Welcome to a chapter of the e-book Disaster Investigation.
'The situation that you from a safety point of view are not permitted to assume and to calculate with the buoyancy of a deck house, does not exclude that such a buoyancy actually exists. It exists and therefore the sequence of events as described by the Commission is very likely'.
Johan Franson and Jan-Olof Selén, Swedish NMA, 15 December 2000
'Even if the investigation later has been subject to quite a lot of criticism, I dare state that with regard to the circumstances under which the investigation was done, the result has been shown to be very valid'.
Mikael Huss to the Swedish NMA, 26 November 2000
'The detailed time sequence of the course of events has still not been clarified, but considerable amounts of water flowed into the car deck (the superstructure) between 01.15 and 01.30 hrs (Estonian time). The ship sank due to the space being filled with water and it disappeared from radar screens at 01.48 hrs. The clock on the radio station on the bridge stopped at 23.35 UTC (01.35 hrs Estonian time)'
Commission press release 15 December 1994 (13) - para. 6
'We must proceed to do a major study of the actual sinking. How did the Estonia sink and why did she sink so fast? That experience may provide still more knowledge to improve safety at sea both in today's and tomorrow's shipping. Latest 1 February next year it shall be informed to the Government office what or which research institute or consortium that has been given this task'.
Mona Sahlin, Minister, Swedish Parliament, 17 March 2005
1.9 The alleged Sinking
Members of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects and all students and researchers of marine accidents are particularly welcome to study this page about the alleged sinking of the 'Estonia' and to verify the observations and conclusions. Please also check 2.17 and 3.12 for more stability data, Appendix 4 for water inflow data and 4.4, why everybody lied the way they lied.
The strange Visor Position
The visor was 'officially' found the following day (18 October) one mile West of the wreck. The only evidence of the location of the visor, i.e. its position, is the position of a red buoy (sic) allegedly established early December 1994 by a Swedish Coastal Artillery, KA, vessel, i.e. two months after the visor was found! The positions of the ship 'Tursas' that located the visor 18 October 1994 and the ship 'Nordica' that salvaged the visor mid-November 1994 have never been announced and it is not known when the red buoy was put at the position and by whom. It is very strange that 'Tursas' could not inform its own and the visor position 18 October 1994 and that the visor position was not confirmed by the salvage vessel 'Nordica' mid-November 1994 or that a red buoy was anchored at the visor before and after salvage. It is unclear why the Swedish Coastal Artillery sent a vessel early December 1994 to the red buoy in order to establish its position = the visor position - after the visor was salvaged. But the position of the visor in the Final report (5) is that of a red buoy established early December 1994. How can anybody believe that the position of red buoy taken December 1994 should be the same as the lost visor position more than two months earlier? Why was the red buoy still there?
There is today a lot of information to the effect that the visor was attached to the superstructure of the vessel, when it sank, thus the visor could hardly have fallen off 'under way' (at 01.15 hrs) 33 minutes before the sinking (at 01.48 hrs) as stated by the Commission on 17 October 1994 and it could hardly have been found one mile West of the wreck on 18 October.
In December 1994 the Commission suggested that the final 'sinking' of 'Estonia' was later - 01.54 hrs.
The 'Estonia' had had a Westerly course from Tallinn to Stockholm, so a rational person would expect the visor to be found East of the wreck, if it had been lost under way, so that waves then could hit against the ramp and open it 1.4-3,4, when the ship moved Westward, etc, and that ship then had capsized (and sunk?) West of the visor.
But the visor was allegedly found one mile West of the (false or real position (?) of the) wreck and it should have raised several questions in the Commission. How did it end up there? The ferry could have heeled first (due to leakage of the hull!), turned around, lost the visor later (it may not have been properly locked) and then drifted to the wreck position. Alternatively the ship had turned before (the crew was aware that something was wrong) and was on its way back to Tallinn, when the accident otherwise took place as stated by the Commission 1.14 except for the 180° turn after the heeling. But these questions are not discussed in the Final Report.
A third alternative, the most likely, is that all information that Commission had published between 28 September and 17 October 1994 about the visor was disinformation and that the visor was attached to the ship, when it sank (between 01.32 and 01.36 hrs).
The actual circumstances where the visor was found need be further investigated.
To support the alleged loss of the visor before the accident - the listing at 01.15 hrs - the Commission simply arranged that the visor be removed from the bow of the wreck below water by divers form the Swedish Navy using explosives a couple of days after the accident. This strange, alternative possibility will be discussed later in this book.
Evident Falsifications
The writer now thinks it is time to introduce the detailed sequence of events of the accident produced by the Commission after the visor was lost as described in the Final Report (5) of December 1997 and the dramatic 35-37 minutes that then followed between, allegedly 01.15 and 01.50/52 hrs, which the Swedish NMA considers 'very likely'. We will not consider the 10-20 minutes of noise, etc. prior to the alleged loss of the visor. The alleged failures causing visor loss and ramp opening are described in detail in 3.7 and following chapters.
The Commission thus alleges that the visor fell off 'under way' at 01.15 hrs, when the vessel was doing 14-15 knots. This strange event should have taken place 1 560 meters West of the final resting - wreck - position. The casualty was due to a design fault of the visor locks, which were too weak and could not withstand the wave loads. The visor pulled the inner ramp fully open, when it fell off. The forward end of the superstructure was thus fully open. Water then allegedly entered on the car deck of the superstructure through the big opening forward >2 meters above the waterline, when the bow pitched down into the waves. There are no witnesses to this event. The crew in the engine control room only saw a closed ramp on the monitor.
The weight of the water loaded on the car deck then allegedly caused the ship first to immediately heel (but not capsize) at 01.15 hrs. As more water came in, the angle of heel increased. Then the ferry turned 180° and proceeded back on an easterly course.
An unproven Turn 2 400 meters West of the Wreck
According the Final report (5) chapter 12.5, page 161:
"It has been discovered both from the sonar investigations of fragments on the seabed and from manoeuvring simulations that the ESTONIA made a port turn at an early stage of the accident."
