Written by: Andrzej Jasionowski, Dracos Vassalos, Piotr
Dolebski, Jerzy Prigara, Luis Guarin, Anthony York, Tolasz
Grzes, Przemek Zagorski, Clemens Strasser
Checked by: Dracos Vassalos
Approved by: Dracos Vassalos
Summary:
The sinking mechanisms established were: (1) sudden
heel due to loss of stability (floodwater on deck and free
surface effects), (2) floating at side (side windows
withstanding substantial hydrodynamic load) and flooding of
lower compartments through centre casing, (3) complete
capsize (loss of stability), (4) trim aft (centre of
floodwater aft of CG) and sinking (loss of
floatability).
… lack of … forward collision bulkhead is
considered as the main reason of the eventual loss
…
Review of the Safety at Sea Ltd Paper
by Heiwa Co (17 December
2008)
On 17 March 2005, the Swedish minister Mona Sahlin,
responsible for MV Estonia matters, announced in the
Parliament:
'We must
proceed to do a major study of the actual
sinking. How did the Estonia sink and why did she
sink so fast? That experience may provide still more
knowledge to improve safety at sea both in today's and
tomorrow's shipping. Latest 1 February next year it shall be
informed to the Government office what or which research
institute or consortium that has been given this
task'.
This paper is more than three years later one result of
this announcement and another scandal in the ongoing Estonia
accident investigation done by Vinnova, Stockholm. The paper
was published a few days before the final Vinnova
presentation of the whole project 23 May at Stockholm, which
was chaired by Mr. Tom Allan, a director of Safety at Sea
Ltd.
The authors suggest that the main reason of the
catastrophe is lack of a collision bulkhead extension.
According official sources 1997 the cause of accident was
incorrectly designed visor locks that could not be found by
due diligence. Nobody was really to blame.
The authors suggest four mechanisms or events that then
produced the disaster and sinking. There is no evidence
for any event!
Sudden heel due to loss of stability
(floodwater on deck and free surface effects) : 01.00 -
01.03 hrs
The first event takes a few minutes starting at 01.00
hrs. More than 2 000 tons/minute water are loaded on the car
deck (no. 2 deck) and the angle of heel becomes >45°
within two, three minutes. No survivors from the accident
have reported such a dramatic event. Nobody heard the
enormous noise associated with pushing in 2 000 tons/minute
of water into a superstructure full with cars and
trucks!
According most survivors there were some bangs and later
the ship suddenly rolled >30° around 01.02 hrs and
then became stable with a heel <15° for about 10
minutes allowing >300 persons to evacuate to open decks.
A fair number of survivors had noted water on deck no. 1
prior the sudden rolling. The engine crew reported water to
the knees in the engine room and noted that the bow ramp was
closed three minutes after the rolling and when heel
was <15°.
It should be clear that 2 000 tons/minute water loaded
on the car deck could not have produced the heeling. 2 000
tons/minute? It is a lot! It would have destroyed all
trucks, cars and the lighting system like a big tsunami. How
the authors can suggest that the ferry heeled >45°
in two, three minutes is a mystery. No survivor supports
that.
There is no evidence for this event! Actually, it
never took place!
25 minutes later (sic!) the ferry's 3/0 Tammes sent
Mayday! No mention about a sudden 45° list 25
minutes earlier!
In below figure the heel angle developments according
Safety at Sea Ltd/Vinnova 2008 and the official
theory 1997 (JAIC fig. 13.3) are shown. Note the time of the
Mayday.
Floating at side (side windows
withstanding substantial hydrodynamic load) and flooding of
lower compartments through centre casing : 01.03-01.23
hrs
The second event between 01.03 and 01.23 hrs is also not
possible. The authors suggest that only two side windows per
deck break and that flooding of the deckhouse is small!
According official sources 1997 all windows in the deck
house were broken when submerged. Based on experience a ship
cannot float on windows in a deck house. It is not clear how
the authors can suggest the opposite. The authors maintain
that the thin windows can resist 10 meters water head!
