M/S Costa Concordia incidents January 13-14, 2012 caused by ship not being seaworthy. Appendix

No improvements of safety at sea August 2015

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Summary:

M/S Costa Concordia acidentally contacted a submerged rock outside Isola del Giglio at 21.45 hrs 13 January 2012 and ripped open the port side. Four hull compartments were partly up-flooded. The double bottom was intact. The damaged condition was not serious. Ship was floating and stable. The Master was happy. He could call for a tug and be towed to a port for repairs. However, electricty failed - black out - and it was decided to Abandon ship and bring the passengers to Porto Giglio not far away to be sent home.

The ship lacked a complete crew to launch all lifeboats and life rafts and to muster all passengers. The ship was not seaworthy. There was panic and fear. By pure luck most people aboard managed to leave the ship mainly using lifeboats.

In the meantime there was progressive flooding through open, illegal watertight doors. The ship was incorrectly designed and certified and not seaworthy. Intact hull compartments ensuring safety were flooded and at 00.32 hrs 14 January 2012 stability was lost and the ship capsized, a fatal incident. >300 persons still aboard were trapped on the port side above water. 32 persons still inside drowned. The hull was down-flooded and the ship sank.

It was decided that all was the fault of the Master that had not refused to sail with his not seaworthy ship. It was decided to hide the fact that the ship was not seaworthy for mutiple reasons and that insurances were not valid. It was further decided to defraud the underwriters and to bribe the judicial authorities, etc, etc. It is easy. It happens in Italy.

The IMO has therefore not seen any reason to improve the rules for safety at sea (SOLAS).

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Appendix 1 - No improved safety of passenger ships (August 2015)

The IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), 95th session, took place 3-12 June 2015, i.e. 3 and a half years after the Costa Concordia incidents January 2012.

Item 6 was about passenger ship safety.

Item 6.6 was about the SDC Sub-Committee (i) reviewing the conditions under which passenger ship watertight doors may be opened (sic) during navigation and (ii) preparing amendments to SOLAS regulation II-1/22 and MSC.1/Circ.1380;

The MSC 95 then approved the draft amendments to SOLAS regulation II-1/22 to clarify when watertight doors may be opened (sic) (!) during a voyage (applicable to all ships).

Hopefully these draft amendments will never be approved and included in SOLAS. Watertight doos are not permitted and, if fitted for any reasons, must be closed at sea.

The MSC 95 however approved Guidance for watertight doors on passenger ships which may be opened during navigation, which includes appendices, containing:

procedure for the determination of the impact of open watertight doors on passenger ship survivability (floatability assessment);

technical standards for watertight doors on passenger ships;

flowchart on Guidance for permitting watertight doors on passenger ships to remain (sic) open during navigation;

and illustration of application of the floatability assessment under hazardous conditions in the Guidance.

The writer managed to get a copy of this Guidance 18 January 2016. It is crystal clear that watertight doors are not permitted but, if fitted by any exemptions, must always be closed at sea and cannot be opened without permission from the bridge with a note in the log book, etc, etc.

Item 6.8 and 9 was about the capsizing of the passenger ship Costa Concordia 14 January 2012; the Committee (MSC 90, MSC 91, MSC 92 and MSC 93) has established a Working Group on Passenger Ship Safety, which has prepared the long-term action plan on passenger ship safety (MSC 93/WP.6/Rev.1, annex 3). Very little has been done!

A long-term suggestion is (4) Development of onboard damage stability system (MSC, SDC, MSC 93/6/7, paragraphs 19 and 20 (CLIA), MSC 93/WP.6/Rev.1 ). This concerns the integration of remote soundings, flooding detection system and draught reading systems which would improve the usability of the stability system.

Such a system was suggested by Heiwa Co via Sweden already after the M/S Estonia incident 28 September 1994 but was not accepted by the IMO then. Better late than never.

Also to be long-termed reviewed is (Table 2. item 1) the conditions under which passenger ship watertight doors may be opened during navigation and prepare amendments to SOLAS regulation II-1/22 and MSC.1/Circ.1380. But it is for new ships only. The goal should be to obviate the need to pass through watertight doors during the daily work and activities on board. Some draft amendments for existing ships were approved (see above).

It seems that the IMO does not understand that watertight doors are not permitted according SOLAS.

The conclusion is that the IMO June 2015 has done nothing to improve safety of passenger ship since the Costa Concordia capsize and sinking 14 January 2012.