The turn allegedly took place (see below), between 01.16 and 01.20 hrs, when the list was only 15-30°, 2 400 meters west (sic) of the sinking/wreck position at 01.52 hrs, i.e. 32 minutes before the 'Estonia' sank.
Facts are that no sonar investigations were done 2 400 meters west of the wreck, no fragments have ever been investigated on the seabed 2 400 meters west of the wreck (or anywhere - all information about fragments on the seabed is false, as nothing falls off a ship when list is 15-30°) and no manoeuvring simulations have ever shown that the 'Estonia' should have done a port turn.
All statements about a turn during the sinking are not proven. All statements that the 'Estonia' then drifts 2 400 meters at 2,2 knots speed are not proven. All statements that the 'Estonia' superstructure high above the waterline is loaded with water are not proven. As everything else that the Commission invented about the sinking.
To further study the strange port turn between 01.16 and 01.20 hrs and the amazingly high speed when drifting while flooding, the stable conditions - no capsize - has the Swedish government on 17 March 2005, i.e. 10 years and five months after the sinking, announced a SEK 8 million research study:
The Swedish government has 17 March 2005 decided that the Swedish agency VINNOVA, as responsible for the Vinnova, so called Safety at sea program, shall order a research project concerning a study of the sinking of the M/S Estonia on 28 September 1994 between 01.15 hrs (the visor falls of when the Estonia is on a westerly course) and about 01.52 hrs (the Estonia sinks 1 560 meters east of the visor) and how the port turn took place, how the ship was flooded while drifting at high speed..
The principal objective of the study is to develop knowledge that may contribute to better safety at sea for ships in Swedish waters. The government has allowed SEK 8 million for this purpose.
Responsible for the government study is Claes Unge (VINNOVA), tel +46-8-473 31 77 and Gunnel Färm (chairperson of the program board of the safety at sea program), tel +46-73-600 38 45.
Responsible for the present VINNOVA safety at sea program is Per Ekberg, Sjöfartsinspektionen.
More information in Swedish about the government study is at regeringens pressmeddelande of the 17 March 2005.
The Sinking continues
At around 01.30 hrs the angle of heel was allegedly >70° but the ship was stable. Between 01.30 and 01.50 hrs the listing ferry drifted Eastward at >2,2 knots constant speed and suddenly she sank (sic) at about 01.50-01.52 hrs.
The writer is absolutely certain that this scenario is impossible and that it is an intentional falsification like every other essential information in the Final report. It is thus very good that the Swedish government 10 years later orders a new study.
The official 1994 scenario, e.g. assumes that the principle of Archimedes does not apply. The reader should therefore know the following - it is basic naval architecture and ship stability theory:
Basic Particulars and Assumptions - Hull - Bilge Pumps - Superstructure - Scuppers - Deck House
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Fig. 1.9.1 - Various parts of the 'Estonia' |
the 'Estonia' (weight
about 12 000 tons) floated on the watertight
hull, which had 12000 tons of buoyancy force
and 6 000 tons of reserve buoyancy and was
subdivided into 14 watertight compartments
indicated in green and blue and purple in the
figure 1.9.1 right by watertight bulkheads. The top
of the hull was the watertight car deck no.
2, which was >2 meters above the
waterline,The False Sequence of Events
The sequence of events after the visor was lost as per the Commission is shown in figure 13.2 of the Final Report (5) and reproduced below. Each arrow represents the position and heading of the 'Estonia' at one-minute intervals, e.g. four minutes after the visor fell off the 'Estonia' was heading South and another 33 minutes later she allegedly sank.
The plot is in fact a falsification. It shows the movements of a completely undamaged ship, which makes a 180° turn and then drifts due to (exaggerated) wind and (exaggerated) currents - it never sinks, e.g. at the Wreck position - but continues to drift after that, but those arrows after 01.54 hrs have been edited away (sic) from the plot.
Then various arbitrary - but cleverly misleading - pieces of information (no evidence exists) have been added on the plot - times, courses, speeds, angles of list and events. The falsifications are described below:
xx
The Ferry starts to heel at 01.15 hrs
In the Final Report (5) page 22 the Commission confirms that the visor fell off at 01.15 hrs (on 28 September), when the ship was under way to Söderarm (course 281°) with unchanged speed, about 14/15 knots, exactly as announced on 17 October 1994 1.12-1. Then the ramp was pulled fully open but see 1.10, water started to enter the superstructure > 2 meters above waterline, when it pitched below the waves, and the ship started to heel - 15 degrees after one minute, 30 degrees after six minutes (when evacuation from inboard to open decks was impossible) and 40 degrees after 10 minutes. The reason for the heeling was that the water collected in the side of the superstructure and produced a heeling moment.
Calculations of the writer shows that 2 000 tons of water should have entered the superstructure in less than 2 minutes. These calculations are easy to confirm with, e.g. model tests. This enormous lose weight should have heeled the vessel >40° and then the ship should have capsized and floated upside down at 01.15 hrs. Therefore the first allegation of the Commission cannot be true.
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The Ferry turns at 01.16 hrs The ship started after two minutes to turn (159°) port according to the Commission, first towards, later away from the waves between 01.16-01.19 hrs on the plot, as in the above plot the visor falls off at 01.14 hrs. The evidence for this event - fragments and simulations - is false. After the visor had fallen off at 01.14/5 hrs, the 'Estonia' thus continued at 14 knots for two minutes straight forward half a mile with the 4,3 meters high waves on the port bow - she was still 'under way' towards Söderarm - but with the bow ramp in the superstructure pulled fully open - the visor had been lost and the list was 15 degrees. The vessel was then pitching up/down with amplitude of 4-5 meters and a period of 6-8 seconds, so the open bow with the ramp down in the superstructure was about 25% of the time several meters below water, when water flowed in due to pitching and forward motion. The Commission does not consider that this water in the superstructure would have stopped the pitching and trimmed the bow permanently below the water - the 'Estonia' should have gone under as a submarine after one minute - actually capsized and turned upside down - before any turn could take place! |
The strange Event at 01.20 hrs - why does the Ferry not upright?
