a strange internal inquiry http://heiwaco.tripod.com/remiss.htm (when above mentioned Ms Birgitta Heijer was head at the ministry which ordered the inquiry). And naturally shall you read about SPF's, your own, strange water filling study (that cost SEK 40,000:-) by Staffan Sjöling Sjöling at http://heiwaco.tripod.com/punkt151.htm and compare with the Heiwa Co analysis http://heiwaco.tripod.com/punkt19.htm . I have myself nothing to do with the Estonia accident except that my company Heiwa Co analyses the information with objective to improve safety at sea, which you evidently are fully aware of. Now I think that the persecution of Heiwa Co goes too far. Your employers do not know the difference between truths and lies any longer and how to behave correctly or morally with, e.g. safety at sea matters. What do you think yourselves? Is it funny to play along in this mess any longer? Do you not have your own judgement? Inform them that you do not want to continue working with the job (memory bank, water filling). Tell that you do not believe in their wishes (whatever they can be?). Suggest that they can find other persons to clean up this garbage heap (e.g. the head of the office of HM the King). Read my new Foreword http://heiwaco.tripod.com/forord.htm why I continue to work with this strange story. I am a happy and free person but I do not like that a number of amateurs with high titles in little Sweden ridicule my company and what I have achieved concerning safety at sea at the IMO and in Europe and in the world. You are kindly asked to resign from further involvement with the Estonia. Best regards Anders Björkman Heiwa Co European Agency for Safety at Sea |
No reply has been received (10 April 2004).
The Computer Animation is stopped (SPF ref. 2004-04-26 Dnr SPF E 28/04) Request for an independent Investigation
Pro Memoria made at meeting with the Estonia
project reference group 26 April 2004 Present: Mats Ekdahl, chairman, Vendela Dobson
Andersson, Göran Lindmark, Disa Byman, Michael
Öun, Allan Sooman, Frank Rosenius, Brett
Hardman, Birger Stensköld, Magnus
Faxén, Anna Carin Wallenstein, Lasse
Johnsen, Odd Lundkvist, Hans Landberg och Daniel
Westman ... Letter from SEA, AgnEf, FAE and
Vilhelminagruppen Above mentioned associations of relatives have
in a letter to SPF of 30 March 2004 among other
matters demanded that the so called Pre-study, how
to explain the sinking of the Estonia 1994, which
the SPF has carried out, shall be completed by an
independent investigation and that it shall not
include delegates and experts from Estonia, Finland
and Sweden. Furthermore it is demanded that the
computer animation of the SPF Pre-study shall not
be done before an independent investigation has
been completed and that the Estonia Fact Bank is
continuously up-dated until the truth of the
sinking of the M/S Estonia has dawned. Mats Ekdahl pointed out that the SPF cannot
decide about all these demands. After thorough
discussion it was decided that the question shall
be further handled and be on the agenda at meeting
with the reference group during the autumn. Next meeting Next meeting with the reference group takes
place Wednesday 15 September, 13.00 - abt. 16.00
hrs at the SPF Minnesanteckningar förda vid
sammanträde med Estoniaprojektets
referensgrupp 26 april 2004 Närvarande: Mats Ekdahl, ordförande,
Vendela Dobson Andersson, Göran Lindmark, Disa
Byman, Michael Öun, Allan Sooman, Frank
Rosenius, Brett Hardman, Birger Stensköld,
Magnus Faxén, Anna Carin Wallenstein, Lasse
Johnsen, Odd Lundkvist, Hans Landberg och Daniel
Westman ... Skrivelse från SEA, AgnEf, FAE och
Vilhelminagruppen Rubricerade anhörigföreningar har i
skrivelse till SPF den 30 mars 2004 bland annat
begärt den så kallade
sjunkförloppsstudie som SPF låtit
utföra fullföljs med en oberoende
utredning och att denna inte ska innefatta
ledamöter och specialister från Estland,
Finland eller Sverige. Vidare kräver man att
den föreslagna dataanimationen av studien inte
genomförs innan en oberoende utredning har
slutförts samt att Estoniasamlingen
löpande kompletteras fram till dess sanningen
om M/S Estonias förlisning kommer i dagen. Mats Ekdahl pekade på att SPF inte kan
fatta beslut om samtliga dessa krav. Efter
ingående diskussion beslöts att
frågan ska beredas vidare och tas upp vid
sammanträde med referensgruppen under
hösten. Nästa sammanträde Nästa sammanträde med referensgruppen
äger rum onsdag den 15 september, 13.00 -ca
16.00 på SPF.
