It is today 19 years since the 'Estonia'
sank in the Baltic on the 28 September 1994 and the cause
of the accident still is a mystery. Many people - or a
gullible majority - believes that the accident was caused by
defective visor locks as officially concluded by the Joint
Accident Investigation Commission, JAIC, in its Final report
published in December 1997. All essential facts in the Final
report are false or manipulated. How the JAIC managed that
is explained in my book Disaster
Investigation.
Immediately after the accident there was
total confusion what could have caused the accident, but
after a few days the authorities and Swedish media only
mentioned only one cause - the ship's bow visor had been
forced open by very heavy wave impacts on it (that nobody
heard), the visor had been knocked off (that nobody
noticed), an internal ramp had been pulled open (the crew
didn't see it but reported it was closed after capsize) and
seawater had entered into the ship's superstructure 2-3
meters above waterline, when it pitched down into the waves.
The result had been capsize upside down after 20 minutes and
complete sinking after another 20 minutes.
One week (4 October 1994) after the
accident the JAIC,
not formally constituted, confirmed this strange cause of
accident in its First Interim Report and added that the
visor had been lost underway some time before the capsize,
and from then on, no other causes of accident were ever
investigated. The public was told that underwater
filming of the wreck had confirmed that the visor was
missing … and therefore must have been lost before the
capsize and sinking ... and caused the accident.
There is no evidence that this
allegation is true. And the vessel never capsized - it sank
- without capsize! Apparently with the visor still in
place!
But three weeks after the accident (18
October 1994) the visor was officially found - a mile West
of the wreck!
There is no evidence that this is true
either!
In all probability the visor was at the
wreck at this time! It had been removed from the wreck by
Swedish navy divers using explosives and dropped down on the
sea floor below the bow.
It is very likely that the whole
investigation was based on these three initial lies, because
the visor no doubt was found attached to the wreck, when it
was filmed 30 September. The visor story of the lost visor
was cleverly planted when millions of people were shocked of
852 drowned victims and when critical voices about the cause
was not yet heard.
Then followed three years of secret
'investigations' of events and causes. The public had no
access to the JAIC meetings and all essential evidence was
kept secret. This was totally illegal but nobody seemed to
care! The JAIC met more than 20 times to write an
investigation report (and to wine and dine and fuck around)
why the visor had caused the accident, which was duly
published in December 1997. At regular intervals 1994-1997
the JAIC re-confirmed the only official cause - the visor
had fallen off, later clarified due to defective visor
locks, enormous waves had struck off the visor, seawater had
entered the ship (or rather the superstructure of the ship -
a big difference) and caused first capsize (that never
happened) at 01.15 hrs, and later sinking, at about 01.50
hrs. All relevant findings from underwater filmings and a
dive examination of the wreck 1994 were manipulated and/or
censored to suit the inventions. Public discussion of the
cause of accident was 'meaningless'.
A self-appointed Group
of German Experts tried to do
its own casualty investigation 1995-1998. It failed
completely. It never understood that the vessel neither
capsized nor lost its visor as alleged by the JAIC. It never
managed to conclude that the alleged causes could not have
contributed to the alleged events. Later it published a
strange report - a mirror picture of the JAIC report - only
pointing out errors in the latter, but never suggesting that
all essential information was falsified! The Germans used
the same stability experts as JAIC and the ship owner to
cover up the Truth. The Germans ignored all information
provided by Heiwa Co at meetings both at Hamburg and
Beausoleil. It seems that the Germans were manipulated by
the JAIC.
When the JAIC Final report was at last
issued many international professional bodies criticized its
content that it didn't make any sense. The JAIC obviously
never really responded to the criticism. Thus followed
another three years of one-sided debate. Valid criticism was
raised while the authorities or responsible parties refused
to reply, except stating that the JAIC Final report was 100%
correct or other nonsense. However, in October 2000 the
Swedish government requested a review of the criticism, e.g.
raised in the writer's book Katastrofutredning
(Disaster
Investigation). A typical
reply was, e.g. by Ms Ann Louise Eksborg, Swedish JAIC
chairperson and then director of the Swedish Accident
Investigation Board, SHK, who signed the Final report 1997,
in a letter to the government 16 October 2000, ref. SHK
A62/00:
"In conclusion you can say
that the main traits in the sequence of events and in the
connexion of causes of the JAIC Final report are based on
several secured and proven relations and facts, where it
is practically impossible to see that a new independent
investigation shall be able to conclude an essentially
different result".
