... to give light on the sinking sequence of the MV
Estonia ...
The hydrostatic analyses by JAIC
(1997), Jasionowski
(2001) and recently also Krüger
and Kehren (2007) all indicate that a
significant amount of water had to come onto the vehicle
deck, otherwise the reported large heeling angles could not
be reached.
Once the watertight integrity of the bow was lost,
this enabled large volumes of water to enter the vehicle
deck. The fact that these large volumes of water actually
entered the vehicle deck was due to the reduced freeboard to
the vehicle deck as a consequence of the forward speed and
the related dynamic effects.
When once a critical amount of water had entered the
vehicle deck, this led to a drastic reduction of initial
stability of the ship, which resulted in a rapidly
increasing heel until an intermediate equilibrium floating
condition of about 30° was reached. Due to this rapidly
increasing heel, it was hardly possible for people to escape
the ship.
During this intermediate equilibrium, additional
flooding took place, where the side ventilation system
played the dominant role. Once the side ventilation openings
were submerged, this resulted in a domino-effect, where more
and more water could enter the ship. Due to this water
ingress, heel and trim increased until the vessel then
finally sank.
Review of the HSVA Paper by Heiwa Co
(21 December 2008)
On 17 March 2005, the Swedish minister Mona Sahlin,
responsible for MV Estonia matters, announced in the
Parliament:
'We must
proceed to do a major study of the actual
sinking. How did the Estonia sink and why did she
sink so fast? That experience may provide still more
knowledge to improve safety at sea both in today's and
tomorrow's shipping. Latest 1 February next year it shall be
informed to the Government office what or which research
institute or consortium that has been given this
task'.
This paper is more than three years later one result of
this announcement and another scandal in the ongoing Estonia
accident investigation done by Vinnova, Stockholm. The paper
was published 5 May 2008 but has not recieved any attention
at all since.
The authors suggest only one cause and three mechanisms
or events that produced the disaster and sinking, where the
ship never capsizes! There is no evidence for any event!
How and why the ship sank is not explained at all!
"... all indicate that a
significant amount of water had to come onto the vehicle
deck, otherwise the reported large heeling angles could not
be reached."
HSVA suggests that the only cause for sudden heel,
as observed by all survivors, must be water loaded on the
vehicle deck (deck 2 several meters above waterline)
in the superstructure. However, water on deck 0 due
to hull leakage below waterline would produce the
same initial result. Sadly, it is not investigated at all!
Doesn't HSVA know that ships float on the hull and lose
stability with water on deck 0 due to leakage?
"Once the watertight integrity of
the bow was lost, this enabled large volumes of water to
enter the vehicle deck".
HSVA suggests that the first event was that the
watertight integrity of the bow was lost at
00.55 hrs, i.e. 19 minutes earlier than according
official (JAIC) information. Actually the bow of the
hull was never damaged at all. What HSVA means is
that the weathertight bow ramp of the
superstructure above deck no. 2 several meters above
waterline apparently opened (the visor had pulled the ramp
open) at 00.55 hrs. HSVA does not suggest how big a large
volume water is coming in and why the crew didn't take
any preventive action before. The water inflow is, however,
apparently not 2 000 tons/minute as suggested by
SSPA/Safety at Sea Ltd
producing a list >45° after a few minutes, because
in the HSVA scenario everything goes much slower, e.g. as
per below track of the course copied from the report:
Time
Heel (°)
Speed (knots)
Note
01.00
2
15
01.02
38
15
01.03
47
11.4
01.04
43
9.0
01.05
41
7.3
01.06
34
6.5
01.07
30
6.0
01.10
27
5.6
01.12
25
5.4
01.14
24
5.2
01.18
26
4.5
01.22
33
3.3
Mayday
01.25
42
3.0
Mayday
01.26
>55
~1.2
Mayday
01.48
>100
0.0
Fig. 31
Track of the vessel with
the turning diameter of 5.74 Lbp.
It is suggested that the vessel continues at 15 knots for
two minutes and then turns 210° port back to Tallinn
and that this sharp turn increases the list to 47°, but
that the list is then is reduced to only 24° at 01.14
hrs when the speed is still 5.2 knots. When the Mayday is
sent 01.22-01.30 hrs the list increases from 33° to
>55° and then the vessel is only 250 meters from the
wreck position.
There is however no evidence that the vessel ever
turned at 01.02 -01.07 hrs (except mysterious
suggestions that various things dropped off the ship and
produced a trace on the sea floor, e.g. 1 400 m due
west of the visor position. JAIC suggest the sea floor was
checked by ROV - 1 400 m west of the visor position!
Can we believe that?).