This amazing request has not been mentioned in
any Swedish media.
(written 7 May 2004)
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Sjunkförloppsstudie Ag Sjunkförloppsstudie 2003-03-28 Vam Frank Rosenius Civ.ing. Staffan Sjöling
Styrelsen för Psykologiskt Försvar Estonia. Sjunkförloppsstudie. Rapport förstudie. 15 bilagor
1. Bakgrund Regeringen har gett SPF i uppdrag att i den faktabank som upprättas inom myndigheten, bör det finnas ett material som åskådliggör hur Estonia kan ha vattenfyllts i haveriets slutskede (Regeringsbeslut 2001-04-19, N2001/4125/TP). SPF bereder denna del av regeringsuppdraget genom att till sig knyta ett par experter. Experterna är Vam (pens) Frank Rosenius samt civ.ing. (skeppsbyggnad) Staffan Sjöling. |
The SPF Pre-study explaining the Estonia sinking Re Sinking Pre-Study 2003-03-28 Vice admiral Frank Rosenius Civ.ing. Staffan Sjöling
Styrelsen för Psykologiskt Försvar Estonia. Sequence of Sinking Study. Report Pre-study. 15 attachments
1. Background The government has given the SPF the task, within the MV Estonia Fact Bank being established by the authority, to include an information package that shows how the Estonia could have been flooded with water during the final events of the accident (Government Decision 2001-04-19, N2001/4125/TP). The SPF prepares this part of the government order by attaching to it two experts. The experts are vice admiral (retired) Frank Rosenius and Staffan Sjöling, M.Sc (Naval architecture). |
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SPF har uppdragit åt experterna att genomföra en förstudie. Syftet med förstudien är att med utgångspunkt i haveriutredningens rapport översiktligt analysera möjliga vägar för vatteninströmning i fartyget och konsekvenser av detta för sjunkförloppet. Förstudien skall skapa underlag för den vidare beredningen av regeringens uppdrag. Denna förstudie avrapporteras härmed. |
The SPF has requested the experts to make a pre-study. The objective of the pre-study is, based on the official accident report, to superficially analyse different ways of water inflow into the ship and the resulting consequences of inflow with regard to the sequence of sinking. The pre-study shall create a base for further treatment of the government order. This pre-study is hereby reported. |
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2. Överväganden och inriktning Arbetsgruppen har som allmän utgångspunkt utnyttjat de slutsatser och övriga uppgifter av relevans för sjunkförloppet som finns redovisade i JAIC's slutrapport [1]. Vissa av dessa uppgifter finns sammanställda i bilaga 1. |
2. Considerations and objectives The work group has as a general starting point used the conclusions and other relevant information of the sequence of sinking as reported in the Final JAIC report [1]. Some of the information is collected in attachment 1. |
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Arbetsgruppen har haft begränsade resurser vilket endast medgivit översiktliga beräkningar och att ett begränsat antal exempel kunnat studeras. För att trots detta erhålla så stor bredd som möjligt i redovisade exempel har vi valt att utnyttja de ytterligheter på inströmningsförlopp som slutrapporten ger underlag för. |
The work group has had limited resources, which have only allowed superficial calculations and that a limited number of example could be studied. Regardless, in order to achieve as large width as possible in the shown examples, we have chosen to use the extremes of sequences of inflow as the Final report is supporting. |
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Beträffande den första delen i haverifasen - när bogvisiret bröts loss från fartyget och därmed förorsakad vatteninströmning på bildäck- har vi utnyttjat i haverirapporten redovisade min- respektive maxvärden på vatteninströmning - 300 ton/min resp. 1 800 ton/min. Anmärkning av
Björkman: Det är oklart vad som
menas med 'den första delen i
haverifasen' och
vatteninströmning i
överbyggnaden. Det tar 40
resp. 6 minuter 40 sekunder att fylla
överbyggnaden med 12 000 ton vatten
vid de givna inflödena, men enbart 1
800 ton vatten behövs för att
Estonia kapsejsar och flyter upp och ner -
efter sex resp. en minut. Den
första delen i haverifasen leder till
blixtsnabb kapsejsning. |
Regarding the first phase of the accident - when the visor was ripped away from the ferry and thereby caused the water inflow onto the car deck - we have used the minimum respective maximum values of inflow of the Final report - 300 tons/min respectively 1 800 tons/min. Remark by
Björkman: It is not clear what is
meant with the 'first phase of the
accident' and inflow into the
superstructure at various rates. It
takes 40 minutes resp. 6 minutes 40
seconds to fill 12 000 tons water into the
superstructure at the given rates, but
only 1 800 tons is required to capsize the