At 01.20 hrs the ship has turned 159° and his heading back at 6 knots with the waves on the stern (sic). The list is 30° to starboard into waves and wind due to 1 500 tons of water inside the superstructure and the ramp is wide open. No more water can enter the superstructure car deck at this instance. The bow opening is not facing the waves any longer! You would thus expect that all water inside the superstructure flows out from the superstructure at this time, when the vessel pitches and trims on the bow! And that the vessel up-rights and gets 100% stable again.
It is a little later that the Mayday message is sent ... to the effect that there is a problem. The Mayday conversation stops around 01.30 hrs. According to the official plot of the accident it was impossible for water to enter the superstructure after 01.20 hrs due to the fact that the opening was facing away from the ways and the ship was moving with the waves. But the Commission decided - without any evidence - that more water flows into the superstructure. Very strange.
The Engines stops at 01.24 hrs
After having turned 159° and proceeded under engine power on contra course for a few minutes, the Commission suggests, that the engines stopped (there is no evidence) and that the ship then drifted about 2 000 meters sideway from about 01.24 hrs (the list was 40 degrees) to the position of the wreck, where the ship suddenly sank/disappeared (sic) 28 minutes later at 01.52 hrs with >135 degrees list. The Commission had however stated in Swedish daily DN 941019 that
'Nothing in the statements of the crew indicates that the Master managed to turn the ship and return towards Tallinn, before she sank'.
But in order to connect the position of the visor, which was not known 17 October 1994, with the position of the wreck a 180° turn and >2 000 meter of drifting were necessary. Evidently it was not the Master that turned the ship - the Commission later tells us that it was the officers on the bridge that initiated the turn - engines running - by turning the rudder fully to port when the ship was listing to starboard.
The mystery here is why the water inside the superstructure never flowed out with the bow ramp opening away from the waves!
Fragments on the Seabed
In order to prove the port turn the Final Report (5) chapter 12.5 states that 'fragments' found during a sonar search of the seabed helped the Commission to determine, that a port turn had in fact taken place 1.14.
When were these 'fragments' found and what were they?
The Commission stated that the Finnish vessel 'Tursas' found and filmed 'fragments' on 5 October, but then the 'Tursas' never searched (a) half a mile West of the visor (sic! - it was not yet officially found) or (b) half a mile South of the visor. No films of the 'fragments' exist!
Notice the logical summersault - small 'fragments' indicating the turn of the ship were found and filmed long before the big visor was (officially) found - but these fragments were not found, where the turn allegedly took place. What type of 'fragments' was found and how and where? It must be big 'fragments', as sonar can only see fairly large objects at 80 meters depth, and it must be assumed that the 'fragments' were buried in deep clay and mud.
Unfortunately the Final Report (5) does not say what the 'fragments' were, their positions, how they were found and how and why they fell off the 'Estonia' before, during and after the turn. According a press release of 6 October from the Estonia Foreign office quoting the Commission the 'Tursas' found the fragments - 'smaller objects' - East and South of the wreck37 (it is not known if it was from the false or correct wreck position), i.e. at least 3 000 meters from the location of the alleged turn!
Objects fall off when the List is <30 Degrees at 01.18 hrs
But it is very strange that small 'fragments' were allegedly found and filmed, before the very big visor was found! And these 'fragments' would prove the port turn, after the visor was lost, i.e. the fragments had fallen off the ship after the visor fell off when the angle of list was <30 degrees.
What fragments could have fallen off a few minutes after the visor, when the angle of list was not very big? The fragments are an obvious lie of chapter 12.5 of the Final report (5). After the report was published Commission member Tuomo Karppinen announced (at Glasgow, October 1999) that the 'fragments' were found 200-300 meters straight West of the true wreck position - see figure in 2.26. But according to fig. 1.9.2 above the 'Estonia' never passed that area - before, during or after the accident and according to the Estonian press release nobody searched that area at the time. And the fragments should prove the turn at 01.16-01.19 hrs >2 000 meters further to the West! The statement in chapter 12.5 in (5) cannot be correct. No 'fragments' ever confirmed the port turn.
The writer is rather concerned about these fragments falling off the 'Estonia' after the visor had allegedly fallen off. Why cannot the Commission clarify this matter? The fragments must have been found 3 000 meters West of the wreck if they proved a turn. And how could they fall off so early? And why do 'fragments' fall off a ship ... but why does not the water in the superstructure flow out?
Did the ship actually turn?
Did the heel to starboard initiate a turn to port? No - model tests showed clearly that the 'Estonia' with starboard list would not turn to port. The Commission then tried another angle. They say in the Final Report that a simulation of manoeuvres (sic) should have indicated that a bow wind would make the ferry turn into the wind - but not turn 180°. No reports of such simulations or model tests are included in the Final report and its supplements.
As the Commission could not prove the port turn with 'fragments' and model tests and simulation, it says instead in chapter 13.3 of the Final Report (5) that it considers it clear (sic), that it was the officers on the bridge that initiated a reduction in speed and a turn to port. The crew on the bridge should have been alerted by (a) the noise, when the ferry collided with the visor before the list occurred and (b) the sudden list (sic) at 01.15 hrs. But there is no evidence that the two or three persons on the bridge actually initiated a slow down or a turn or if there were any persons on the bridge in the first place.
Note here the logic of the Commission - the ship is said to have collided with the visor, which is not proven - it could have been attached to the ship, when it sank. And then there should have been a sudden list - but according to e.g. 3/E Treu there was no sudden list - the ramp was still closed and there was only a slow increase in list 1.3. And due to this alleged collision the officers on the bridge are assumed to have initiated a 180° turn to port. Why not starboard away from the waves? Logic?