Reason is that officially, according to IMO member Italy, the Costa Concordia was seaworthy and in perfect order at departure 13 January 2012 and that everything is just the fault of an incompetent Master (Francesco Schettino), which the IMO has adopted. Thus the IMO cannot learn anything from the incident.   

 

 

Appendix 2 - REPORT OF THE MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE ON ITS NINETY-SECOND SESSION Pages 27-32 June 2013 regarding M/S Costa Concordia - review by Anders Björkman - and what happened May 2014 on the ninety-third session. Nothing has been done at the MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE at its ninety-third session May 2014. By March 2015 passenger ship safety has not improved since January 2012! Media say nothing. (May 2014)

Below is a copy of pages 27-32 of the June 2013 report of the IMO/MSC 92nd session about M/S Costa Concordia incidents January 13-14, 2012. It describes the not very professional work at IMO to improve safety at sea after the M/S Costa Concordia incidents.

It is worthwhile to note:

  1. Only one incident is mentioned in the IMO/MSC report - the fatal capsizing of the M/S Costa Concordia in very shallow waters. There is no mention of an accidental contact prior to capsize and the sinking following the capsize that damaged the ship in contact with the rocky sea bed. Evidently the ship neither collided, nor grounded.
  2. There is therefore no mention of the causes of the accidental contact, e.g. badly trained crew, language problems, steering gear not working, faulty charts, etc.
  3. There is no mention that the ship's Voyage Data Recorder was not functioning.
  4. Regarding progressive flooding of watertight compartments due to a 36.5 meters structural damage it is not mentioned that only four compartments were partly flooded with the double bottom intact and that the ship was stable and upright and safe.
  5. Regarding the evacuation and abandon ship following the contact, it is not mentioned the lack of muster stations aboard and lack of trained crew to inform passengers about the purpose of a muster station and to escort passengers from muster stations to lifeboats and life rafts. All people just rushed to the embarcation deck #3 P+S and ... most got into lifeboats. Pure luck!
  6. The crew and staff aboard had no idea what to do in an emergency, e.g. tell passengers to gather at the muster stations, as it had never been trained or practised. The report fails to discuss the matter.
  7. Regarding life saving appliances it is not mentioned that three lifeboats and 60 life rafts were not launched due to lack of trained crew to launch them.
  8. The cause of the fatal capsize is not determined, i.e. progressive flooding of intact hull compartments reducing stability to zero.
  9. The cause of progressive flooding is not determined, i.e. 25 illegal, watertight doors aboard that apparently were not closed allowing water the spread.
  10. The illegal watertight doors and how to operate them (sic - they should have been permanently closed and not operated at all) are not mentioned at all!
  11. In view of above it is evident that the ship was not seaworthy. The IMO/MSC report does not consider lack of seaworthiness as the ultimate cause of 32 people getting killed.

Conclusions - the IMO/MSC work in respect of the M/S Costa Concordia incidents is very defective and does not contribute to improved safety at sea. One reason is the defective Italian incident report accusing the Master for everything and hiding the faults of the ship owner and the maritime authorities allowing a not seaworthy ship to operate.

Read the June 2013 report below:

6 PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY

BACKGROUND

6.1 The Committee recalled that MSC 90 had agreed that the fatal capsizing of the Costa Concordia had raised new challenges for the Organization that needed to be addressed expeditiously to ensure the safety of passengers at sea. In particular, it was agreed that a two-pronged approach should be taken, namely: consideration of short-term measures related to passenger ship operations and management; and development of a long-term action plan for the remaining work, which would be based on the Costa Concordia accident investigation report. 

6.2 The Committee noted the information provided in document MSC 92/6 (Secretariat) relating to the discussions and action taken on passenger ship safety at MSC 91. 

6.3 The Committee further recalled that MSC 91 had: 

.1 re-established its Working Group on Passenger Ship Safety and, having considered its report, approved draft amendments to SOLAS chapter III on emergency drills and updated the Recommended interim measures for passenger ship companies, which has been issued as MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.1; and 

.2 approved the Revised long-term action plan on passenger ship safety, as set out in annex 3 to document MSC 91/WP.8. 

COSTA CONCORDIA CASUALTY INVESTIGATION REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.4 The Committee considered document MSC 92/6/3 (Italy), providing the preliminary recommendations arising from the marine casualty investigation into the capsizing of the passenger ship Costa Concordia, together with documents MSC 92/INF.6 (Italy), informing that the casualty investigation report had been uploaded to GISIS, MSC 92/6/8 (IUMI) and MSC 92/6/10 (CLIA), both commenting on the preliminary recommendations.