Estonia upside down - after six resp. one
minutes. The first phase of the
accident should cause immediate
capsize. |
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För det fortsatta sjunkförloppet finns det två dimensionerande parametrar, nämligen (1) hur snabbt däcken ovanför bildäck vattenfylls i samband med fartygets ökande slagsida samt (2) hur vatten når däcken under bildäck och när så sker, hur fort detta förlopp går. Denna sist nämnda parameter är avgörande för att beräkna fartygets successivt reducerade flytförmåga som leder till att fartyget sjunker. |
For the subsequent sequence of the sinking there are two limiting parameters, thus (1) how fast the decks above the car deck are filled with water due to increasing angle of list, and (2) how water reaches the decks below the car deck and when it happens, how fast this event takes. The latter parameter is decisive to calculate the gradually reduced buoyancy capacity that results in the sinking of the vessel. |
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Beträffande vatteninströmning på däcken ovanför bildäck anger haverirapporten att detta sker genom att bordvarts liggande fönster på SB-sidan slås sönder av vågorna samt genom dörrarna på akterkant av däckshusbyggnaden. Dessa dörrar är klenare till konstruktionen än fönstren. Vi har därför valt att studera två huvudexempel - ett där vatteninströmning endast sker genom dörrarna och ett där det sker genom både dörrar och 10 av de stora fönstren på resp. däck 4 - 6 (d.v.s. 100 % av dessa fönster är helt intryckta av vågorna). För däck 7 och 8 räknas vatteninströmningen endast genom de dörrar som där finns. Inom resp. exempel har tidsförloppet beräknats utifrån två variationer på vatteninströmningen på bildäck - 300 ton/min resp. 1 800 ton/min. Detta leder till att vi redovisar fyra tidsförlopp, två för resp. studerat huvudexempel. |
Regarding water inflow on the decks above the car deck the Final report states that it occurs when the lee side windows on the starboard side are broken by the waves and through the aft side doors of the deckhouse. These doors are of weaker design than the windows. We have therefore chosen to study two principal examples - one where water inflow is only through the doors and one where it takes place through both the doors and 10 of the big windows on respective decks 4 - 6 (i.e. 100% of these windows are totally pushed in by the waves). For decks 7 and 8 the water inflow only through the existing doors is considered. Within respective example has the time sequence been calculated with regard to two different water inflows on the car deck - 300 tons/min respectively 1 800 tons/min. It means that we present four time sequences, two for respective studied main example. |
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Avseende vatteninströmning på däcken under bildäck utgör detta sjunkförloppets "kärnfråga". Genom konstruktionen med en s.k. centercasing mitt i fartyget för all förbindelse - trappor, avgaser, ventilation mm - mellan de övre däcken och däck 1 och 0 så skall inget vatten kunna tränga in i de undre däcken förrän vatten når branddörrarna i centercasingen på bildäck och/eller när vatten når luftintagen i området vid skorstenen på däck 8. Detta sker först vid ca 90 graders slagsida. |
Regarding water inflow on the decks below the car deck, it constitutes the "central question" of the sequence of the sinking. By design with a so called centre casing in the centre line of the vessel for all communications - stairs, exhaust, ventilation, etc., - between the upper decks and decks 1 and 0, no water shall penetrate down to the lower decks until water reaches the fire doors in the centre casing on the car deck and/or when water reaches the air inlets at the funnel on deck 8. The latter only happens at 90 degrees list. |
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Arbetsgruppen har dock funnit i byggnadsvarvets ritningar [4] [5] [6], som beskriver ventilationssystemen ombord, att det bordvarts finns 6 ventilationskanaler på SB- resp. BB-sida vilka leder luft till/från maskinområdet från utsidan av fartyget (underkant däck 4). Vatten kan via dessa kanaler snabbt och i större mängd nå de undre däcken redan vid ca 40 graders slagsida. Dessa ventilationskanaler har endast brandavstängningsventiler som hanteras manuellt från bildäck vilket talar för att de ej stängdes under olycksförloppet. Arbetsgruppen har därför antagit att dessa ventilationskanaler var öppna. |
The work group has however found shipyard drawings [4] [5] [6] of the ventilation system, which describe the existence of 6 ventilation ducts on starboard respective port side, which directs air to/from the engine spaces from the outside of the ship (just below deck 4 level). Water can via these ducts fast and in larger amounts reach the lower decks already at about 40 degrees list. The vent ducts are only fitted with manual fire dampers on the car deck, which suggest that they were not closed during the sequence of the accident. The work group has therefore assumed that these ventilation ducts were open. |