The repeat statement of the Commission on page 223 of the Final Report (5) that the watch-keeping officers reduced speed and initiated the port turn is not proven. To make a sharp turn to port you need to turn the rudders maximum angle to port - it takes about 30 seconds, i.e. the alleged turn was initiated 90 seconds after the loss of the visor. But the rudders were found 1.16 turned to maximum starboard angle 35°. After the turn to port - which took a couple of minutes - the bridge apparently turned the rudders full starboard again, which takes another 60 seconds. How, why? After the turn ending at 01.19 hrs the crew must have put the rudders amidships - the ship continued straight - and later they turned the rudders full starboard?
Eyewitnesses to the Sinking - no Turn, no Drifting, the 'Estonia' immobile
However - there are eyewitnesses to the sinking of the 'Estonia' and they never mention a turn. On 24 October 1994 the Finnish police interviewed second officer Ingemar Eklund of the 'Mariella', who had seen the 'Estonia' at 01.30 hrs and that the ship disappeared already at 01.36 hrs (act A93c). The testimony of Mr Eklund was discussed at a Commission meeting 26-27 January 1995. His watch had started at 22.00 hrs and he had all the time seen the 'Estonia' since then. He told the Finnish police:
"At 22.00 hrs I saw the 'Estonia' at an angle in front of us, about 30°, on the port side. ... Her course at 22.00 hrs was almost Westerly and she sailed steady there beside us. ... I saw the 'Estonia' all the time on the radar. ... At 01.30 hrs the Master Törnroos called the bridge and asked about the weather. I replied something about the pitching and at the same time, during the telephone call, I heard on Channel 16 how the 'Estonia' said once Mayday. I think her next words were about blackout and heavy listing. I told the Master to come to the bridge, which he did. I replied to the 'Estonia' at once but they did not respond back. When the Master arrived on the bridge I was still trying to contact the Estonia but she didn't reply. Meanwhile I recorded her position from the radar. From hearing the Mayday-call and until the radar echo of the 'Estonia' disappeared I think it was only about six minutes. The times can be seen from the log book I kept during the night. As soon as the Master arrived on the bridge we changed course towards the 'Estonia'. ... We also saw the'Estonia' optically, I had looked at her several times earlier during the night with binoculars and recognized her silhouette. ... During the voyage towards the position of the 'Estonia', her lights disappeared and she also disappeared from the radar. Just before she disappeared from the radar, I thought she turned to port ...this happened very quickly ... because the vector disappeared, I assumed that the 'Estonia' sank. ... We were using all three radars. ...During the voyage to the position of the 'Estonia' I manoeuvered the ship ... I also kept the log book. ... In the log book I wrote the exact times taken from the GPS Navigator".
The missing Logbook
A copy of the 'Mariella'/Eklund logbook does not exist in the Commission's archive, so we do not know what position of the 'Estonia' was recorded. The logbook has disappeared. Note that Mr Eklund thinks that the Mayday was at 01.30 hrs and that the 'Estonia' sank already at 01.36 hrs and that the positions of the 'Estonia's were recorded at 01.30 hrs and 01.36 hrs and that she appeared to turn just before disappearing at 01.36 hrs. Eklund is quite clear - he did not see the 'Estonia' drifting >1 300 meter sideways until say 01.52 hrs. Eklund was at the time of the Mayday talking on the phone to the Master of the 'Mariella', Jan-Tore Thörnroos (who was in his cabin), when the Mayday was heard, and he has told the Commission in November 1994 that the 'Estonia' was not moving, when she was under observation between 01.30 and 01.36 hrs, i.e. the position of the 'Estonia' didn't change. It is quite obvious that a ship without engine power and listing on the side does not turn or drift very fast or long, in spite of all later suggestions to the contrary.
Note that Eklund gave his testimony after the Commission had announced its cause of events and the finding of the visor. Therefore the Commission had to modify it to suit.
How the Commission falsified Eklund's Testimony
It is interesting to note how the Commission presents (falsifies) Eklund's testimony in the Final report (5) chapter 7.5.3 (page 104):
"The officer of the watch (Eklund) was talking on the telephone with the master (Thörnroos) about reducing speed when the first (sic) Mayday call was received. On learning of the call the master went quickly to the bridge. ... at 01.32 hrs ... we turned towards the site of the accident. When she was four nautical miles away, the radar image of the ESTONIA disappeared at about 0150-0155 hrs (sic)."
Evidently the Commission decided to censor the observations of the eyewitnesses on the 'Mariella' - they did not see a turn at 01.16-01.20 hrs. Later the Commission totally falsified the testimonies of Eklund/Thörnroos to the effect that they had seen the 'Estonia' sinking at 01.50-01.55 hrs as shown above! Media has also published other statements of Thörnroos about the 'Estonia's movements prior to the Mayday (but then Thörnroos was in his cabin and could not have noticed anything).
In the Jörle/Hellberg book 'Katastrofkurs (20), chapter 15 (page 120) the call Thörnroos/Eklund is described as follows:
"The ship (Mariella) made 10 knots (sic), when the master Jan-Tore Thörnroos called the watch keeping mate Ingemar Eklund to order a further (sic) reduction in speed. "I thought it was too much slamming at the bow" he (Thörnroos) has told. During the call Eklund heard the first (sic) Mayday from the 'Estonia'."
Jörle/Hellberg makes a big deal about the 'Mariella' making only 10 knots (not proven of course - it was 14.6 knots according to a plot in the Final report (5)) - and that the 'Estonia' was going faster. In reality the 'Mariella' kept about the same speed as the 'Estonia'. And Eklund never testified about reducing the speed (they might in fact have increased the speed to reach the 'Estonia').
In the Jörle/Hellberg book 'Katastrofkurs (20), chapter 34 (pp 246) the position noted in the log book by Eklund is described as follows:
"When the last Estonian word is heard from 3rd mate Andres Tammes on the 'Estonia, the time is 01.30,06 and the Estonian ship is visible on the radar screen (of the 'Mariella') but does not make any forward speed (sic). ... Ingemar Eklund notes the position given by the radar and gets N 59.22 and E 21.39 (sic). ... Life rafts and lights were clearly visible when the 'Mariella' arrived in the area.