To suggest that "the second officer (E1) on watch
onboard the MV Mariella tracking MV Estonia that night saw
in the corner of his eye (sic)
on the radar screen the track of a hasty, sharp turn to port
made by MV Estonia" at 01.02-01.07 hrs, i.e. 20 minutes
prior Mayday, is not based on the person's (E1) testimony!
E1 might have seen something at 01.35 hrs, when the ship
sank.
HSVA suggests inflow 100 tons/minute
while SSPA/Safety at Sea, Ltd suggests 2 000
tons/minute!
A list of 24° at 01.14 hrs corresponds only to about
1 500 tons of water on the car deck in the superstructrure,
i.e. HSVA suggests an inflow of only 100 tons/minute, while
SSPA model tests clearly show that a realistic inflow is
>2 000 tons/minute! Actually, if only
1.500 tons of water was on the
the car deck at 01.24 hrs, it would have flowed out by
itself at that time! Or quoting the report:
"The following case was studied: The ship advances at
the speed of 6 kn without visor, ramp fully open, and has no
other leaks. The ship has turned 180°, that is, the
waves come from the starboard stern quarter. The ship has
about 2000 tons of water on the vehicle deck and it advances
straight ahead. This case was investigated to find out how
the vessel would behave after the turn to port.
.. Water sloshed in and out of the vehicle deck, or
water flowed slowly out due to the pitch motions of the
ship.
.. No gradual large heeling or sinking of the vessel
took place.
.. The main reason for the gradual egress of water
from the vehicle deck are the pitch motions of the ship,
which make the water on the vehicle deck to slosh in the
longitudinal direction of the ship. This water has a
considerable linear momentum. When the water flows to the
narrowing bow part of the vehicle deck, its level can rise
due to its momentum, like the level of incoming tide rises
on a narrowing river. This contributes to the water
egress".
Thus, after the vessel had turned, the list was reduced
... and the water should have flowed out.
"When once a critical amount of
water had entered the vehicle deck, this led to a drastic
reduction of initial stability of the ship, which resulted
in a rapidly increasing heel until an intermediate
equilibrium floating condition of about 30° was
reached. Due to this rapidly increasing heel, it was hardly
possible for people to escape the ship".
The second event is when a critical amount of
water had entered the vehicle deck causing a list of
30°! As seen from fig. 31 of the report above it is
suggested that the MV Estonia had 30° list - an
intermediate equilibrium floating condition - at three
occasions! First between 01.01 and 01.02 hrs before
the turn starts, then at 01.07 hrs after the turn and
then around 01.20 hrs just before the Mayday was sent. All
three conditions are evidently stable and in equilibrium.
HSVA however produces a strange Fig. 10 in the report (with
SSPA/Safety at Sea Ltd
and HSVA above data
added by this writer) with a completely different Time
Sequence of the Capsizing (sic)
of MV Estonia.
Fig. 10 Development
of list to starboard during the MV Estonia
accident.
Here the list is say 5° at 01.01 hrs,
30° at 01.07 hrs and 50-90° at 01.22 -
01.30 hrs, when the Mayday was sent and heel angle
20-30° was reported. What happens after 01.40 hrs is
not clear except that no capsize takes place (180°
list).
There is no evidence for this time sequence. It
differs completely from the original JAIC one of 1997 and
also from the SSPA/Safety at
Sea Ltd 2008 model
tests and computer
simulations and the HSVA
data above. According SSPA/Safety at Sea Ltd the
heel is 47° at 01.02 hrs and 90° at 01.22 hrs.
But let's assume that the list was 30° at 01.07 hrs
(SSPA/Safety at Sea Ltd suggests it is >60°!). HSVA
suggests it is hardly possible for people to escape at that
angle. Actually it is impossible for anybody to move on a
deck slooping at 30°! A more realistic limiting angle
of heel for escape is 18° - after 01.04 hrs any escape
would be impossible.
HSVA includes interesting, new information how the
three crew members in the
ECR on deck no. 1 escaped to deck no. 8 centre line.
It is finally established that there are slooping
ladders in the engine room uptake as seen in figs. 63 and 64
below. No vertical shafts with vertical ladders, etc, as
suggested elsewhere by, e.g. Hummel and the crew itself, are
fitted.
The three crew thus opened a
watertight door on deck
1, and then used seven slooping ladders to reach deck 8 at
centre line, when the list was >40°. This escape
route is however not possible to use, unless the list is
<15°, so it is now clear that the engine crew
escaped from the ECR very early, around 01.03 hrs, to open
decks port side.
The HSVA report fails to show the last bit of the escape
route on open deck - from the centre line to the port
side, where two of the crew managed to get into a life raft
at 01.30 hrs. It is impossible to move/evacuate from the
centre line to the side, when the list is >15°.