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3. Redovisning av exempel på sjunkförlopp 3.1 Beräkningsmodell För beräkning av fyllnadsförloppet har det skeppsbyggnadstekniska mjukvaruprogrammet NAPA använts. Mjukvarumodellen av Estonia beskriver fartygets skrovform samt indelning i tankar och rum. Modellen är densamma som före olyckan använts vid beräkning av fartygets stabilitet samt samma modell som använts av haverikommissionen. |
3. Description of examples of sinking 3.1 Calculation model To calculate the flooding sequence the naval architecture software program NAPA is used. The software model of the Estonia describes the ship's hull form and partitions into tanks and compartments. The model is the same, which was used before the accident to calculate the ship's stability and the one that was used by the accident investigation commission. |
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Modellen har kompletterats. Den modell SPF erhållit sträckte sig endast upp till däck 4, 13.4 m över baslinjen. Utifrån generalarrangemangsritningar har modellen kompletterats för att inkludera hela fartyget. Detta har gjorts för att på ett så korrekt sätt som möjligt kunna beräkna fyllnadsförloppet. Fartygsmodellens utsträckning återges i bilaga 2. |
The model has been added to. The model SPF was given had an extension only up to deck 4, 13.4 m above base line. Based on general arrangement drawings the model has been enlarged to include the whole ship. It has been done in as correct manner as possible in order to calculate the flooding sequence. The extension of the ship model is shown in attachment 2. |
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Modellen har även kompletterats med de mest väsentliga flödesöppningarna. Flödesöppningarna återges i bilaga 3. |
The model has also been fitted with the essential inflow openings. The inflow openings are shown in attachment 3. |
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I bilaga 2, över beräkningsmodellens utsträckning, kan man se att däcken ovan bildäck är indelade i avdelningar. Denna indelning valdes för att få möjlighet att studera ett successivt inflöde av vatten på varje däck. Beräkningar är genomförda både för däck indelade i flera delar samt för varje däck som en helhet. |
In attachment 2 of the extension of the model you can see that the decks above the car deck are divided into compartments. This interior division was selected in order to study the successive inflow of water on every deck. The calculations are done both for decks divided into several parts and for each deck as a complete unit. |
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3.2 Avgränsningar Att göra en detaljerad studie av fyllnadsförloppet är mycket svårt. Speciellt gäller detta de olika vägar vattnet kan ha trängt in i fartyget. Att säga att ett sätt som fartyget vattenfylldes på är det riktiga är i praktiken omöjligt. Att i detalj rekonstruera vilka vägar vattnet tog, hur mycket vatten som trängde in i de olika tidsskedena och hur detta minut för minut påverkade sjunkförloppet har arbetsgruppen ej kunnat göra utan vi redovisar exemplen översiktligt. |
3.2 Limitations To make a detailed study of the flooding sequence is very difficult. This concerns in particular the various ways water can have penetrated into the vessel. To say that one way the ship was flooded is the correct one is in practice impossible. To simulate in detail what ways the water took, how much water that entered at different times and how this, minute by minute, affected the sequence of sinking has not been possible for the work group. Instead we show the examples superficially. |
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Tidsförloppen för vatteninströmningen i olika delar av fartyget är, som angivits ovan, svåra att exakt beräkna med det underlag och de verktyg som arbetsgruppen haft tillgång till. Angivna tider är därför approximativa. JAIC´s slutsatser angående att vattentäta avdelningar samt att branddörrar till bildäck stängdes tidigt har legat till grund för beräkningsexemplen utom avseende det som berör de bordvarts placerade ventilationstrummorna till maskinområdet. |
The time sequences of water inflow in different parts of the ship are, as stated above, difficult to calculate exactly with the input and tools available to the work group. Given times are therefore approximate. The conclusions of the JAIC regarding the early closing of the watertight compartments and the fire doors on the car deck are the base of the calculated examples except what concerns the side vent ducts to the engine spaces. |