The 'Mariella' is now heading towards the 'Estonia' but loses ... sight of the lights at 01.34-01.35 hrs. But still there is a radar echo (sic). A quarter of an hour later, at 01.50,27 the 'Mariella' tells the 'Silja Europe', that they have a radar echo five miles South. ... Jan-Tore Thörnroos and other officers on the bridge of the 'Mariella' say that this echo disappears about five minutes later, thus 01.55 hrs. ...
This time, 01.55 hrs, shall be compared with the official time 01.48 hrs ... then the echo disappeared on the radar screen of the Utö fortress."
Note that Eklund told the Finnish police that the radar echo disappeared, when the lights went out. The positions and the times are nonsense and the logbook of the 'Mariella' has, as stated, disappeared. And the recordings/plot of the radar screen at Utö has disappeared 1.13.
In the Jörle/Hellberg book 'Katastrofkurs (20), chapter 35 (pp 255) the port turn seen by Eklund (and his colleagues - sic) is described as follows:
"It means that the turn reasonably was made between 01.15 and 01.20 hrs and that the engines stopped thereafter.
If we compare with the time when the officers (sic) on the 'Mariella' see that the 'Estonia' is turning - a short moment before (sic) the first 'Mayday'-call at 01.22 hrs ... we see that the times align correctly."
Observe the strange reporting above about the turn - Eklund was alone on the bridge on the 'Mariella' when he hears the end of the Mayday at 01.30 hrs (or the beginning at 01.22). The master of the 'Mariella' comes up to the bridge and course is changed at 01.32 hrs towards the 'Estonia'. Later more officers come to the bridge of the 'Mariella'. And Jörle/Hellberg then reports gladly that all these officers observed the 'Estonia' turning before the first 'Mayday'-call took place at 01.22 hrs. But then Eklund was still alone on the bridge and had not seen anything - he was on the phone to the master.
In the Jörle/Hellberg book 'Katastrofkurs (20), chapter 2 (pp 19) all above is also described - but no port turn is mentioned. But Jörle/Hellberg are sure about the port turn - in chapter 23 (page 183) they say:
"Eklund had nevertheless been given a little pre-warning (about the Mayday). He (Eklund) tells us that the 'Estonia' about one half or one minute before the 'Mayday' tried (sic) to turn. It is a manoeuvre which is clearly seen on a big professional radar screen. Every echo has a vector - an arrow of different length indicating speed and course of the ship. If a ship turns, the arrow changes quickly direction. So the echo of the 'Estonia' looked like that just before ... the Mayday call."
Aha - Eklund told Jörle/Hellberg about the 'Estonia' port turn and that it took place just before the Mayday call at 01.22 hrs. But then Eklund was talking to the master on the phone about other things. And later Eklund told the Finnish police that the 'turn' - or what looked like a 'turn' - took place when the 'Estonia' sank - at 01.36 hrs. Then vectors and arrows disappeared.
If the speed is zero there is no vector arrow - and you cannot see if the ship is turning. Why would a ship at zero speed turn?
But officially according to the Commission the 'Estonia' was drifting > 1 300 meters at 2.2 knots until after 01.50 hrs - and there were echoes (and vectors?) on the radar screen. More about Jörle/Hellberg in 1.44. They are clever disinformers and they have cleverly falsified Eklund's statements - one (Hellberg) is a star reporter of the biggest Swedish daily Dagens Nyheter, the other (Jörle) is today information chief at the Nuclear Power Inspection Board.
A normal person reading Eklund's testimony gets the impression that Eklund was chatting with the Master Thörnroos on the phone and thus did not hear the initial Mayday on the VHF. But during the call Eklund heard the Mayday conversation Estonia/Silja Europe. According to the Final report (5) Eklund or Thörnroos then contacted Silja Europe already 01.25 hrs on VHF and at 01.28.31 the Mariella didn't see the 'Estonia'. This was 8 minutes after the alleged turn.
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Let's assume the port Turn took place! But let's assume that the port turn took place after the alleged loss of the visor and the sudden listing (which either took place at 01.02! (see below) or after 01.15 hrs) and that the speed then was 10-14 knots and long before the Mayday was sent. How much water would enter through the open bow ramp into the superstructure during the suggested manoeuvre? The writer's conclusion is simple - 1 800 - 3 600 tons would have entered during the first minute, when the speed was still >14 knots - the 'Estonia' would have capsized immediately and floated upside down on the hull and there would never have been time for a turn and, even less time for >32 minutes of floating and drifting >3 000 meters. For detailed calculations see below (and Appendix 4). And no survivor would have time to escape! Dr Michael Huss, FRINA - Inventor of the false Plot The project to reconstruct the last 35-40 minutes of the fatal voyage and to answer the question, how the 'Estonia' could lose the visor 1 560 meters West of the wreck and later heel, turn and sink (sic - without capsizing!), was given to the stability expert of the Commission - tekn. dr. and docent Mikael Huss, FRINA, etc, 1994 of the Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm. |
The reader should know the following about basic naval architecture:
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Basic Particulars and Assumptions - Buoyancy - Intact Stability - Damage Assumptions - Damage Stability - Water in the Superstructure - Capsize - Sinking
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The first Attempt of dr Huss to simulate the Accident
In his first report (12) written in 1994 Huss, FRINA, stated that it took only 6 minutes to fill up the car deck space in the superstructure with 2 100 tons of water 1.15 - inflow 480-240 tons/min through a wide open ramp - and that the ship then capsized, i.e. floated upside down on the undamaged watertight hull.
This calculation was not too bad - but this was not what the Commission wanted to hear!! And it was not what the survivors had experienced!
Huss had been employed as 'expert' to the Commission in November 1994 to demonstrate how the 'Estonia' sank slowly during 38 minutes with water on the car deck 1.5 without capsizing. He had apparently not been properly briefed, what he should do and report.