The Swedish government only listened to
Ms
Eksborg, a woman with a look
between an apostle and a jail bird, and no further official
investigations were ordered in April 2001, except that the
Swedish Board of Psychological Defence, SPF, should assemble
a 'Memory Bank' of 'Estonia' accident information and make a
study to explain the sinking - or water filling of the
'Estonia', which the JAIC hade never done during its three
years of 'investigation'. Why water in the superstructure
would cause sinking of the hull was never explained ...
and is still, 19 years after the accident, not explained,
and there is no evidence that there was water on the
car deck causing the accident. The government also
decided to support safety at sea research! This is another
sad story - how SEK 25 millions were swindled away 2001-2002
and another SEK 20 millions 2003-2004 by the government
innovation agency Vinnova
(in Swedish only) - and only relevant to the 'Estonia'
story, as the money seems to be payments to qualified
Swedish people to shut up!
Then, 2001-2004, followed the last act of
the present drama which is still going on; numerous debates
in the Swedish Parliament and Constitutional Commission and
the SPF
failure to assemble the
'Memory Bank' and to explain the water filling of the
superstructure and the deckhouse and sinking of the
hull,even if falsified information and calculation methods
were again shamelessly used. On 28 September 2004 at 16.00
hrs the SPF arranges a meeting at Stockholm, Sweden, to
commemorate the event 10 years ago. The King and Queen of
Sweden, the prime minister and the Speaker of the Parliament
are asked to attend. No doubt the King's chief of staff,
admiral Frank
Rosenius, will assist in the
background, smiling like a forger in an anchor forge (or
torpedo workshop), when the visor story is
reiterated.
Legal proceedings had of course started
early to find the real cause and the responsible party but
during every phase of the above developments any legal
proceedings were delayed or postponed for various
reason.
And this is the situation today of the
most shocking and tragic marine accident in Europe after the
Second World War - no explanation what happened has been
given except a false Final report, 19 years of denials of
any wrong doings by several governments, authorities and
legal courts and continued cover-ups of any attempts to
clarify matters, e.g. the water filling study of admiral
Rosenius. Safety at sea is sadly a bad joke in Sweden,
Finland and Estonia.
The only forum where the matter is still
open is at the legal Court of Paris, France. To assist the
complaining party at Paris to get a favourable verdict,
below follows some pertinent observations how to convince
the Court that, e.g. the present official and only
investigation is faulty and cannot be trusted and must be
re-done. It is very easy. The official Final report contains
61 (sixty-one) official Findings on pages 223-224.
All Conclusions (pages 225-226) and
Recommendations (pages 227-228) are based on these
Findings. If/as any Findings are found
incorrect, the Conclusions and Recommendations
cannot be correct. So below follows why all essential
Findings are faulty (falsified, untrue, based on
manipulated information, pure inventions, etc).
There are 61 relevant or irrelevant
Findings (points) on pages 223-224 in the Final report to
prove that the visor caused the accident. All of these
relevant Findings cannot be proven or are
intentionally falsified as described in the below table of
some typical Findings (references are made to other pages of
this web site where the falsifications are explained), thus
you should conclude the complete sequence of official
events is an invention - there is no evidence for any
essential, relevant Findings.
No.
Official
Finding
Why the Finding
is not correct
References
5
Ship's condition
The vessel was seaworthy and properly
manned.
No valid certificates are provided in the Final
report to this effect and, e.g. the life
saving appliances, the evacuation plan and the
watertight subdivision (watertight doors) were
not as per regulations. The ship was not
seaworthy as per any international and national
laws. But the ship did not sink because it was
unseaworty or carried false certificates - the
ship sank because it was leaking in the hull
(not investigated by the JAIC).
Failure
The failure sequence may have started at
about 0055 hrs when the AB seaman heard a
metallic bang at the bow ramp.
No failure is proven According to the first interview of the AB
seaman by the Swedish daily Dagens Nyheter
published on 7 October the AB seaman was on the
car deck at 0040 hrs and heard a loud bang not
associated with the bow. Reports that the bilge
pumps had started and that the engine room was
flooded (indicating hull leakage) were quickly
censored.
The visor worked its way forward and forced
the ramp partly open due to mechanical
intereference between the visor and the ramp,
inherent in the design. Water started entering
the car deck at the sides of the partly open
ramp.
Not proven (another
invention). Wave forces acting in the aft
direction and a strong deck beam prevented the
visor to move forward. The ramp locks are not
damaged.