6.5 In considering the above documents, the Committee noted the following views expressed during the discussion: 

.1 Due to the late availability of the official casualty report, Member States and international organizations had not had sufficient time to scrutinize the report in detail, and thus certain issues still needed to be clarified, which might require work to be conducted intersessionally before any comprehensive actions could be taken; 

.2 The background information supporting the preliminary recommendations in the casualty investigation report was difficult to find and the working group to be established should consider linking the various recommendations to the relevant parts of the report;

.3 Any proposed measures recommended by the working group to be established should be linked to the outcome of the casualty investigation report; their scope of application should be clearly established; and preparation of requisite justifications for any proposed new or expanded outputs should be in SMART terms;

 4 A formal safety assessment study may be needed to evaluate the effectiveness of any substantial recommended measures, particularly measures that could impact on all types of passenger ships;

.5 Some delegations expressed the view that there may be a need to consider preparing definitions for different types and sizes of passenger ships, while others pointed out that this issue had already been thoroughly discussed during the passenger ship safety initiative; and

.6 While some delegations felt that the principles of safe manning should be further reviewed, others pointed out that the principles had recently been revised with the adoption of resolution A.1047(27) together with the amendment of SOLAS regulation V/14, and that it was premature to conduct another review until experience is gained with the latest set of amendments, also noting that the ongoing revision to IMO model courses could be a better way to improve the situation than amending mandatory instruments. 

6.6 Having considered the above comments, the Committee decided to refer documents MSC 92/6/3, MSC 92/6/8, MSC 92/6/10 and MSC 92/INF.6 to the working group for detailed consideration. 

RECOMMENDATIONS EMANATING FROM THE CRUISE INDUSTRY OPERATIONAL SAFETY REVIEW

6.7 The Committee, having considered documents MSC 92/6/1 (CLIA) providing three new outputs from the Operational Safety Review and proposing to revise MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.1, and MSC 92/6/9 (CLIA) providing comments relating to the Costa Concordia incident, decided to refer the documents to the working group for consideration with a view to preparing revisions to MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.1, as appropriate.

6.8 The Committee, having considered document MSC 92/6/5 (ICS) providing information on a review on operational safety measures carried out by ICS members' passenger ship operating companies, including ro-ro passenger ships and high-speed craft, decided to refer the document to the working group for detailed consideration and advice. 

EVACUATION ANALYSIS 

6.9 The Committee considered document MSC 92/6/2 (Germany and Spain) expressing the view that simulation of evacuation procedures, including basic rules on how to carry out such simulation, should be made mandatory under SOLAS or the FSS Code, together with document MSC 92/6/4 (ITF and NI) providing comments on document MSC 92/6/2 and, having noted the views expressed during the discussion that: 

.1 consideration should be given to make simulation of evacuation procedures mandatory; 

.2 the outcome of the ongoing revision of related recommendations by the FP Sub-Committee (MSC.1/Circ.1238) should be taken into account in making the final decision to make it mandatory; and 

.3 there would always be the need for a well-trained crew to provide professional assistance during evacuations, 

agreed to refer the above documents to the working group for detailed consideration and advice. 

SURVIVABILITY OF PASSENGER SHIPS

6.10 The Committee considered documents MSC 92/6/6 (Austria et al.) providing information on the results of the studies on damage stability of ro-ro passenger ships and a goal-based damage stability research and demonstration project proposing a two-phase approach to review and improve the survivability of passenger ships after damage, and MSC 92/6/7 (United States) commenting on document MSC 92/6/6. 

6.11 During the ensuing discussion, the Committee noted the views of some delegations that a compelling need should be established before considering the expansion of ongoing work on damage stability, while others expressed the view that the FSA Experts Group should be instructed to consider the research project and advise the Committee. In this connection, the IFSMA observer made a statement, which is set out in annex 46. 

6.12 After a brief discussion, the Committee decided to refer documents MSC 92/6/6 and MSC 92/6/7 to the working group for detailed consideration and advice. 

RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY 

6.13 The Committee re-established the Working Group on Passenger Ship Safety and instructed it, taking into account comments and proposals made in plenary, to

.1 based on the preliminary recommendations (MSC 92/6/3) and the Costa Concordia casualty investigation report (MSC 92/INF.6) and taking into account documents MSC 92/6/8 and MSC 92/6/10, consider recommendation by recommendation:
.1 whether a sufficient link for the proposed recommendation can be found in the casualty report or more information is needed;

.2 for recommendations having such a link, consider any actions to be taken and advise on the possible scope of application and the way forward; and

.3 prepare relevant draft text for any recommendations on operational, management or other issues where immediate action is needed; 

.2 consider the latest recommendations from the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review (MSC 92/6/1 and MSC 92/6/9) and prepare revisions to MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.1, as appropriate, for approval by the Committee; 

.3 consider the outcome of the ICS Review of Operational Safety Measures to Enhance the Safety of Passenger Ships (MSC 92/6/5) and advise the Committee accordingly; 

.4 consider whether the voluntary guidance on evacuation analysis should be made mandatory, taking into account documents MSC 92/6/2, MSC 92/6/4. MSC 92/6/10 and MSC.1/Circ.1238, and advise the Committee accordingly; 

.5 consider the proposal related to survivability of passenger ships, taking into account documents MSC 92/6/6, MSC 92/6/7 and MSC 92/6/10, and advise the Committee accordingly;

.6 update the Revised long-term action plan on passenger ship safety (MSC 91/WP.8, annex 3), including the prioritization of the work to be undertaken (i.e. target completion dates for each task), taking into account the preliminary recommendations (MSC 92/6/3) and the Costa Concordia casualty investigation report (MSC 92/INF.6) and other documents submitted to the session, as appropriate; and 

.7 consider whether a correspondence group should be established and, if so, prepare draft terms of reference for consideration by the plenary. 

REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP 

6.14 Having considered the report of the working group (MSC 92/WP.8), the Committee approved it in general and took action as indicated below.

Costa Concordia casualty investigation report and recommendations 

6.15 The Committee, having noted that the group had considered at length the Costa Concordia casualty investigation report and the associated preliminary recommendations: 

.1 invited Italy to provide more technical information on penetration depth in support of the recommendation for a double-skin to protect watertight compartments (WTCs) containing equipment and the recommendation to consider relocation of the UHF radio switchboard above the bulkhead deck;

.2 expanded the planned output, 5.2.1.15, on Revision of SOLAS chapter II-1 subdivision and damage stability regulations to include consideration to limit the down-flooding points on the bulkhead deck for passenger ships (see also paragraph 23.20); 

.3 instructed the Correspondence Group on Casualty Analysis and the FSI (III) Sub-Committee to consider the Costa Concordia accident investigation report and advise MSC 93 accordingly; 

.4 invited Member Governments and international organizations to submit detailed comments and proposals to MSC 93 on the Costa Concordia official casualty investigation report (which is a joke); and 

.5 invited Italy to assist both the FSI (III) Sub-Committee and the MSC Working Group by providing further clarification and information, as appropriate, with regard to the Costa Concordia casualty investigation report. 

Recommendations emanating from the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review 

6.16 The Committee noted that the group had considered, in detail, the latest recommendations emanating from the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review (MSC 92/6/1 and MSC 92/6/9) and had agreed to include three additional guidance notes in the Recommended interim measures (MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.1) (see paragraph 6.24). In this connection, the Committee endorsed the view of the group that the role of shoreside management was critical to the proper development and functioning of an effective Safety Management System.

Operational safety measures to enhance the safety of passenger ships 

6.17 The Committee noted that the group, having considered in detail the review carried out by ICS passenger ship operating companies (MSC 92/6/5), had agreed to include four additional guidance notes in the Recommended interim measures (MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.1) (see paragraph 6.24). 

Evacuation analysis 

6.18 The Committee, having noted the group's consideration of documents MSC 92/6/2, MSC 92/6/4. MSC 92/6/10 and MSC.1/Circ.1238 related to evacuation analysis, agreed to instruct FP 57 (SDC 1)2 to consider the mandatory application of evacuation analysis to non-ro-ro passenger ships and advise MSC 93 accordingly. 

Survivability of passenger ships

6.19 In considering the group's recommendations related to the survivability of passenger ships, the Committee agreed to forward documents MSC 92/6/6 and MSC 92/6/7, together with the EMSA and GOALDS studies (SLF 55/INF.6, SLF 55/INF.7, SLF 55/INF.8 and SLF 55/INF.9), to SLF 56 (SDC 1) for consideration. In this regard, the Committee instructed SLF 56 (SDC 1) to examine the Phase 1 options that were technically justifiable for raising the Required Subdivision Index 'R' and to review other aspects deemed relevant to the issue, such as the length of the ship, number of persons on board and practical and operational aspects, taking into account actual economic factors, and advise MSC 93 accordingly. 