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Studien har genomförts med ett antal övriga begränsningar enligt nedan: · Studien är genomförd helt statisk. Ingen hänsyn har tagits till inverkan av fartygets rörelser. · Flödesöppningarna har inte kunnat modelleras fullständigt. I ett fartyg finns ett stort antal öppningar genom vilka vatten kan ta sig in i fartyget samt genom vilka vatten kan ta sig från ett utrymme till ett annat. Att fullständigt beskriva dessa samt att ta dem i beaktande är nästan ogörligt. · Beräkningarna för inflöde av vatten in i fartygets olika utrymmen är av enkel karaktär. Inga dynamiska effekter eller strömningsförluster har beaktats. · Beräkningarna har genomförts för stora krängningsvinklar och med stora mängder vatten ombord. Liknande beräkningar förekommer inte särskilt ofta i daglig skeppsbyggnadsteknik. I en del fall har datorprogrammet varnat för att beräkningsnoggrannheten närmat sig gränserna för det tillåtna. Det är ett fenomen som uppträder just vid stora trim och stora krängningsvinklar även vid vanlig läckstabilitetsberäkning. · Ingen effekt av en eventuell lastförskjutning har beaktats. · Vid stabilitesberäkningarna med vatten på bildäck har beräkningsmodellen tvingats till att kränga åt SB. Detta eftersom datorprogrammet känner av att bildäcket är asymmetriskt. Då centercasingen på bildäck ligger om SB väljer programmet automatiskt att kränga fartyget åt BB. Detta kan förhindras genom att välja beräkning för SB krängningsvinklar. · I och med att datorprogrammet räknar med lost bouyancy-method blir beräkningarna i en del fall missvisande. Ett exempel på detta kan iakttagas vid vattenfyllnaden av bogtrusterrummet, T210. När rummet ligger under lugnvattenytan fylls det med vatten. När fartyget får ett stort akterligt trim och rummet lyfts över vattenytan försvinner den mängd vatten som fyllt rummet i ett tidigare skede. Så var med säkerhet inte fallet i verkligheten. |
The study has been done with a number of additional limitations as follows: · The study is made fully static. No consideration is given to vessel movements. · The inflow openings have not could be modelled correctly. In a vessel there are a large number of openings through which water can enter into the ship and through which water can move from one compartment to another. To describe all these and to consider them is almost impossible. · The inflow calculations into the different compartments of the ship are of simple character. No dynamic effects or flow losses are considered. · The calculations have been done for large angles of heel and with large amounts of water onboard. Similar calculations are rarely done in daily naval architecture work. In some cases the computer soft ware has warned that the calculation accuracy is close to allowable limits. It is a phenomenon that appears at large trim and large angle of heel also at usual damage (leak) stability calculations. · No effects of shifting cargo have been considered. · At the stability calculations with water on the car deck the model has been forced to list to starboard. This is due to the program feeling that that the car deck is asymmetric. As the centre casing is located to starboard, the program chooses automatically to list the vessel to port. Choosing calculation of starboard angles of list can prevent it. · As the computer programme calculates with 'lost buoyancy method', the calculations become in some cases misleading. One example of this can be seen when the bow thruster compartment T210 is flooded. When the compartment is below the still water line it fills with water. When the ship trims a lot on the stern and the compartment is lifted above the water surface, a large amount of water disappears, which was previously inside the compartment. In reality the case was certainly different. |
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3.3 Lastkondition Den lastkondition som använts i dessa beräkningar är hämtad från [2], Loading Condition K.0, Departure from Tallinn. Lastkonditionen är korrigerad för visirets vikt om -59 ton x=138.3 z=10.62. Uppgifter för visirets vikt och tyngdpunkt är hämtade från [3]. Lastkonditionen, kallad L2, finns presenterad mer i detalj i bilaga 4. |
3.3 The Loading Condition The loading condition used in these calculations is taken from [2], Loading Condition K.0, Departure from Tallinn. The loading condition is corrected for the weight of the visor of -59 ton x=138.3 z=10.62. The info of the visor weight and location is taken from [3]. The loading condition, called L2, is described in more detail in attachment 4. |
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3.4 Vatten på bildäck Utifrån lastkondition L2 har fartygets stabilitet beräknats för en ökande mängd vatten på bildäck. Lastfall L2 har beräknats med en vattenmängd från 0 till 12 000 ton på bildäck. Dessa lastfall kallas C0-C31 och finns presenterade i bilaga 5.