The ramp rested for a while within the visor
before the visor at about 0115 hrs fell into the
sea, pulling the ramp fully open.
Not proven (a third
invention). There is no evidence that the visor
fell off or the ramp was pulled fully open at
any time, including 0115 hrs. What most
survivors said is shown below. The visor
position is not proven
Capsize
Large amounts of water entered the car
deck and in a few minutes a starboard list of
15° developed.
No capsize
A majority of survivors stated that the ship
suddenly lost its initial stability and rolled
twice >30° to starboard at about 0102
hrs and then stabilized itself at about
10-15° list to starboard for sufficient
time enabling them to evacuate. The vessel
never capsized! It was always stable, albeit
with a list, while it sank (due to water leaking
into the hull below the car deck).
Not proven -
information that the vessel slowed down before
the sudden listing has not been investigated, as
it was a sign that the crew was aware of the
hull leakage.
The vessel drifted with her starboard side
towards the waves.
Not proven and
impossible. Assisting ships observed the
ESTONIA immobile in the water ... no drifting
... from the time of the MAYDAY (0122 hrs) and
until the sinking about 0135 hrs. The JAIC
suggests that the sinking vessel drifted at a
speed >2.2 knots for more than 30 minutes,
which is impossible
At about 0125 hrs the list was more than
40°. By then windows and a door had broken
in the aft part on the starboard side, allowing
progressive flooding of the accommodation.
...
At 40° list due only
to water in the superstructure the
non-watertight deck house is immediately flooded
and the ship should have capsized, i.e. turned
and floated upside down on the undamaged hull.
But no capsize took place.
As the list increased the ESTONIA started to
sink stern first. At about 0135 hrs the list was
about 80°.
Not proven. At 0135
hrs the ESTONIA had probably already sunk
without capsizing due to leakage of the hull,
which has not been investigated. The visor
was then evidently still attached to the ship!
It had never come lose!
Furthermore the JAIC cannot explain why the ship
would start to sink at this time due to water
loaded in the superstructure two meters
above waterline! Elementary stability
calculations of the ship and flooding
calculations of the superstructure would
indicate that the ship would have capsized and
floated upside down already before Finding 14
took place!
Action by the crew
Two reports of unusual sounds from the
bow area were given to the officers on the
watch, the first about 20 minutes prior to the
loss of the visor.
The Finding is based on statements of only
one survivor, the AB seaman, who
has given different accounts of what he did or
did not do or hear at various times - thus not
proven. In all probability the AB seaman gave an
accurate description of what happened in the DN
inteview - see 8, and was later forced by the
JAIC to change his story to suit the JAIC
inventions.
The master arrived at the bridge and was
present when the second attempt was initiated
shortly after 0100 hrs.
See 18 - not proven.
As stated in 12 the sudden listing took place at
that time (starting about 0102 hrs). One reason
why JAIC delayed the time seems to have been to
get the master on the bridge before the
accident.
21
The speed setting was maintained until the
list developed. At about 0100 hrs the speed was
about 14 knots ...
Not proven - see 13 -
an invention. There is no evidence about these
matters in the Final report. The last hour of
the Estonia is totally unaccounted
for.
22
The visor indicator lamps on the bridge did
not show when the visor was detached ...
There is no evidence that the
visor was ever detached ... (it is an
invention).
23
The ingress of water at the sides of the
partly open bow ramp was observed on a monitor
in the engine control room, but no information
was exchanged with the bridge.
The Final report contains
three testimonies from crewmembers in the engine
control room on deck 1 that the bow ramp was in
the closed position two minutes after the sudden
rollings/listing, thus water on the car deck
could not have caused the listing. This was
allegedly seen by the seamen in the control
room. Much later the same seamen miraculously
escaped from the control room on deck 1 to deck
8, which was impossible! There is no evidence
that the three witnesses were in the control
room at 0115-0122 hrs. They had probably escaped
much earlier. According to the Final report
there were several telephone calls between
bridge and engine control room (but no
evidence).
As the list developed the officers of the
watch reduced speed and initiated at turn to
port. They also ordered the engineer to
compensate for the list by pumping ballast, but
the pump sucked air and, furthermore, the tank
was almost full. The officers of the watch also
closed the watertight doors.
There is no evidence of any
of these actions - they are all inventions to
add substance to the official fairy tale. And
even if the turn took place after the
visor was lost, the vessel could never reach the
position where she sank (1 560 m East of
the visor). In all probability the vessel just
stopped soon after the first listing (and the
visor never fell off).