Actually, just the thin steel wall itself will be severly
deformed at 1 meter water head and the window frame will
also deform and the window pane break! At once.
In the latest simulations it takes 22 minutes to flood
the deck house as the windows do not break and the flimsy
doors aft remain closed. According official sources 1997 the
deck house was flooded completely immediately as it became
submerged.
There is no evidence for this second event! No ship
has ever floated on glass windows!
Flooding of lower compartments through central casing at
this time is also not possible as it is above the water
level at this time.
What you would expect to happen at 01.03 hrs is simply
that the vessel capsizes and floats upside down - heel
180°. The authors suggest that capsize is prevented
by side windows not breaking but it is not possible.
Complete capsize (loss of stability) :
01.24-01.30 hrs
The third event takes place between 01.24 and 01.30 hrs
when the angle of heel increases rapidly from 90 -
180°. After that the vessel floats upside down. This
event is also not possible as it takes place exactly when
the Mayday is sent! And in the Mayday message it is said
(01.25 hrs) that the angle of heel is only 20-30°!
Later in the Mayday the position of the vessel is reported.
After the Mayday (01.30 hrs) survivors suggest that the
officer sending the Mayday is seen leaving the bridge.
The authors completely ignore the Mayday message in the
report!
There is no evidence that the vessel capsized at 01.24
hrs!
The authors suggest further that two survivors climb down
on the closed bow ramp when angle of heel is 93°. It
is evidently not possible. The picture is pure propaganda. A
ship cannot float as shown! It will capsize at once! Does
anyone believe that 3/0 Tammes is sending Mayday from the
port bridge wing (left upper corner in below picture), when
people are climbing down the ramp? And that 300+ people are
walking on the flat, port upper side? In SSPA model tests
the ship is rolling violently in this strange (impossible)
condition!
At some instant
two survivors managed to climb down the closed
ramp, using its stiffening arrangement and abandon the ship.
Angle of heel 93°. (Source - Vinnova/SSPA/Safety at
Sea/Glasgow, May 2008)
If the ramp had been open, you would expect the following
to happen - I quote from chapter 3.11
of Disaster
Investigation:
"If the visor had pulled open the ramp, then the ramp
should have hit the fore peak deck with 1.8 MNm energy. The
visor should then first have remained hanging on the ramp
top, when the ramp was open - the visor was pushed aft
by the water, waves and the forward motion of the ship. If
the ramp actually fell down on the forepeak deck, the ramp
plate grid should have been bent downward, all ramp hinges
should have been broken, the ramp side guard rails might
have been damaged and should have been bent outwards
3.10, the 'preventer'
wires120 and the ramp hydraulics should have
been pulled out and it would later have been
impossible to close the ramp1.8.
The starboard ripped apart ramp hydraulics should
have hanged out and should later have blocked the closing of
the ramp, when the list was >90 degrees. The ramp should
have folded itself around the fore peak structure. The
forepeak deck 2 should have been smashed (but it is
undamaged). Then you would expect the visor to slip off the
ramp causing more damages to visor housing, etc. But none is
seen."
Conclusion - if any survivors climbed down a
closed ramp as shown in the figure, the ramp could never
have been open before that! The Safety at Sea
report actually confirms that the accident could not have
been caused by an open ramp!
Trim aft (centre of floodwater aft of
CG) and sinking (loss of floatability) : 01.30-01.52
hrs
At 01.30 hrs the ship floats upside down and the final
event starts - the sinking.
When the ship floats upside down, it floats on buoyancy
provided by trapped air inside the hull and buoyancy
provided by the superstructure and deck house now submerged.
The latter buoyancy is of the order 3 906 m3!
The authors suggest that the vessel first starts to trim
on the stern, but it is not possible. No water can penetrate
into or be shifted to the aft end of the hull in a floating
condition upside down. The paper presents some strange
explanations that water flows up (?) into the aft end
compartments but cannot explain where the compressed air
goes. There are no detailed calculations of available
buoyancy after capsize.