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3.4 Water on the car deck In load condition L2 the vessel stability has
been calculated with increasing amounts of water on
the car deck. Load condition L2 has been calculated
with a water amount from 0 to 12 000 tons. These
load conditions are called C0-C31 and shown in
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3.5 Beräkningsmetodik I den här studien har två alternativa beräkningsmetoder använts. Dels har de olika utrymmena i fartyget steg för steg fyllts med vatten för att försöka efterlikna ett troligt fyllnadsförlopp så bra som möjligt. Dels har fartyget utifrån ett initialt lastfall med vatten på bildäck beräknats med successivt minskande deplacerande volym. |
3.5 Methods of calculation In this study two alternative methods of calculation have been used. On the one hand the various compartments are filled step by step with water in order to simulate a probable sinking sequence as well as possible. On the other hand an initial loading case with water on the car deck is used and the condition is calculated for step-by-step reduced displacing volume (buoyancy) of the ship. |
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Den beräkningsmetod som visade sig fungera bäst och som gav bäst överblick över händelseförloppet var den senare. Beräkningarna kunde inte genomföras på ett traditionellt sätt. Normalt utgår man från ett lastfall utan inträngt vatten och beräknar steg för steg vad som händer när fartyget successivt fylls med vatten. I dessa beräkningar var man dock tvungen att utgå från lastfall med vatten på bildäck. |
The best method of calculation was the latter and it gave also a clear view of what happened. The calculations could not be done in a traditional manner. Normally you start from a loading condition without inflow of water and calculate step by step what happens when the ship is gradually filled with water. In these calculations we were however forced to start with loading condition with water on the car deck. |
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Mängden vatten på bildäck har i beräkningarna ökats. När vattenmängden ökat har fartygets slagsida ökat. Med ökande slagsida har fartygets flödesöppningar successivt kommit under vatten. När flödesöppningarna kommit under vatten har de utrymmen öppningarna leder till flödats med vatten. Fyllnadsförloppet är beräknat stegvis. De olika utrymmena i fartyget har ansatts fyllas i diskreta steg. I verkligheten var nog förloppet mer regelbundet. |
The amount of water on the car deck has in the calculations been increased (stepwise). When the amount of water has increased, then the ship's angle of list has increased. With increasing angle of list the inflow openings of the ship comes below water one after the other. When the inflow openings are submerged, the associated/connected compartments are flooded with water. The sequence of flooding is computed stepwise. The various compartments are assumed to be flooded in discrete steps. In reality the sequence was probably more continuous. |
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I den här studien har inte eventuell vattenfyllnad av fartygets tankar beaktats. Det är möjligt att vatten trängt in även i dessa. Men omfattningen av en sådan vatteninträngning är svår att efterlikna. Många tankar var förmodligen ventilerade med svanhalsar vilka oftast har ett fyllnadsskydd. Det enda undantaget från detta är den aktra ballasttanken T58. Den aktra ballasttanken förväxlades tyvärr med styrmaskinrummet, T1500. Detta upptäckte vi i ett allt för sent skede. Styrmaskinrummet har en något större volym än tank T58 men är placerad längre föröver. |
In this study final water filling of the ship's tanks is not considered. It is possible that water has also flooded the tanks. But the extent of such inflow is difficult to simulate. Many tanks were probably ventilated with swan necks, which are fitted with non-return closing appliances. The only exception is the aft ballast tank T58. The aft ballast tank was mixed up with the steering gear room, T1500. We discovered this to late in the study. The steering gear room has a slightly larger volume than tank T58 but is located further forward. |
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För att på ett så noggrant sätt som möjligt försöka beskriva sjunkförloppet har beräkningarna genomförts för fartygets hela volym. Den enda del av fartyget som inte tagits med som bidragande till flytbarheten är fartygets skorsten. |