Tecnical matters
There were no detailed design
requirements for bow visors in the rules of
Bureau Veritas, the classification society
concerned, at the time of the building of the
ESTONIA
This Finding is cleverly misleading as a bow
visor locking arrangement is generally not a
responsibility of a classification society (even
if rules are provided to estimate the loads on
the visor). Superstructure and deck house
doors and their locking devices, etc. including
visors in a ship's superstructure's sides is the
responsibility of the maritime administration
(Estonia) as per the International Load Line
Convention 1966.
28
The Finnish Maritime Administration was,
according to a national decree, exempt from
doing hull surveys of vessels holding valid
class certificates issued by authorised
classification societies.
This Finding is
irrelevant. The FNMA was not concerned with
the ESTONIA 1994. And the visor was not attached
to the hull, it was attached to the
superstructure and an important part of the Load
Line (not Hull) surveys done by the
FNMA.
29
The visor locking devices were not examined
by the Finnish Maritime Administration, nor by
Bureau Veritas.
Another irrelevant
Finding. The visor locking devices were the
responsiblity of the Estonian National Maritime
Administration, ENMA - see 27. But when the ship
was under Finnish flag, evidently the FNMA
should have checked the locks.
30
The visor design load and the assumed load
distribution on the attachments did not take
realistic wave impact loads into
account.
Not proven in the Final
report and misleading. It would appear that the
design load used by the yard/classification
society (a head of water times the total
horizontal area of the visor) >535 tons far
exceeded any real buoyancy and impact loads to
be encountered in service. The wave impact loads in the Final report are
based on manipulated
model tests
and simulations. The JAIC furthermore never
presented any calculations how wave impact loads
would have been transmitted to the ship's
superstructure by the 'attachments'.
The visor locking devices installed were not
manufactured in accordance with the design
intentions.
Not proven in the Final
report and misleading. It would appear that
the locking devices could withstand the design
load/intentions as it worked well during 14
years in service. The JAIC never investigated if
the Atlantic lock were damaged before the
accident and out of order (which would appear to
have been the case!).
No safety margin was incorporated in the
total load carrying capacity of the visor
attachement system.
Not proven in the Final
report and misleading - see 30 - and if it
were the case, the Estonian NMA was
responsible.
33
The attachment system as installed was able
to withstand a resultant wave
force only slightly above the design
load used.
Not proven in the Final
report and misleading. The Final report does
not even present a calculation how either a wave
buoyancy or a wave impact load on
the visor is transmitted to the superstructure
via the 'attachment system', the latter which is
not even defined.
35
Wave impact loads generated on
the night of the accident exceeded the combined
strength of the visor attachments.
Not proven in the Final
report and misleading - see 30 and 33. It
would appear that wave impact loads in a sea
state Beaufort 7 with 4 m significant wave
height (thus not even a storm) would be
insignificant (and that the model tests and
simulations had to manipulated to show something
else -see 36).
36
Wave impact loads on the visor
increased very quickly with increasing
significant wave height, while forward speed had
a smaller effect on the loads.
Not proven in the Final
report and misleading - see 30 and 33.
The model tests and the simulations are
false. It is of course a scandal that a
recognized ship model test institute (SSPA Marin
AB, Gothenburg, Sweden) produces a false model
test report, but it remains a fact. The model
tests cannot be re-done by any other independent
institution!
The SOLAS requirements for an upper extension
of the collision bulkhead were not
satisfied.
Irrelevant as the ship did
not collide (except with waves). Evidently the
existing bow ramp in the superstructure
would have acted as the upper extension of the
existing collision bulkhead fitted in the
hull in a real collision with another
ship or object.
The general maintenance standard of the visor
was satisfactory.
Existing minor maintenance deficiencies were not
significant factors in the accident.
Not proven - only
based on statements of un-named witnesses.
Information to the effect that the visor did not
fit and could not be locked due to wear and tear
or previous contacts has not been
investigated.
Evacuation
The time available for evacuation was
very short, between 10 and 20 minutes.
Strange Finding. If the ship started to list
slowly at 0115 hrs as stated by the JAIC and the
list was 40° at 0125 hrs due to >2 000
tons of water in the superstructure, the time to
evacuate must have been less than 10 minutes, as
it is impossible to walk on a ship's deck with
list >18°. But if the loss of stability
and sudden heeling >30° took place at
about 0102 hrs and if the ship later was stable
for a fairly long time at 15° list, then
there was time for many persons to evacuate
until 0122 hrs. The suggestion that
approximately 300 people reached the open deck
means that the JAIC development of the list
cannot have taken place as stated.