Re-establishment of the Experts Group on Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) 

6.20 In light of the above decision, the Committee re-established the experts Group on Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) and instructed it to review the EMSA and GOALDS studies, taking into account the risk models and calculated risk and the validity of the data and assumptions that were used and the revised FSA Guidelines (MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12), and advise MSC 93 accordingly (see also paragraph 23.28.10). The Committee noted that the report of the FSA Experts Group would be submitted to MSC 93 for consideration under the agenda item on Passenger Ship Safety. 

Revised long-term action plan on passenger ship safety 

6.21 Noting that the group had updated the Revised long-term action plan on passenger ship safety (MSC 92/WP.8, annex 2), the Committee agreed to bring forward the output on "Review of conditions under which passenger ship watertight doors may be opened during navigation and prepare amendments to SOLAS regulation II-1/22 and MSC.1/Circ.1380", for inclusion in the provisional agenda for SLF 56 (SDC 1) (see paragraph 23.17). 

6.22 In considering the updated revised long-term action plan on passenger ship safety, several views were expressed during the discussion, in particular that: 

.1 any action to be taken as a result of the Costa Concordia accident should be directly linked to the cause of the accident; (the useless Master??)

.2 the Costa Concordia accident had provided the opportunity to review and take appropriate action on SOLAS regulations and guidance material related to passenger ship safety issues, and therefore should not be restricted to issues emanating solely from the accident;

.3 the long-term action plan was not clear and should indicate the status of each action item; and

.4 actions related to existing outputs should be separated from those which could lead to new unplanned outputs, which should require a full justification in accordance with the Committees' Guidelines.

6.23 Having considered the above views, the Committee instructed the Secretariat, in consultation with the Chairman of the working group, to revise the long-term action plan (MSC 92/WP.8, annex 2) with a view to clearly identifying whether any proposed actions are related to existing outputs or are new outputs arising from the loss of the Costa Concordia, and reissue it as document MSC 92/WP.8/Rev.1. 

Recommended interim measures for passenger ship companies to enhance the safety of passenger ships

6.24 The Committee approved MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.2 on Recommended interim measures for passenger ship companies to enhance the safety of passenger ships. In this connection, the Committee noted the view of the group that, in the future, a decision will need to be taken regarding the final status of the above interim guidance. 

 

IMO has 2014 no info about its IMO Working Group on Passenger Ship Safety. We do not really know what it has done between MSC 92 June 2013 and MSC 93 May 2014.

The Danish Maritime Authority has however published a Summary of the 93rd session of the IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC 93):

MSC 93 was held in London from 14 to 23 May 2014 with Deputy Director-General of the Danish Maritime Authority Christian Breinholt as the Chairman of the Committee and with Captain Segar from Singapore as the Vice-Chairman.

In his opening address, Secretary-General Sekimizu pointed to several areas where the IMO should make a clear difference. ... Mr. Sekimizu established that he expected the IMO to be able to gain experience (sic??) from the COSTA CONCORDIA accident soon. ...

Among the interesting issues on the agenda were the following:

Passenger ship safety

As a consequence of the loss of COSTA CONCORDIA, the Committee established a working group to consider passenger ship safety. On the basis of both the specific accident and the experiences gained, the group was to identify the need for new safety-related initiatives.

On the basis hereof, the Committee determined a number of temporary measures that passenger ships are urged to follow, such as for example the location of lifejackets at the lifesaving appliances of the ship, improved route planning and restricted access to the ship’s navigation bridge during voyages.

The Committee also decided to consider the possibilities of making stricter the criteria for ship’s survivability following hull damage (damage stability), including the use of watertight doors during voyages. The need for double hulls in the engine room area and the possibilities of making the use of evacuation analyses mandatory were also to be considered. Furthermore, the Committee decided to look into the possibilities of making damage control plans more informative and user-friendly, while examining whether to lay down provisions on mandatory damage control drills.

Finally, the working group had identified a number of potential focus areas, where the member States are urged to submit proposals for new measures, for example on the location of vital marine equipment, the extent of the emergency power supply and the cooperation with local search and rescue authorities.

As the cause of the Costa Concordia capsize and sinking 14 January 2012 is still not established (apart from the Master being incompetent), it seems passenger ship safety has not improved at all since the M/S Costa Concordia incidents January 2012.

Passenger ships are still allowed to sail in a not seaworthy condition with open and illegal watertight doors and with insufficent crew to handle mustering, evacuation, abandon ship and launching of lifesaving appliances. No temporary measures have been taken about these matters.

The conclusion is that IMO Marine Safety Committee is not really doing its job 2012-2015. It is interesting to note that media do not react and report based on pertinent questions.

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