Many survivors observed two of the engine crew on the
port open side very soon after the heeling occurred. Thus
it is clear that the three engine crew lied about their
escape as outlined in the JAIC report 1997!
According HSVA: "The testimonies from the
members of the crew in the ECR can be considered to
be literally correct. They can also be considered
to be false, but only if there is other evidence
available, which is heavy enough to overrule them".
HSVA believes they are correct in all respects!
On the other hand the report concludes that the
three engine crew must have got out latest at 01.07
hrs. According JAIC they got out at 01.25 hrs (when
the emergency generator started) after a lot of
heroic work down in the ECR and multiple telephone
calls with the bridge.
Sillaste suggests in his testmonies that the
bilge pumps were
started! When and why do you start bilge
pumps? Evidently when the hull is leaking
and when there is water on deck 0. But HSVA does
not consider this! Actually, not a word in the HSVA
report about bilge pumps. And not a word about the
same crew standing in water to the knees ... in the
engine room prior to that. Maybe the crew told the
truth in their early testimonies and something else
in the later ones?
HSVA does not consider this possibility!
"Once the side ventilation openings
were submerged, this resulted in a domino-effect, where more
and more water could enter the ship. Due to this water
ingress, heel and trim increased until the vessel then
finally sank".
The final event in the HSVA report is that
"once the side ventilation openings were submerged ....
the vessel then finaly sank". There is no evidence
for this proposal in the report and no calculations of
any kind to support it. The vessel must heel >40°
for any side ventilation openings to be submerged - and it
is not clear if they exist, and, if they exist, if they were
open and undamaged! If the openings exist and if they
ventilate spaces in the hull below the car/main deck, they
must be fitted with fire dampers that can be locked closed,
etc. so you can seal the space in case of fire, etc.
However, HSVA suggests that any water (1 500
tons?) in the superstructure 2.5 m above waterline would
have flowed out by gravity, when the bow opening was in lee
after 01.07 hrs, list <30°. On the other hand, if
the vessel heels >40° due to 2 500 tons loaded
on the car deck, deck 2, the ferry would capsize due to
GZ<0 and float upside down.
Conclusions
The HSVA report Research Study on the Sinking
Sequence and Evacuation of the MV Estonia - Final Report
is another scandal of the Estonia saga. It does not
contribute anything to clarify the sinking of MV Estonia on
28 September 1994.
It in fact produces more lies about the accident than
previously and invents a completely new story;
sudden 45° heel due to a sharp port turn ...
while,
no water flows out of the superstructure after the turn,
in spite of clear scientific evidence to the contrary, if
water had actually entered in the first place,
and heel is 60-90° when Mayday is sent, while the
person sending Mayday reports 20-30° heel.
How the sinking took place is not explained at all except
that side ventilation openings came under water (and no
evidence that the ducts existed or were open or
undamaged)!
You wonder how an allegedly reputable company like
HSVA can produce such fantasies 2008? What are they
trying to achieve? Protect Karppinen? He is a good friend of
Mr. Valanto! But its is good that the report shows how the
JAIC key witnesses lied about their escape from the ECR.
The report spends a lot of time on internal evacuation
by/of passengers to open decks but fails to mention that
evacuation had never been practiced on MV Estonia as
the vessel simply lacked regulatory live saving appliances,
LSA! Most passengers were supposed to jump into the water,
if they managed to evacuate to open decks! HSVA fails to
understand that evacuation does not end at open decks.
Evacuation consists of mustering all persons in safe areas
aboard, escorting them to LSA, dry embarction of LSA,
launching LSA and then using life boats to tow rafts away
from the sinking ship.
It is a pity that HSVA does not mention or even
try to analyse the Heiwa Co
sinking scenario , simple leakage of the hull below
waterline. Heiwa Co has evidently informed HSVA about
it ... and the result is silence. As usual!
On 1 October 2008 the Swedish minister Sten Tolgfors,
responsible for MV Estonia matters announced in the
Parliament:
From the studies presented by the consortia SSPA
Sweden AB and HSVA (Hamburgische Schiffbau-Versuchsanstalt
GmbH) on 5 May 2008, can be seen that the sequence of
sinking in all essential ways follows the scenario
presented in the report of the Joint Accident Investigation
Commission (JAIC). The consortia have had the
possibility to enlarge the analysis of a number of points
compared to what JAIC did. The consortia conclude, i.a.,
that the sequence of sinking started earlier than concluded
in the report of JAIC. The cause of the sinking of the M/S
Estonia is not questioned in the studies of the consortia
and they therefore confirm the conclusions of JAIC.
Mr Tolgfors must have misunderstood the report of
HSVA.