In order to try, as carefully as possible, describing the sequence of sinking, the calculations have been carried out for the complete volume of the vessel. The only part that has not been considered contributing to the buoyancy is the ship's funnel. |
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3.6 Fyllnadsförlopp Utifrån haverikommissionens beskrivning och vittnesmålens uppgifter har två tänkbara exempel på fyllnadsförlopp studerats närmare. I deras beskrivning av fyllnadsförloppet har fartygets slagsida och dess akterliga trim tilltagit. I ett slutskede, strax innan fartyget försvann från ytan, har det från att ha haft en kraftig SB slagsida roterat runt helt och slutligen sjunkit. |
3.6 Sequences of water filling Based on the description of the accident commission and the observations of the testimonies two possible examples of sequences of water filling have been studied closer. In their descriptions of sequence of water filling the ship lists and the stern trim increases. In one final stage, just before the ship disappeared from the surface, it has from having a severe starboard list rotated completely and finally sunk. |
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I det först studerade fyllnadsförloppet, Exempel 1, har vattnets inträngning i fartyget enbart antagits kunna ske genom fartygets rampöppning, dörrar och ventilationskanaler. |
In the first studied sequence of water filling, Example 1, water inflow into the vessel is assumed only through the ship's ramp opening, doors and ventilation ducts. |
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I det andra studerade fyllnadsförloppet, Exempel 2, har vattnets väg in i fartyget antagits kunnat ske genom att fönsterrutor på däck 4-6 krossats av vattnets tryck och vågornas kraft samt genom fartygets rampöppning, dörrar och ventilationskanaler. |
In the other studied sequence of water filling, Example 2, it is assumed that water inflow through the broken windows on deck 4-6 is possible and that water flows in through ramp opening, doors and ventilation ducts. |
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3.6.1 Exempel 1 Utifrån lastfall L2 har försök gjorts för att rekonstruera fyllnadsförloppet. Lastfall L2 har beräknats med olika mängd vatten på bildäck, lastfall C0-C31. Utgående från dessa lastfall har fartyget beräknats för successiv vattenfyllnad i hela fartygets struktur. Fyllnadsförloppet finns beskrivet i bilaga 6 och flytläge i de olika skedena finns beskrivet i bilaga 7. GZ-kurvor för fyllnadsförloppet i Exempel 1 återfinns i bilaga 8. |
3.6.1 Example 1 In load condition L2 attempts have been made to simulate the sequence of water filling. Load condition 2 has been computed with various amounts of water on the car deck, load cases C0-C31. Starting from these load cases, the complete water filling of all ship structure has been computed. The sequence of water filling is described in attachment 6 and the floating positions at the various stages are described in attachment 7. GZ curves for the sequence of water filling in Example 1 are shown in attachment 8. |
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När fartyget förlorade sitt visir tränger stora mängder vatten in på bildäck. Med 600 ton inträngt vatten på bildäck har fartyget en slagsida på ca 16 grader, C3. Då mer vatten tränger in i fartyget ökar slagsidan samtidigt som det akterliga trimmet minskar något. Med 1 300 ton vatten på bildäck är slagsidan ca 28 grader. |
When the vessel lost its visor large amounts of water flows onto the car deck. With 600 tons water inflow the ship has an angle of list of about 16 degrees, C3. When more water flow into the ship, the angle of list increases while at the same time the stern trim is slightly reduced. With 1 300 tons on the car deck the angle of list is about 28 degrees. |
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Då 1 900 ton vatten trängt in på fartygets bildäck kommer de första flödesöppningarna under vatten. Det är ventilationsöppningarna för tilluft till huvudmaskinrum, separatorrum, KaMeWa-rum och maskinverkstad (T1010, T1110, T1210, T1310). Dessa börjar vattenfyllas. Slagsidan är nu ca 38 grader. (C8/DX7F 2 EQ) På ritning [4] [5] och [6] kan man se var dessa ventilationskanaler är placerade. Under resten av fyllnadsförloppet ökar fartygets trim på aktern.