Likewise, the sinking - loss of floatability - cannot be
explained at all! It is suggested that the buoyancy
disappears. The ship weighs at this time 11 930 tons. It
floats on about 3 906 m3 of solid material in the
superstructure and deckhouse and 8 023 m3 of
compressed air and solid material inside the hull. About
5 607 m3 of water has entered the hull
compressing the air there. At least
3.191 m3 of hull is
above waterline; 1-2 meters of the hull is thus above
waterline as seen in the picture above. The vessel floats
upside down! In order for the vessel to sink the 3 191
m3 of 'reserve buoyancy' above waterline
must disappear. The authors do not explain how
3.191
m3 of compressed air is replaced by sea water for
the vessel to sink. Heiwa Co has of course contacted the
authors to clarify matters and received the following reply
on 16 December 2008 from the author Andrzej
Jasionowski:
"Hi Anders,
All details are enclosed in the report, "Technical
Summary …", a simple calculator will suffice to
cross-check every number necessary. If needed, numerical
model can also be made available to third, forth and fifth
parties, no problem, (as suggested long ago). Please spend
some time on analysing and thinking about what has been
presented, stick to basic Archimedes, try to avoid
speculations, and I am sure you will be able to dissolve
your confusion on the matter. It is really simple naval
architecture, undergraduate students could do it.
With best regards
Andrzej"
Actually, no details or numbers are available in the
report about the floating condition at 01.30 hrs and why/how
it will change in the next 20 minutes! As seen in below
(simple) figures produced with a calculator the MV Estonia,
prior capsize, floats on/displaces 11 930 m3
buoyancy in the hull (10 666 m3 air, 1 264
m3 solids, permeability 0.894) with 6 886
m3 volume above waterline but below
the watertight main deck (6156 m3 air and 730
m3 solids, permeability 0.894)
reserve buoyancy.
Total hull volume is
18.816
m3. Above main deck in the superstructure and
deck house are another 3 906 m3 of solids. Upside
down, after capsize, MV Estonia floats with 3 191
m3 of hull above waterline. About 5 012
m3 of water is now inside the hull compressing
the air there at 1.5 bar. The vessel displacement is still
11 930 m3: 8 024 m3 compresssed
air/solids in the hull + 3 906 m3 solids in the
superstructure/deck house. No air can escape from the hull
in this condition, so the vessel cannot sink. In
model scale 1/40 the model evidently floats higher after
capsize, as the air pressure inside the model hull is less
(1.05 bar). But neither ship nor model can sink after
capsize! Archimedes looks after that! Any undergraduate
student using a calculator can conclude that a capsized,
floating ship cannot sink.
Dr. Dracos Vassalos has refused to assist in explaining
the alleged loss of buoyancy between 01.30 and 01.52 hrs.
Vassalos is not interested to dissolve the confussion he is
causing. And he lectures stability at the University of
Strathclyde. Poor undergraduates.
Strangely enough the Safety at Sea Ltd 's partner
SSPA, Gothenburg, part of Chalmers University, makes exactly
the same unexplained error, when calculating buoyancy after
capsize.
There is no evidence for this last event! Actually, it
cannot take place. MV Estonia cannot sink after
capsize.
Conclusions
The Safety at Sea Ltd report Technical Summary
of the Investigation on the Sinking Sequence of MV
Estonia is a scandal. It does not contribute anything to
clarify the sinking of MV Estonia on 28 September 1994.
It in fact produces more lies about the accident than
previously and invents a completely new story;
sudden 45° heel due to 2 000 tons/min water loaded
on the car deck (?) ... and nobody heard it or felt it,
vessel floating on deck house windows (??) ... that has
never happened before,
survivors climbing down/up a closed ramp (???) when the
ship is heeling 90° for less than a minute, and, worst
of all,
that a capsized, floating ship slowly sinks, when
compressed air escapes from an intact hull (????).
Where does the air escape?
You wonder how an allegedly reputable company like
Safety at Sea Ltd can produce such fantasies? What
are they trying to achieve?
It is sad when a university professor and naval
architects prostitute themselves in this way and produce
nonsense reports. They could, lazily, have just walked away
from the project but instead Dr. Vassalos and Mr.