Huss knew, or should have known, what of course would have happened during the first few minutes: If the ramp in the superstructure was wide open (pulled open) at 01.14-01.15 hrs, if the speed was 7,46 m/s (14.5 knots), if the waves were 4.3 meters high with a period of 8-9 seconds, and if the relative motion amplitude (up/down vis-à-vis the water surface) was ±5 meters at the bow ramp, the opening forward, 2,0 m above the waterline/bow wave, should be under water about 1.5 seconds every 5,5 seconds, when the ship headed and pitched straight into the waves on the port bow (wave direction 160-180°). The opening was 5,4 meters wide and about 3 meters, on average, below water at each downward motion. Then 180 m3 of water flows into the forward opening of the superstructure every time the bow dips into a wave (1,5 seconds every 5,5 seconds), as the area (5,4x3,0 m2) x speed (7,46 m/s) x time (1,5 seconds) = 180 m3/dip into the wave. In one minute about 1 963 m3 (60/5.5 = 10.9 waves of 180 m3 = 1 963 m3) flows in; Appendix 4 for detailed calculations. If the direction of the waves were on the bow side, the inflow was slightly reduced, but according to the Commission sequence the 'Estonia' headed straight into the waves at 01.16-01.17 hrs, when the speed was about nine knots (inflow about 1 200 tons/minute). If you consider that the ramp acts as a plough forcing more water into the superstructure of the ship, the inflows may be doubled. The above assumes that the ship actually pitches up again, when the first wave with 180 tons have entered the superstructure.180 tons would trim the ship >one meter on the bow and may have stopped the relative motion altogether - the ship might not have pitched up again; but would have gone down like a submarine. But let's assume that the ship pitches up and then pitches down again and scoops up another wave and that the superstructure is gradually filled up with more and more water with each wave encountered every six second. The above is very easy to verify with, e.g. model tests.
With 1 963 tons of water (11 waves) on the car deck in the superstructure at 01.16 hrs, the 'Estonia' should have capsized, stopped and floated upside down on the hull in the stormy weather 2.16. It should have taken a few minutes to fill the deck house. Nobody would have survived! 'Estonia' should have floated upside down latest at 01.19 hrs.
Testimonies of Survivors censored
There were other big problems for the Commission. The surviving passengers testified about something completely different.
Surviving passengers stated 2.1 that the 'Estonia' listed suddenly already at about 01.02-01.05 hrs >30 degrees, and then became stable at about 15 degrees list, while rolling a lot - it was possible to evacuate during several minutes, when the decks were almost horizontal.
For unknown reasons the Commission has falsified/delayed (a) the time of the listing 10-15 minutes 4.4 and (b) never reported the big list >30 degrees and (c) that stability was re-established at a smaller angle of heel - say 15 degrees.
How could the angle of heel be reduced, if water continuously flowed into the superstructure?
The survivors then stated that the ship slowly sank, while the list increased. The ship was on the side at 01.30 hrs, when many survivors jumped into the water and their watches were broken and stopped. The survivors testimonies tally with the observations of the 'Mariella' - see above.
It is very likely that the ship sank at 01.32-01.36 hrs. And therefore the 'Estonia' could not have turned at 01.16 hrs and drifted between 01.24-01.52 hrs.
All this Huss knew or should have known in 1994.34 The Commission certainly knew it (later) and it was the main reason, why the Commission 1994 had great difficulties to explain the alleged (unproven) sequence of events - sudden listing at 01.15 hrs, 'fragments' falling off, and final sinking without capsize at about 01.54 hrs after >3 000 meters drifting.
The Bow Ramp partially open
The Commission had first stated 4 October 1994 that the bow ramp of the superstructure was only partially open (permitting an inflow of only 60-120 tons of water per minute 1.15) and all three survivors in the Engine Control Room had testified to this effect 1.48. Later the Commission discovered that it - a partially open ramp as testified by the ECR staff, would not have caused sudden listing/capsize - so it decided 15 December 1994 that the ramp had been pulled fully open even if the crew maintained it was closed - and then it probably discovered that it would have caused immediate capsize.
Huss was thus probably ordered to reduce the inflows into the superstructure to fit the alleged - read false - sequence of events? The delay of the time of the heeling from 01.02 to 01.15 hrs was probably an attempt to align a testimony of a watchman (Linde) with the testimonies of the ECR staff - even if the many survivors testified that the listing started at 01.02 hrs and that there was a fair or short time to evacuate.
In his first attempt (12) Huss thus managed to reduce the inflow to 2 100 tons in 6 minutes - see table 1.9.1 below - when the ship had only turned 150° port, while the speed was quickly reduced during four minutes, which also reduced the water inflow - but then the ship would have capsized 1.15 at 01.20 hrs, when the first scenario ends with the ship floating upside down. Huss cautiously writes (12)
"After this event (i.e. 2 100 tons had flowed into the superstructure) water starts to enter the upper decks (i.e. the deck house; decks 4-9). The ship is then lost (i.e. capsizes and floats upside down). The time depends on how quickly the upper decks fill up".
When the 'Herald of Free Enterprise' capsized due to water inside its superstructure (the bow door was fully open), the upper decks in the deck house filled up in less than a minute. Then the HFE had capsized and the voyage was ended. We know why the HFE capsized, but we do not know what happened to the 'Estonia'.
Basic Physics - Water inside a Superstructure heels a Ship
Water inside a superstructure above water line heels and trims the ship. The relationship between the free water in the superstructure and the resulting angle of list or heel in below table 1.9.1 is generally correct, even if Huss does not consider the trim caused by the very large amounts of water, which evidently collects at one end of the superstructure, when it fills up, and trims the ship on the bow. Huss assumes that the water in the superstructure does not modify the trim, which pushes the bow down below the water.