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When 1 900 tons of water has flowed onto the car deck, the first inflow openings come below water. They are the vent duct openings for supply air to the main engine room, the separator room, the KaMeWa-room and the engine workshop (T1010, T1110, T1210, T1310). These start to fill. The angle of list is now about 38 degrees. (C8/DX7F 2 EQ) On drawings [4] [5] and [6] you can see where these ventilation ducts are located. During the remaining sequence of water filling the stern trim increases.
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Därefter kommer de stora SB-ventilationsöppningarna till bildäck under vatten. Detta sker vid ca 40 grader slagsida. 4 cirkulära ventilationsschakt i fören och 4 i aktern, med ca 1m diameter, leder ner till bildäck. När dessa ventilationsschakt når vattenytan ökar vatteninträngningen till bildäck ytterligare utöver inträngningen genom bogrampsöppningen. Bogrampens nedre hörn ligger fortfarande över vattenytan. |
Thereafter the big starboard vent openings to car deck come under water. It happens at about 40 degrees list. 4 circular vent shafts at the bow and 4 at the stern, with about 1 m diameter, lead down to the car deck. When these vent shafts reach the water surface, the water inflow onto the car deck increases in addition to the flow through the bow ramp opening. The lower corner of the bow ramp lies still above the water surface. |
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När vattenmängden på bildäck är ca 3 900 ton och slagsidan är ca 51 grader når vattenytan den akterliga dörren på SB sida till däck 5. Denna dörr nås tidigare av den omgivande vattennivån än den akterliga dörren på däck 4 som är placerad mer in mot fartygets centerlinje. Ungefär samtidigt som däck 5 börjar vattenfyllas akterifrån kommer ventilationen till styrmaskinrummet(T58) under vatten. Ventilationen av styrmaskinrummet framgår av ritning [5]. (C15 DX7F 3 EQ) |
When the water on the car deck amounts to about 3.900 tons and the list is about 51 degrees the water surface reaches the aft door on starboard side deck 5. This door is reached by outside water level before the aft door on deck 4, which is located more to the ship's centreline. About the same time as deck 5 starts filling from aft, the vent openings to the steering gear room (T58) comes below water. The steering gear vent system is seen on drawing [5]. (C15 DX7F 3 EQ) |
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När hela däck 5 och hela maskinrum T1010-T1310 vattenfyllts samt med en vattenmängd om ca 5 500 ton på bildäck och en slagsida på ca 56 grader återstår ca 0.5 m till den aktre SB dörren på däck 4. I beräkningarna har inte slagsidan och fartygets sättning blivit så stor att denna dörr kommit under vattenytan i detta skede. Men eftersom fartyget rullade och hävde är det inte osannolikt att vatten kunde ta sig in på däck 4 genom denna dörr. (C21/DX7F 6 EQ) När bildäck fyllts med ca 5 500 ton vatten är vattennivån så hög inne på bildäck att den når dörrarna från centercasingen till bildäck. Vatteninträngning genom dessa är dock inte beräknad i det här skedet, utan antas inträffa senare. |
When the whole deck 5 and all the engine rooms T1010-T1310 are water filled and with about 5 500 tons of water on the car deck and at an angle of list of 56 degrees, 0.5 m remains to the aft starboard door on deck 4. In the calculations the angle of list and the trim of the ship have not become large enough to submerge this door. But as the ship was rolling and heaving, it is not unlikely that water could enter onto deck 4 through this door. (C21/DX7F 6 EQ) When the car deck is flooded with about 5 500 ton water, the level of water is so high on the car deck that it reaches the doors of the centre casing to the car deck. Water inflow through these are not calculated at |