Jasionowski apparently decided to join the Swedish
conspiracy and cover up (paid for by the government) and
produce more disinformation. We are living in a strange
world.
On 1 October 2008 the Swedish minister Sten Tolgfors,
responsible for MV Estonia matters, announced in the
Parliament:
From the studies presented by the consortia SSPA
Sweden AB and HSVA (Hamburgische Schiffbau-Versuchsanstalt
GmbH) on 5 May 2008, can be seen that the sequence of
sinking in all essential ways follows the scenario presented
in the report of the Joint Accident Investigation Commission
(JAIC). The consortia have had the possibility to enlarge
the analysis of a number of points compared to what JAIC
did. The consortia conclude, i.a., that the sequence of
sinking started earlier than concluded in the report of
JAIC. The cause of the sinking of the M/S Estonia is not
questioned in the studies of the consortia and they
therefore confirm the conclusions of JAIC.
Mr Tolgfors must have misunderstood the report of
SSPA/Safety at Sea Ltd.
Anders Björkman (17 December
2008)
Competition
Heiwa Co announces a Competition for undergraduate
students of naval architecture (but anybody can join).
Explain how MV Estonia sinks after capsize based on
details in the Safety at Sea Ltd report! Further hints to do
so you find at 1.9,
2.16 and 2.17.
Send answers to:
The Heiwa Co Estonia
Sinking Scenario (developed 2000-2003)
Safety at Sea Ltd correctly concludes in its
report that the MV Estonia could not list more than 20°
due to leakage below waterline and flooding of compartments
below deck no. 2 only. But Safety at Sea Ltd does not
consider what happens later, while sinking.
Thus let's assume Estonia is leaking below waterline
(starting at 00.50 hrs and never investigated by competent
authorities) and floods several compartments on deck 0 (the
tank top). GM becomes <0 and the Estonia rolls severely
(noted by survivors) at 01.02 hrs and then finds a new
stable equilibrium at <15° heel (noted by survivors)
at 01.03 hrs, when more water flows in on deck no. 0. See
2.17for details.
Safety at Sea Ltd confirms these data in its report
and suggests that the heel cannot increase >20°
unless the car deck, deck no. 2, is flooded. This is
correct. The crew was apparently trying to stop the leakage
until abt. 01.15 hrs as bilge pumps were started. The bridge
was probably informed since 00.50 hrs about the leakage. No
Mayday is sent! 300 people have time between 01.05 - 01.15
hrs to evacuate to open decks! Heel is <15°!
But the vessel is sinking due to the leakage - the draft
increases - and survivors observe the ship is trimming on
the stern. The leakage is apparently aft. After a while,
while sinking losing buoyancy at a rapid rate, deck 2 aft
comes below water and - the car deck is flooded via the aft
ramp that is not closed properly (it is seen open on the
wreck)! See 2.26 for
details. And now the heel can become >20° as
observed by survivors. The time is say 01.20 hrs. So water
flows in on deck no. 2 via the partly open aft ramp.
Heel quickly becomes 30° also observed by survivors.
Mayday is finally sent at 01.24-01.30 hrs. Now it goes
quick. When heel is >40°, the deck house is flooded.
At 01.30 hrs heel is 60° degrees at 01.31 it is
90° and at 01.35 the ship sinks. No capsize. People
jump into the water as the vessel didn't have correct Life
Saving Equipment. The biggest disaster in the Baltic since
1945 was under way! At 01.57 hrs MV Mariella arrives as
first assisting ship to the position of the wreck. Mariella
observed Estonia immobile in the water until sinking.
Heiwa Co has advised Safety at Sea Ltd this
scenario several times 2000-2007. It is strange that it is
not considered in the report. Is Safety at Sea Ltd no
really interested in safety at sea? Why make up fairy tales
about 2 000 tons/minute of water being forced into the
superstructure from forward like a big tsunami. That nobody
heard? That nobody saw? That nobody felt? Why can Safety
at Sea Ltd not explain how a floating ship loses
buoyancy? Why produce low quality 'research'
papers?