Table 1.9.1 Water inflow into the superstructure, listing, speed and turn as per Huss' first estimates 1994/5 (12)
Estonian Time Time after Loss
of Visor (min) Water in the
Superstructure (tons) List
(degrees) Water Inflow
(tons/min) Velocity of Heel
(degree/min) Wave Direction*
(°) Speed
(knots) Turn to port
(°) 01.14.00 0.0 0 0 500 14 120 14 0 01.15.00 1.0 500 14 400 7 140 10 20 01.16.00 2.0 900 21 400 4 170 6 50 01.17.00 3.0 1
300 27 300 5 210 3 90 01.18.00 4.0 1
600 32 200 3 240 1 120 01.19.00 5.0 1
800 35 300 4 260 0 140 01.20.00 6.0 2
100 39/180! - 180 270 0 150
(* 180° = bow straight into the waves)
(h. m.s)
Constant Water Inflow - sudden Stop after four Minutes - 150 Degrees Turn in six Minutes
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As you can see, Huss thought 1994 that the inflow into the superstructure through the wide open ramp was quite constant 500-200 tons/min regardless of speed and wave direction and that the speed was zero knots after four, five minutes, i.e. the ship stopped almost immediately. The distance made after losing the visor was about half a mile - the ship would then have capsized more than two miles from the actual wreck position (sic) and more than three miles from the false wreck position 1.3. With 2 100 tons of water loaded inside the superstructure the list was 39 degrees (the Huss calculations are only 90% correct as he forgets that water starts to flow out when speed is >3 knots and turn to port is >90° away from the waves) and an inside view (from the bow - no cars/trucks) of the inside of the superstructure at zero (sic) trim is figure 1.9.3 right. No water has flowed out but you would expect most water to flow out when the ship trims on the bow and its open ramp. |
Fig. 1.9.3 Water in the superstructure |
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Compare figure 2.16.1D. The water reaches the underside of deck 4 above! The trim is assumed to be zero. An outside view of the 'Estonia' shortly after that time (01.20 hrs) is figure 1.9.4 right. Evidently nobody can walk on the sloping decks at this time. It is at this time or later that three crew members on deck 1 decide to start evacuation 1.48. The first Huss report seems to have been based on the information about a sudden list, say 14 degrees and then a slowly increasing list, and not based on real inflows. Huss didn't seem to be aware of the fact that the visor was allegedly found 1 560 meters due West of the wreck (that position was not official until December 1994, when the false wreck position was 'corrected'. When Huss started his work, he must have been confused by plenty of disinformation of the Commission). |
Fig. 1.9.4 'The 'Estonia' listing 45° |
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But with 2 100 tons of water loaded in the superstructure Huss knew - "The ship is then lost"! She quickly tips on the side - 90 degrees list - see figure 1.9.5 right. The Commission (Forssberg/Stenström) apparently could not accept the results. The speed could not be zero after only four minutes, because the ferry could then not reach the 'position of the wreck' >3 000 meters East and sink at 01.52 hrs; Huss first attempt ended >3 000 meters West of the wreck position at 01.20 hrs! No - after four minutes the 'Estonia' had only turned 120° according to the alleged (false) sequence of events of the Commission/Huss and was only listing <30 degrees. But Huss knew that the ship was lost, i.e. would have floated upside down as indicated in figure 1.9.6. |
Fig. 1.9.5 'The 'Estonia' capsizing |
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Fig. 1.9.6 'The
'Estonia' floating |
It is interesting to note how nonchalantly the 'experts' consider 2 000 tons of free water in a superstructure - as if it was a small weight being used in an inclining experiment in harbour. 2 000 tons of extra free water was more or less 60% the total deadweight of the ship of which 80% was already used. And the weight was lose! It was a monster! But on paper it was just an imaginary weight listing the ship - not trimming it - according to Huss. And this monster weight never caused any capsize! Later the Commission suggested that the 'Estonia' floated on the deck house! The windows in the deck house were never smashed. The ferry floated on the deck house!
The second Attempt of Huss/Rosengren to simulate the Accident - the first false Plot
Dr Huss was apparently soon thereafter told by the Commission to 'improve' - read 'falsify' - on the simulation - he must then have been given more details (the real story?) - and Hans Rosenberg, member of the Commission, came to assistance and suggested that they should use the navigation simulator at the Kalmar Marine Academy. Now the serious falsifications started. The whole cover-up of the 'Estonia' accident was in the hands of dr Huss and his co-conspirator, Captain Rosengren.
The Final Report (5) clearly states that the plot of the 'Estonia's last 40 minutes - figure 13.2 in (5) reproduced in this chapter - has been done on the navigation (sic) simulator of the Marine Academy at Kalmar, Sweden. The navigation simulator was made by Norcontrol A/S, Horten, Norway. This type of simulator can be programmed with the particulars of a ship and then predict the results of various navigation (rudder, engine) manoeuvres with a certain correction for wind and current. Naturally the ship's hull must be undamaged and upright. Another condition is that you know when the different manoeuvres take place - reduction in speed, rudder turned, etc.
The simulator cannot be used to predict a manoeuvre with big heel, as the characteristics of the ship then change and are not known. Likewise you cannot simulate the movements of a sinking ship, as then the total displacement, including water trapped inside the deck house, increases >200-300%, i.e. the mass of the ship is modified (increased) - and the characteristics of the ship are changing and not known - the ship evidently moves much slower or stops, particularly if there is no engine power. Therefore the plot of Huss/Rosengren is wrong within a few minutes.
Evidently a navigation simulator cannot calculate stability - intact or damage of a ship. These data including the increase in mass had to be input separately - and it is here the falsifications of the plot are crystal clear.
Evidently it was not possible for Huss to accept that the water inflow was1 963 m3/min at speed 14,5 knots (7.45 m/s) in head seas as suggested by, e.g. the writer and easily verified by moddel tests, as then the 'Estonia' would have capsized immediately. Huss started to produce other calculations - maximum 250-400 m3/min according to apparently/certainly falsified calculations and mathematical models (see figures. 4.2, 3 and 4 in supplement 522 in (5)) to cause an initial list and much, much less inflow later (to prevent capsizing).