42
The lifesaving equipment in many cases did
not function as intended. Lifeboats could not be
lowered.
This Finding is a scandal.
The lifesaving equipment was not as per
recognized (SOLAS) rules. Most of the passengers
were assumed only to jump into the water and try
to swim ashore or to a life raft that somebody
was supposed to throw into the water!
Of the approximately 300 people who reached
the open deck, some 160 succeded in climbing
into liferafts, and a few climbed onto capsized
lifeboats. Helicopters rescued 104 people, and
vessels rescued 34.
Another scandalous
Finding. 99% of the survivors had to jump
into the water to get off the sinking ship to
survive in the first place - extremely few
climbed into any life raft and none onto
a capsized lifeboat. How do you climb
onto a capsized lifeboat from a sinking and
listing ship?
Actually there was no realistic evacuation plan
at all! In any event a majority of
persons aboard had to jump into the sea to
survive!
As can be seen from above table the JAIC
makes a big issue that wave impact loads on
the Estonia fore ship/visor attached to the
superstructure in a sea state with 4 m significant
wave height (not even a storm) far exceeded what would have
been expected and that the actual attachment system could
not withstand the resultant wave force.
Falsified Model Tests
Actually it is quite simple to
demonstrate that the alleged wave impact loads on the visor,
gained from Swedish model tests and Finnish simulations done
by the JAIC, are falsified (increased) by a factor of at
least five! The model
tests ordered by the JAIC
and carried out by Messrs. SSPA Marin AB model test basin,
Gothenburg, Sweden, are falsified and cannot be re-done by
any other model test basin! Nor can the simulations be
re-done by any scientist! Just by visual inspection of a
similar ship in the same sea state B7 and waves 4.2 meters
confirms that the visor is hardly submerged, when pitching
into the waves and that wave impacts on the visor high above
the waterline are very rare (seldom heard) and of small
magnitude and does not even lift the visor from its
attachments! There is no way that waves of 4.2 m
significant height could have knocked off the visor of the
ESTONIA in September 1994! This is the central lie of the
whole cover-up! But in more severe weather B9 and waves
6 meters it is another story! If the ferry bow then hits a
wave it is heard like a big BANG all over the ship and you
must slow down.
19 years of patriotic
Lies
But how could the JAIC get away with its
report of lies? It is extremely simple! The Swedish
government appointed three Swedish investigators that were
told to blame the accident on the visor (that story was
ready beforehand for obscure reasons not developed here) in
a totally secret and illegal investigation and not on the
real cause - hull leakage (which would have been much
simpler). It was easy to put social pressure on the
investigators - an affirmative patriotic culture adapted to
the political power - so that they started to lie of
patriotic reasons to protect what they thought were Swedish
interests. They were patriotic liers, and it was the
same patriotism that silenced them (and killed one of them)
when they were faced with their lies. Not one investigtor
was later able to explain/prove any essential Finding in the
Final report. But other patriotic liers were prepared to
stand up and support the lying investigators and the large
Swedish public was generally happy. Consensus is part of the
Swedish mind and media, because Sweden is a small country
with few alternatives. Either you support the outrageous
lies of the leaders or you are destroyed unless you can
leave the country and defend the truth elsewhere. It is
evidently simpler to join the lying majority than to tell
the Truth alone. The Board of Psychological Defence assists
of course to cover up official lies in Sweden. Finland and
Estonia are the same; even smaller countries with the same
narrow minds as Sweden and even fewer alternatives and they
were very happy or forced to play along. The whole
manipulation was carried out by a dedicated few people. As
basic stability calculations confirmed that the whole
official sequence of events was false, all JAIC
stability
calculations had to be
falsified. When that failed, admiral Rosenius had to step in
to produce a falsified water filling study 2003.
Pictures of Damages caused by
Explosives
In order to support the visor story
Sweden (read the Swedish Navy) had to remove the visor from
the wreck under water the first week after the
accident using explosives. The explosive
damages seen on underwater
films, e.g. the
big hole in the starboard side of the superstructure bow
ramp frame (officially
undamaged according to the JAIC), are caused by these
actions after the accident! Quite a story that
probably will be told one day! But first the patriotic liers
of Sweden, Finland and Estonia and their Final report must
be taken to pieces by the legal Court at Paris. September
2013 the Paris Court had done nothing. And
maybe the whole thing will be legally stopped October,
2013. Morally it will never
be stopped.