To avoid a critical review of the results of the second attempt Forssberg classified all the reports of Huss as secret during the investigation. This is typical - a false report is classified secret to prevent it being disclosed as forgery!
Then they (the Commission, Huss, Rosengren?) decided to reduce the speed - from 14 to 9 knots under two minutes before the turn - but the speed could not be zero - the ship must turn 180° and sail or drift almost two more miles for 38 minutes, before it sank at the wreck position 1 560 meters East of the visor. It is during this time 'fragments' fall off the vessel.
Dr Huss and Rosengren thus tried with the help of the simulator and other 'scientific' (sic) methods to reconstruct the last 40 minutes of the 'Estonia'. Their results are shown in figure 4.12 in supplement no. 522 of (5) by Huss - Simulation of the Capsize. This report is not dated and has no reference number, etc. This report is a pure falsification.
Small Water Inflow during 28 Minutes - no sudden listing
Assuming that the turn actually took place, dr Huss predicted that it now took 6-19-28 minutes to fill the superstructure with 1 000-1 500-2 000 tons of water (inflow 166.7-38.5-55.6 tons/min), when the angle of heel increased to 22-29-37 degrees (heel velocity 3.67-0.54-0.89 degrees/min), i.e. there was no sudden listing, and that it then took the 'Estonia' 19 minutes to stop, and, after having drifted another 9 minutes, the ship capsized (which did not happen): after the 'capsize' Huss/Rosengren allows the ship to drift sideway (upside down?) another 9-10 minutes at >2 knots to suddenly sink at the wreck position.
How and why the hull is flooded in this scenario, so the ship could sink, is not described. It could evidently not be described - a ship cannot drift >2 000 meter with >2,2 knots and simultaneously sink.
Figure 4.12 in supplement no. 522 is identical to figure 13.2 (or 1.9.1 above), when it comes to the courses, speeds, positions and times - all arrows at one-minute intervals are identical (the simulated ship is of course assumed to be undamaged). However - the alleged amounts of water on the car deck in the superstructure and the corresponding angles of heel differ completely. The differences are shown in table 1.9.2 below. But let's first review the background of the Huss second and final report - supplement no. 522 of (5).
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Modified and falsified Data Two minutes and 24 seconds after the loss of the visor, i.e. during the turn, the 'Estonia' steamed according to Huss/the Commission against the waves with about 9 knots, when about 1 200 tons/min should have flowed into the superstructure according to the writer's calculations. Huss reduced the inflow to 83.3 tons/min! The speed was then zero 19 minutes after the loss of the visor! Until then only total 1 500 tons water had entered (during 10 minutes!) into the superstructure according Huss, when the angle of heel was only about 29 degrees (according to correct intact stability calculations) at 01.33 hrs. This condition is a safe and stable condition - albeit with a list and much reduced stability range. However - the problem with this calculation was that the ship, according to both the Commission and survivors, was on its side at 01.30 hrs (see below) with an angle of list (say 90 degrees) much, much greater than 29 degrees of Huss and sank soon afterwards. Why the water in the superstructure (1 500 tons) didn't flow out, when the speed was zero and when the bow was directed away from the waves, Huss does not explain. The condition with 1 500 tons of water in the superstructure is stable and safe. Huss does not calculate the trim caused by 1 500 tons of lose weight or any weight. You would have expected, when the listing ship at zero speed was pitching with the opening away from the waves, that the water simply would have flowed out, when the ship trimmed on the bow! The open bow ramp should have acted like a big scupper! |
Furthermore, when the 'Estonia' with an alleged total of 2 000 tons of water on the car deck in the superstructure and with a list of 37 degrees (the righting arm GZ was zero), she would have capsized (half a mile from the position of the wreck!) at 01.42 hrs - table 4.3 in supplement 522, which is also shown in table 1.9.2 below.
Table 1.9.2 Differences between Huss' figures 1995/6 (Suppl. no. 522) and the Commission/Final Report 1997
Estonian
Time Time
after Loss of Visor (min) Water
in the Super-structure as per Huss
(tons) Inflow
as per Huss (tons/ minute) List
as per Huss (degrees) Wave
Direction (°) List
as per Final Report (degrees) Velocity
of Heel (degrees per min) based on
(5) Diff.
in List between Huss and Final
Report Speed
acc. Huss (knots) Speed
acc. Final report (knots) 01.14.00 0.0 0 400.0 0 135 0 15.0 0 14.5 14.0 01.14.30 0.5 200 400.0 6 135 - 15.0 - 14.5 ~ 01.15.00 1.0 (340) 285.7 (10) ~ 15 15.0 (+5) ~ ~ 01.15.12 1.2 400 250.0 11 150 15 0 +4 13.0 ~ 01.16.00 2.0 (571) 250.0 (15) ~ 15 0 ±0 ~ 9.0 01.16.24 2.4 700 83.3 17 *180 - 5.0 - 8.5 ~ 01.20.00 6.0 1
000 38.5 22 ~ 30 5.0 +8 5.5 6.0 01.22.00 8.0 (1
077) 38.5 (23) ~ 35 2.5 (+12) ~ 4.5 01.24.00 10.0 (1
154) 38.5 (24) ~ 40 2.5 (+15) ~ 2.1 01.27.00 13.0 (1
269) 38.5 (26) ~ (50) (3.3) (+24) ~ ~ 01.30.00 16.0 (1
385) 38.5 (27) ~ 60-70 3.3-5.0 (+33/43) ~ 1.7 01.33.00 19.0 1
500 55.6 29 255 80 6.7 +51 0.0 2.2 01.40.00 26.0 (1
888) 55.6 (35) 255 110 2.5 (+75) 0.0 2.2 01.42.00 28.0 2
000 55.6 37/180! 255 115 4.0 +78/-65 0.0 2.2 01.43.00 29.0 2
056 - 180!! ~ (119) 4.0 (-61) 0.0 2.2 01.51.00 37.0 - - 180!! ~ (150+) 4.0
(h. m. s)
Turn starts
Turn finished
Water inflow stops
Alarm aboard